Karl Barth's Alexandrian Christology

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Summary

The purpose of the thesis is to demonstrate that Barth's christology is basically Alexandrian rather than Antiochian. To achieve this end, we examine Barth's doctrine of the divinity of Jesus Christ, his concept of the unity of the person of Christ, and his use of the name "Jesus Christ" and its variants. These three issues have been decisive in past debates between Alexandrian and Antiochian theologians, and Barth's treatment of them reveals the Alexandrian character of his thought.

We clarify our contention by distinguishing Alexandrian theology from Antiochian. According to the definitions we propose, these two theologies conceive the identity of Jesus Christ differently. For Antiochian thought, Jesus Christ is first of all a complete, human person who is distinct from God, although he performs a unique function in God's relation with all people. He is the man who is "also" divine. In Alexandrian thought, Jesus Christ is first of all the eternal Logos, the second "person" of the trinity who condescends to the creaturely realm and unites human nature to himself. He is the divine person who is "also" human.

These contrasting ideas of the identity of Christ

lead to different concepts of the divinity of Christ, the unity of his person, and the use of the name "Jesus Christ" and its variants. Barth, along with other Alexandrian theologians, understands the divinity of Christ as his inherent nature. In contrast, Antiochian theology denies that Jesus is inherently divine, although it admits that Jesus can be said to be divine because of his unique relation to God. In the strictest sense, however, divinity does not belong to Jesus but to the God who is present with him.

Second, Barth places himself in the Alexandrian tradition when he conceives of the unity of the person of Christ as a unity between the fully personal, divine Logos and the human nature of all men. Although this human nature is complete, it is not a person. On the other hand, Antiochian theology understands the personal unity of Jesus Christ as a unity between two persons, God and Jesus.

Third, Barth uses the name "Jesus Christ" and its variants in an Alexandrian manner to denote the one divine person. Although Barth relies on the connotations of the names to draw attention to particular aspects of Christ's being and action, he does not use them to denote a human person who is distinct from God. In Antiochian terminology, the two persons who are united through the incarnation are given different names. "Jesus" and similar terms can be used to denote the human person, while "Logos" or "Son" can be used to refer to the divine person.

In the first chapter we show that a determination of whether Barth is Alexandrian or Antiochian will make a valuable contribution to the contemporary discussion of Barth, for there is disagreement among Barth scholars on this question. To illustrate the differences between Alexandrian and Antiochian interpretations of Barth, we outline the views of John McIntyre and Claude Welch. Their discussions of Barth indicate that a thorough study of this issue should consider Barth's formulation of the divinity of Christ, the unity of the person of Christ, and the use of "Jesus Christ" and its variants.

In the second chapter we construct an Antiochian interpretation of Barth's christology. This interpretation revolves around the basic assumption that Barth understands Jesus Christ as a human person over against God. This view is supported by Barth's characterization of the human nature of the Logos. Since Barth assigns a will, personality, and self-consciousness to the human nature, Antiochian interpreters conclude that he means that it is a person. Similarly, Barth seems to place the man Jesus and his human nature in the same category with the Bible and proclamation, which he says become identical with the Word of God in the moment of revelation. This classification implies that Jesus is divine because of his participation in the revelatory event and therefore because of his relation to God, not his inherent nature. Further, in his development of the unity of the person of Christ, Barth emphasizes the concepts of fellowship and encounter, suggesting that the unity involved is between two persons, God and Jesus. In addition, in his discussions of revelation and reconciliation, Barth seems to substitute such terms as "Jesus" and "Son of Man" for the human nature of the Logos, intimating that the human nature has a personal name and is therefore a person.

In the third chapter we present the evidence for the Alexandrian interpretation of Barth's concept of the divinity of Christ and the unity of his person. We argue that Barth conceives of Jesus Christ as directly identical with God and thus divine by nature. Both in God's inner-trinitarian act and also in his existence as a man in time, Jesus Christ is the act, essence, and person of God. He is the trinitarian act which constitutes God's being, and therefore his divinity is God's divinity. This conclusion is mandated by Barth's development of the concept of Jesus Christ as the act of God, his account of the two moments in the divinity of Christ, his denial that the human nature of Christ has an independent existence, and his elaboration of the claim that God is the subject of Christ's human nature because he is its bearer.

In the fourth chapter we show that Barth uses "Jesus Christ" and its variants to denote God himself. In contrast to Antiochian thought, Barth uses terms which connote Jesus' humanity, such as "Jesus," to denote God himself. This fact is evident in Barth's discussion of the referent of the names; his explanation of the so-called propositiones personales, which affirm that the man Jesus is by nature divine; and his rejection of Ebionitism and Docetism, which use "Jesus" and similar terms to denote a human being distinct from God. We show that Barth relies on the connotations of the various names when he abstracts particular aspects of Christ's being and action. The principles of connotation and abstraction can account for those instances in which Barth appears to use names such as "Jesus" to denote a human being who is over against God.

In our last chapter we deal with some of the implications of Barth's Alexandrian thinking. We argue that a recognition of this character of his thought contributes to a proper understanding of other major aspects of his theology, such as his concept of revelation, his rejection of natural theology, and his doctrine of reconciliation. We suggest that Barth's christology guarantees the divinity of Christ and the unity of his person, but it minimizes the significance of Christ's humanity.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

Purpose

The principal purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that Barth's christology is predominantly Alexandrian rather than Antiochian in character. In order to achieve this goal, we shall focus upon Barth's treatment of the doctrine of the divinity of Jesus Christ, his understanding of the unity of the person of Christ, and his use of the name "Jesus Christ" and its variants. In these three areas Barth pursues a line of thought which is consistently Alexandrian.

These three issues merit attention because they have been decisive in past debates between Alexandrian and Antiochian thinkers and also because they are important topics of discussion in the contemporary assessment of Barth's theology. Consequently, concentrating upon them will enable us to portray in an efficient manner the sharp contrast between Alexandrian and Antiochian modes of thought and, at the same time, accentuate the relevance of our findings for current Barthian scholarship. In addition, these boundaries will allow us to delineate crucial elements in Barth's christology while freeing us from the necessity of explicating every detail.

In order to clarify what we mean when we say that Barth's christology is Alexandrian, it is necessary to characterize Alexandrian thought and show how it differs from Antiochian. While a more detailed account of these traditional ways of doing theology will be presented later,[1] our understanding of the basic distinctions between them can be offered here.

In our judgment, it is helpful to define Antiochian and Alexandrian christologies according to how they conceive the identity of Jesus Christ. For Antiochian thought, Jesus Christ is first of all an individual human being, a concrete person. Although he has a special relation to God and performs a unique role in God's plan for all men, he nevertheless does not become something other than a man. In Alexandrian theology, on the other hand, Jesus Christ is first of all the eternal Logos and Son of God, the second "person" of the trinity who condescends to the creaturely realm and unites human nature to himself. In Antiochian theology, Jesus Christ is the man who is "also" divine, while in Alexandrian thinking Jesus Christ is the divine person who is "also" human.

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[1] See pp. 38-58 below.

Given these diverse conceptions of who Jesus Christ is, the differences between these two theologies on the three issues before us can be readily discerned. First, Alexandrian theology understands the divinity of Jesus Christ as an inherent quality of his being. As the second "person" of the trinity, Jesus Christ is divine prior to and apart from his existence as a man. In contrast, Antiochian theology is willing to state that Jesus Christ is divine because of his unique relation to God. Because God is present in and through Jesus Christ in his redemptive act, and since Jesus Christ participates in this act, one may say that Jesus Christ is divine. However, in the strictest sense, this divinity does not belong to Jesus Christ but to the God who is present with him. Second, Alexandrian theology conceives of the unity of the one person of Jesus Christ as a unity between the fully personal divine Logos and the less-than-personal human nature of Jesus. That is, in Alexandrian thought the human nature which is related to God in the incarnation is not a complete individual person in its own right, although its human nature is complete. In opposition, Antiochian theology understands the personal unity of Jesus Christ as a union between two personal subjects, the divine person God in his second mode of being and the human person Jesus. Third, for Alexandrian thought the name "Jesus Christ" and its variants denote the one divine person, while in Antiochian thinking the language is more complicated. Since there are two personal beings united in one reality, "Jesus" or "Jesus of Nazareth" can be used to denote the man Jesus, and "Logos" or "Son" can be used to denote the divine person. The one reality of the union can be designated by the phrase "the incarnate Logos."

Now that the predominant features of these two modes of christological thinking are before us, the content of our claim about the Alexandrian character of Barth's theology can be stated more clearly. Our view is that Barth's doctrine of the deity of Jesus Christ is Alexandrian because Barth conceives of the deity of Christ as the act which constitutes his being. This conception of the identity of Christ's divine being with his act is developed by Barth in such a way that it gives theoretical justification for two important affirmations. The first is that Jesus Christ's deity is fully and completely his own deity; it is his inherent, active nature. This deity is not simply predicated of him although it does not strictly belong to him. The second is that the act of being of Jesus Christ is divine because it is completely and fully identical with the act and being of God himself. For Barth, there is no tension between the deity of Jesus Christ and the deity of God. The act of God is the divine being of God, and this act is Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ is the deity of God.[1]

Barth's understanding of the unity of Christ follows the Alexandrian pattern, although it incorporates significant Antiochian elements. The unity of Christ is presented as a unity of the eternal Logos with the human nature of all men. The specific human nature of the Lord is not, for Barth, a complete person in itself, although it is, in some sense, personal. It possesses its own will, soul, body, personality, and even its own self-consciousness, and it is related to the Logos in obedience and fellowship; yet it is, in the final analysis, less than a person. The person Jesus is the Logos, and this "is" is direct and emphatic.

Finally, Barth's christological language follows from and is consistent with his understanding of the deity of Christ and the unity of his person. "Jesus Christ" and its variants are used to denote the divine subject, the eternal Logos. While Barth uses "Jesus" and "Jesus of

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[1] We use the terms "divinity" and "deity" interchangeably. Barth uses a variety of terms for this concept: _Gottheit_, _Göttlichkeit_, _Gottsein_, _göttliches Wesen_, _göttliche Natur_.

Nazareth" to connote the divine Logos in his being and action as a man, these terms do not denote a human subject who is distinct from the divine subject. As we shall show, a recognition of the distinction between the denotation and the connotation of "Jesus Christ" and its variants clears up a lot of ambiguity in Barth's language.

In the remainder of this introduction, we wish to show, first, that a careful analysis of the issue of whether Barth is Alexandrian or Antiochian in his christology will make a needed contribution to contemporary Barthian scholarship. Concomitantly, a discussion of this topic will offer a valuable clarification of Barth's treatment of the divinity of Christ, the unity of his person, and the name "Jesus Christ." We shall illustrate the need for the analysis we propose by showing how two commentators interpret Barth differently in respect to these questions. Secondly, we shall indicate the method and order to be followed in our analysis.

Need

It may be asked, why focus upon the problem of whether Barth's christology is Alexandrian or Antiochian? Does this subject merit this much consideration? The answer to this question has several parts.

In the first place, the question of whether Jesus

Christ should be understood in Alexandrian or Antiochian terms is important not only because it is inherently interesting but also because of its systematic implications. The judgment that a theologian makes with respect to it will have a significant impact upon the way he develops other doctrines, such as justification and revelation. As a result, determining whether Barth's christology is Alexandrian or Antiochian will suggest a great deal about his theology as a whole.

The importance of this question is evidenced by the extensive attention that it has received in the history of Christian thought, particularly during the era of the Council of Chalcedon in the fifth century. Proponents of the various positions realized that they were at odds over matters of serious theological consequence which influenced the Christian gospel at its roots. Even today this issue has not been resolved or become outdated.

Secondly, in spite of the importance of this question, no thorough investigation has been devoted to Barth's treatment of it. Studies of Barth's christological thought have tended to concentrate upon other significant issues, such as the importance of the historical Jesus, the relation of christological method to historical thinking, christology and anthropology, christology and analogy, christology and revelation in relation to natural theology, christology and justification, and christology and pneumatology.[1] Some studies have dealt with problems which are directly related to the question of whether Barth's christology is Alexandrian or Antiochian, such as the unity of the person of Christ. However, they have spent much of their energy comparing the basic thrust of Barth's position with other viewpoints, rather than going into Barth's thought in depth.[2] As a result, a careful analysis of Barth's position is needed.

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[1] For an example of an important work in each of the seven areas mentioned above, see the following: Daniel Leo Migliore, "The Problem of the Historical Jesus in Karl Barth's Theology" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1964); Thomas W. Ogletree, Christian Faith and History: A Critical Comparison of Ernst Troeltsch and Karl Barth (New York: Abingdon Press, 1965); George Harry Kehm, "The Christological Foundation of Anthropology in the Thought of Karl Barth" (Th.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1966); Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, trans. John Drury (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971); Hans Wilhelm Frei, "The Doctrine of Revelation in the Thought of Karl Barth 1909-1922" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1956); Hans Küng, Justification: The Doctrine of Karl Barth and a Catholic Reflection, trans. Thomas Collins, Edmund E. Tolk, and David Granskou (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1964); and Joseph Elmer Hathaway, "The Structure of the Christian's Appropriation of the Grace of God in the Church Dogmatics of Karl Barth" (Th.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1969).

[2] For example, see Warren Frederick Groff, "The Unity of the Person of Christ in Contemporary Theology" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1954); and William Richard Barr, "The Enactment of the Person of Christ: The Relation of Conceptions of Christ's Person and Work in Some Twentieth Century Christological Discussions" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1969).

Thirdly, although insufficient attention has been given to Barth's stance on this question, this does not mean that the whole subject has been ignored. In fact, the attention which has been devoted to it indicates the need for further study. This is the case because there is a striking disagreement among Barth scholars as to whether Barth's christology is Alexandrian or Antiochian. Many investigators consider Barth a forthright defender of the Alexandrian way of doing christology. For example, Herbert Hartwell, Walter Günther, and Wolfhart Pannenberg hold this view.[1] On the other hand, the influential commentators Henri Bouillard and Regin Prenter believe that Barth stands firmly in the Antiochian tradition and that his position can be accurately described as Nestorian.[1] The existence of this disparity suggests that there are elements of both traditions in Barth's theology, yet the relationship between them remains unclear.

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[1] Walter Günther, Die Christologie Karl Barths (Mainz: Gutenberg Universität, 1954), p. 27, believes that Barth's acceptance of the concepts of enhypostasis and anhypostasis places him in the Cyrillian-Alexandrian tradition and accentuates his dependence upon Luther rather than Calvin.

Herbert Hartwell, The Theology of Karl Barth: An Introduction (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1964), pp. 185-86, states that Barth denies that the human nature of the Logos is a person.

Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968), p. 33, says that Barth is the foremost representative of Alexandrian thinking in modern Protestantism. Pannenberg bases this conclusion on the fact that Barth's theology begins "from above" rather than "from below."

Hathaway, pp. 115-16, argues that Barth's position is Cyrillian because it emphasizes that Jesus Christ is man rather than a man.

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[1] Henri Bouillard, Karl Barth: Parole de Dieu et Existence Humaine, 2 vols. (Aubier: Editions Montaigne, 1957), 1:122. Here Bouillard concludes that Barth is Nestorian because of the way he emphasizes the separation of the two natures.

Regin Prenter, in "Karl Barths Umbildung der traditionellen Zweinaturlehre in lutherischer Beleuchtung," Studia Theologica 11, Fasc. 1 (1957): 1-88, presents what is perhaps the most comprehensive defense available of the claim that Barth is Nestorian. Although Prenter does not explain thoroughly what he means by Nestorianism, it is clear that he thinks that Barth understands Jesus in the way that we have defined as Antiochian. According to Prenter, Barth thinks of Jesus as a human person, distinct from God. This is seen, Prenter thinks, in the way Barth depicts the concept of the unity of the two natures as the historical development of the covenant between God and man. The relation of the two natures is, first of all, a relation between two persons, Jesus and God. Then it is, secondarily, a relation between God and all other men as well. In this union, God and Jesus confront one another and have fellowship with one another. They are two partners in the covenant. The distinction between Jesus and God is also seen, Prenter argues, in the way Barth assigns the priestly function and humiliation to the divine nature, and the kingly function and exaltation to the human nature. It is God who reconciles, and man who is reconciled. See especially pp. 10-30.

Fred H. Klooster, The Significance of Barth's Theology: An Appraisal, with Special Reference to Election and Reconciliation (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1961), pp. 94-95, argues in a way that is similar to Prenter. Since Barth obliterates the distinction between the person and the work of Christ, and since he assigns humiliation to God and exaltation to man, it is impossible for him, in Klooster's view, to maintain a viable doctrine of the unity of the person of Christ. Consequently, Barth is guilty of a radical Nestorianism.

Barr also follows Prenter's arguments. He states that

Since there is definitely a need for an airing of this problem, it is surprising that the investigators who have explicitly dealt with it have not developed their views in more detail. Yet, they have not engaged in any significant debate with their opponents, nor have they discussed systematically either the evidence which supports their judgment or the implications which follow from it. In general, they have been content to assert their conclusion as though it were self-evident, without carefully examining the alternative. As a result, the grounds for each interpretation of Barth need to be clarified and

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the hypostatic union seems to be interpreted by Barth as a union of the "thou" of God with the "thou" of the man Jesus. See especially p. 337.

Groff chooses Barth as a representative of Antiochian theology in contrast to representatives of Alexandrian thinking. He argues that since Barth assigns a will and a personality to the human nature which God assumed in the incarnation, this human nature must be understood as an individual person in his own right. Although Jesus is a complete person, he only becomes so in his unity with God. Therefore, it is not proper, Groff argues, to criticize Barth as Nestorian, as though the two persons, Jesus and God, were related only in an external manner, by association. Since Jesus and God are related as "I" and "Thou," the love between them has ontological depth. See especially pp. 172, 209, 235-43.

Daniel Lee Deegan, "The Doctrine of the Person of Christ in the Theology of Karl Barth" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1958), also thinks that Barth falls principally in the Antiochian school. Like Groff, he relies upon the fact that the human nature of the hypostatic union has its own will. He adds that the human nature has its own proper activity in relation to God, and therefore it is an acting person. See especially pp. 75-81.

evaluated.

Fourthly, not only is there a need for an investigation of whether Barth is Alexandrian or Antiochian, there is also a need for a study of each one of the three subissues which we have mentioned, the deity of Jesus Christ, the unity of the person of Christ, and the use of the name "Jesus Christ" and its variants. Although these topics are inherently interesting and important, no thorough analysis of Barth's treatment of them is available. By examining these subjects within the context of the broader question of whether Barth is Alexandrian or Antiochian, we can show how they are related to each other and to the larger issue. Showing these relationships will make a valuable contribution to Barthian scholarship because the consistency of his treatment of these subjects is not always noted. For example, Hartwell thinks that Barth's treatment of the unity of the two natures is Alexandrian; yet he thinks that Barth's language about Jesus Christ is in tension with this view.[1] We shall attempt to demonstrate that Barth's language is also Alexandrian.

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[1] Hartwell, p. 185, states that Barth wants to stress the identity of the Son of God with Jesus Christ but that "the language used by him to that end is, theologically, open to question."

As we conclude this discussion of the ways in which this study will contribute to Barthian scholarship, perhaps we should mention the rather apparent point that our findings will also shed light on studies of Barth's thought which do not directly deal with the question of whether Barth is Alexandrian or Antiochian. Once the characteristics of Antiochian and Alexandrian interpretations of Barth are made clear, it will be possible to recognize them when they appear in studies of Barth, whether or not they are labeled as such.

In the preceding pages we have made three principal points. The first is that we shall argue that Barth's christology is Alexandrian. The second is that in order to substantiate our position we shall analyze Barth's doctrine of the deity of Jesus Christ, his concept of the unity of the person of Christ, and his use of the name "Jesus Christ" and its variants. The third is that Barth's theology and the secondary scholarship about it reflect a need for this investigation. In the next section we shall clarify the second of these points and give a concrete illustration of the third by examining briefly the conflicting interpretations of Barth presented by two influential theologians, John McIntyre and Claude Welch.

McIntyre and Welch

John McIntyre interprets Barth as an Antiochian theologian, while Claude Welch sees him as standing in the Alexandrian camp. By contrasting their views we can show in a straightforward manner both some of the basic characteristics of these two ways of understanding Barth and also some of the features of Barth's thinking which give rise to these two interpretations. At the same time, the close relationship between the deity of Christ, the unity of the person of Christ, the use of the name "Jesus" and its variants, and the question of whether Barth is Alexandrian or Antiochian will become apparent. In the commentaries of McIntyre and Welch, these issues arise directly from the text, and a discussion of any one of them leads inevitably to the others. This fact supports our proposal to show Barth's Alexandrianism by concentrating on his concept of the deity of Christ, the unity of the person of Christ, and the use of the name "Jesus Christ."

Neither McIntyre nor Welch concentrates primarily upon the question of whether Barth is Alexandrian or Antiochian. Welch does not mention this problem specifically, while McIntyre argues that Barth veers closely to Nestorianism but avoids its error. Their opinions come into explicit conflict not over Alexandrianism or Antiochianism but in regard to Barth's concept of revelation and its relation to the divinity of Christ. Both think that Barth attempts to demonstrate that the event of revelation entails the doctrine of the divinity of Jesus Christ. McIntyre concludes that Barth fails in this derivation, while Welch believes that Barth is successful.

The fact that Welch and McIntyre devote considerable attention to the concept of revelation helps substantiate our belief that whether Barth is Antiochian or Alexandrian is not simply a minor question, with implications that are restricted to christology in the narrow sense. On the contrary, the findings of these interpreters indicate that this question has direct significance for a proper understanding of Barth's treatment of revelation and also the doctrine of the trinity. Nor should we conclude that the relevance of this issue stops here.[1]

Although McIntyre and Welch do not self-consciously confront one another over the issue of Barth's Antiochianism or Alexandrianism, our hypothesis is that this is the primary difference between them. They understand the identity of Jesus Christ differently, and this leads to their opposite conclusions regarding the divinity of Christ, the unity of Christ, and the meaning of "Jesus Christ." For McIntyre, Jesus Christ is the human person who is the form of revelation and who as such, is distinct from God. Jesus Christ is the man through whom God reveals himself, not the God who reveals. For Welch, on the other hand, Jesus Christ is primarily the divine agent who reveals himself through the form. In Welch's view, Jesus Christ is not so much the medium as the revealer, although he is also the medium as well. When this principal contrast between McIntyre and Welch is grasped, then their other differences can be clearly perceived.

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[1] More attention will be given to the importance of Barth's Alexandrianism in Chapter V.

We shall look first at the interpretation of Barth presented by McIntyre. Since he raises serious objections to Barth's christology, we can bring the issues into focus more quickly by considering him first. After presenting the viewpoints of both McIntyre and Welch, we shall indicate specifically how they differ on the topics of the deity of Christ, the unity of the person of Christ, and the use of the name "Jesus Christ" and its variants.

McIntyre

McIntyre believes that Barth's attempt to derive the concept of the divinity of Jesus Christ from the fact of revelation is doomed to failure because the medium or form of revelation must be something or someone other than God.

God is not known directly, McIntyre argues. He reveals himself through forms which are creaturely and different from God himself. The fact that God reveals himself through the life of Jesus Christ does not lead us to conclude that Jesus Christ is divine. Jesus Christ is simply the instrument or medium of God's revelation, and therefore he must be different from God. If Jesus Christ is confessed as divine, says McIntyre, this confession must be based on some firmer foundation than simply the fact that he is the form through which God reveals himself.

According to McIntyre, revelation has a triadic structure. The three components of God's revelation are "God, the reality through which God reveals himself, and ourselves as recipients of revelation." By affirming the triadic structure of revelation, McIntyre denies that revelation is "a theophany, the naked appearance of God before us."[1] God always reveals himself through some form or medium which is known directly, but which is not God. This aspect of revelation, McIntyre explains, can be designated by the symbols Non-B reveals B to C.[2]

Any notion that the medium of revelation is identical with God himself is attacked by McIntyre as "quite close to impermissible nonsense."[1] Because the medium of revelation is known directly, there would be no revelation if the subject of revelation were identical with the medium. "For *ex hypothesi* the medium of revelation is known directly, and if the medium and the subject of revelation are identical and thus known directly, there is no occasion for revelation."[2]

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[1] John McIntyre, The Shape of Christology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), p. 154.

[2] Ibid. In this formula, B=God and C=the recipients of revelation.

The principle of the creaturely character of the medium of revelation is upheld in the understanding of revelation found in the New Testament, McIntyre believes. In the New Testament, the medium of revelation is "the ordinary human life of the man Jesus, as it would appear to the people of his day regardless of whether they believed in him or not, his life as it would be written down by a modern scientific historian."[3]

The creaturely character of the medium of revelation is also upheld by Barth, according to McIntyre. This fact is made clear in the later volumes of the Church Dogmatics,[1] particularly 4/2, where Barth claims that the medium of revelation is the human nature of Jesus Christ.[2] In this volume, McIntyre explains, Barth explicitly affirms that God reveals himself through the human nature, through the words and actions of the man Jesus of Nazareth. The human nature is described by Barth as the "organ" of God in his revealing action to man.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 169.

[2] Ibid., pp. 153-55. McIntyre draws upon A.A.M. Fairweather for support of his claim that the medium of revelation must be different from the revealer.

[3] Ibid., p. 150. The significance of the man Jesus as the revealer of God is best expressed in McIntyre's model number two, A(x) reveals B(A) to C(H.S.). This model can be translated as follows: the man Jesus (A), pointing beyond himself (x), reveals God (B) as he is present in Jesus (A) to man (C), through the aid of the Holy Spirit.

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[1] Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, vol. 1: The Doctrine of the Word of God, part 1, trans. G.T. Thomson, part 2, trans. G.T. Thomson and Harold Knight; vol. 2: The Doctrine of God, part 1, trans. T. H.L. Parker and others, part 2, trans. G.W. Bromiley and others; vol. 3: The Doctrine of Creation, part 1, trans. J.W. Edwards, O. Bussey, and Harold Knight, part 2, trans. Harold Knight and others, part 3, trans. G.W. Bromiley and R.J. Ehrlich, part 4, trans. A.T. Mackay and others; vol. 4: The Doctrine of Reconciliation, parts 1-4, trans. G.W. Bromiley; 4 vols. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936-69).

In the following pages, references to this work will use the letters CD accompanied by the number of the volume and part. The corresponding page(s) in the original Kirchliche Dogmatik will be stated in parentheses. For example, a reference to the first page of the work will be designated CD 1/1, p. 1 (KD, p. 1).

[2] McIntyre, p. 157. McIntyre thinks that Barth's statements about revelation in CD 1/1 are misleading and dangerous. There Barth speaks of the medium of revelation as "God as He is in Jesus Christ." This implies that God is both the medium and the subject of revelation, a notion which McIntyre finds nonsensical. It also leads to a neglect of the fact that revelation is based "upon a historical person, Jesus of Nazareth." Nevertheless, these statements by Barth about revelation, although dangerous, are not exactly false, for they presuppose the revelatory function of the man Jesus. McIntyre thinks that Barth's position in CD 4/2 is clearer and less confusing.

Although McIntyre does not say so unequivocally, it is evident that he thinks that Barth makes no conceptual distinction between the human nature which is the medium of revelation and the man Jesus of Nazareth. For McIntyre, when Barth states that the divine nature reveals itself through the human nature, this is equivalent to saying that God reveals himself through the man Jesus of Nazareth.[2] "Human nature" and "the man Jesus of Nazareth" appear to

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[1] Ibid., p. 160. "Within the framework of very strong assertions that no dualistic thinking must be allowed to divide the human from the divine, Barth[1] says quite clearly that 'the divine essence (nature) expresses and reveals itself wholly in the sphere of the human nature.' Also,[2] 'the saving act of God takes place in the man Jesus of Nazareth. The power and authority of God are revealed by him and to him, in his words and in his actions.' These quotations are definitely not against the run of play. Three times on earlier pages[3] Barth has spoken about the human essence of Jesus Christ being the organ of the nature or work of the Son as the Mediator."

The footnotes which McIntyre gives from Barth are as follows: "[1]Church Dogmatics (ET), IV/2, 1958. [sic] Cf. II/1, pp. 16f. [2]Op. cit., p. 99. [3]Namely, pp. 96ff." Note that no page number is given for the first reference.

[2] See the previous note, where McIntyre speaks of God acting in Jesus and of the divine nature revealing itself in the human nature. Later we shall show that Antiochian theologians tend to personify the human nature which is united with God in the incarnation.

McIntyre to be interchangeable terms in Barth's theology. For McIntyre, both these terms denote the man Jesus as he could and can be known through ordinary, empirical means.

This assumption of McIntyre is a crucial element in his criticism of Barth. Because he thinks that Barth identifies Jesus Christ with the human nature, he can conclude that the man Jesus is not divine. Barth clearly states that the human nature is not divinized by its participation in revelation.[1]

McIntyre's opinion that Barth identifies the human nature with the man Jesus is evidenced not only by the fact that he uses these terms synonymously but also by his belief that Barth is in danger of Nestorianism. Barth's speaking of the human nature of revelation as the "organ" of God, McIntyre notes, is "curiously reminiscent of the famous sentence attributed to Nestorius, 'Mary bore a man who was the organ of the Godhead.'" However, McIntyre thinks that Barth's position should not be called Nestorian because there are not in Barth's presentation "two complete persons present in exactly the same way at the same time."[2] If there were, then Barth would be Nestorian.

Barth avoids the charge of Nestorianism, McIntyre believes, because his stance is "rather different and much more subtle." Although the man Jesus is a person who is present to man in "the ordinary empirical and inspectible way," the divine person or the "divine nature is 'there' only as it reveals itself through the human nature." God and his divine nature are therefore present in the human nature "revelationally." The two natures and the two persons are related to each other "in terms of this quite peculiar and unique relation of revelation."[1] They are not present in the same manner at the same moment.[2]

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 100 (KD, p. 111), for example.

[2] McIntyre, p. 160.

McIntyre's argument against Barth is simple and direct. "For example, it has been argued that if it is true that Jesus Christ reveals God, then the deity of Christ is ipso facto demonstrated. But such a demonstration is not by itself valid."[3] On the contrary, as the medium of revelation, Jesus must be a creaturely reality, distinct from God.

For McIntyre, there is a clear distinction between the person Jesus Christ, who is the medium of revelation, and the person God, who reveals through revelation. God may reveal himself through any medium, such as a sunset or, more traditionally, the words of a preacher, but such an act does not make the medium divine. If the person Jesus is divine, the foundation of this divinity is not the event of revelation.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] McIntyre defines Nestorianism rather narrowly. In our view, if McIntyre's interpretation of Barth were correct, Barth would be Antiochian.

[3] Ibid., pp. 166-67.

Welch

In our consideration of Welch's interpretation of Barth, we shall deal with two principal points. The first has to do with the derivation of the doctrine of the trinity from revelation, and the second concerns the unity and diversity of God. These elements are related directly to the question of who Jesus Christ is.

In support of Barth, Welch argues that an analysis of the event of revelation requires the concepts of the divinity of God the Son, Jesus Christ, the divinity of God the Father, and the divinity of God the Holy Spirit. The deity of Jesus is established not in isolation but along with the doctrine of the trinity. As an element of the doctrine of the trinity, it is an immediate and analytical implication of revelation.

The event of revelation confronts us with three questions. We must ask "not only *who* is the self-revealing God, but also *how* this happens and *what* is the result." The answer to each of these questions is the same. We must say that "it is God who reveals himself, that he reveals himself through himself, and that he reveals himself."[1] The doctrine of the trinity is the answer to the question of whether or not there is a revelation. If there is a revelation, the doctrine of the trinity informs us who reveals, how he reveals, and what he reveals.

The manner of revelation is related closely to God's being as Son. God reveals himself by freely choosing to distinguish himself from himself. He becomes himself a second time in a second mode of existence. In his first mode of existence he is hidden from men, unavailable to them. In his second mode as Son he is revealed to man. He assumes a form and is made visible to man in that form. His lordship is his freedom to assume a form and to be God for man as well as God in himself.[2]

In his second mode of being, God is the same God who also remains in a first mode of being. He is both the one who remains hidden in himself as Father and also the one who becomes a man and exists in the creaturely world as the Son, Jesus Christ. This means that Jesus Christ is not merely the means or form of revelation. He is the one who reveals himself. "Christ reveals the Father our Lord, but in so doing is himself our Lord and reveals himself."[1] The work of revealing and reconciling is appropriated to the Son, not to the Father or the Holy Spirit. But since revealing and reconciling can be accomplished only by God, we must say that the subject of this activity, the Son Jesus Christ, is "identical with God in the full sense of the word."[2]

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[1] Claude Welch, In This Name: The Doctrine of the Trinity in Contemporary Theology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), pp. 163-64.

[2] Ibid., pp. 169-70.

Although God is three, his threeness is no threat to his oneness. Barth states that God is three modes of existence in one divine essence. It is the one essence which possesses subjectivity and personality; there are not three different agents in God. God's subjectivity is understood in analogy with human subjectivity. He is one actor who acts in his three modes of existence. The modern notion of personality, which denotes a 'self-conscious individuality' or a 'distinct center of consciousness' is applied to the one essence of God, not to his three modes of being.[3] God is the one true person.

This brief discussion of Welch's endorsement of Barth indicates that Welch thinks of Jesus Christ primarily as the Son of God, the divine subject who reveals himself.

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[1] Ibid., p. 174.

[2] Ibid., p. 175. Welch quotes from CD 1/1, pp. 469-70 (KD, p. 431).

[3] Ibid., pp. 182, 187, 191.

For Welch, "Jesus Christ" denotes not merely the human, creaturely form of revelation, but the incarnate Lord, the one who is both God and man. This Lord reveals through his flesh, but his flesh is not a separate person. That Welch thinks of Jesus Christ as the incarnate Lord and not simply as the medium of revelation is clear from the structure of his argument.

This structure can be described as follows. First, if God is truly known in revelation, he must be present to man. Second, if the one who is present to man is truly God, he must be of the same essence as the God who is the presupposition of revelation, the whence of revelation. The one who is known on earth must be of the same essence as the God who remains in heaven, veiled and hidden. Third, if the God who is known and present to man is truly God, then he must be God in a second mode of existence, different from his mode of existence as the whence of revelation. Fourth, this God who is known is God the Son. Finally, God the Son is Jesus Christ. Thus, Jesus Christ is one essence with the Father.

The question of the form or medium of revelation is basically irrelevant to the validity of this argument. Therefore, it is not important for Welch to emphasize that the medium must be some reality other than God. The argument states that the one who is present in revelation, and presumably in some form, must be God, if in fact God is revealed. This God who is present is Jesus Christ, whatever be the character of his form and the relation of his creatureliness to his divinity.[1]

Issues

This comparison of Welch and McIntyre provides concrete documentation that the issues of the deity of Jesus Christ, the unity of the person of Christ, the use of the name "Jesus Christ," and whether Barth is Alexandrian or Antiochian are inherently related to each other. Welch and McIntyre come to different conclusions about the validity of Barth's derivation of the idea of Christ's divinity from the fact of revelation, and in each case their conclusions are consistent with their understanding of Barth's position in regard to these other issues. We shall indicate more specifically how they interpret Barth differently on these issues, and these differences will indicate the problems we shall consider in our investigation.

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[1] Several other features of Welch's thought indicate that he thinks of Jesus Christ primarily as the incarnate Lord and not merely as the human person who is the medium of revelation. For example, the fact that the oneness of God is conceived as the oneness of a personal agent means that the Son who acts to reveal himself is the one agent God, not merely the human nature. Again, Welch speaks of Jesus Christ as the object of faith and the content of revelation, terms which he can apply just as readily to God. (For Jesus Christ as the object of faith and the content of revelation, see pp. 176, 223-24. For God as the same, see pp. 169, 178.) Welch also indicates that Jesus Christ is the second in God from eternity, and as such he is the "possibility" of revelation. See p. 183.

It is clear from what has been said above that McIntyre thinks of Jesus Christ as the purely human person who is separate and distinct from God. He can be known by empirical investigation as any other historical person is known. Because he is the human form of revelation, he must be other than God. Conversely, Welch thinks of Jesus Christ as the one who is fully identical with the Son of God and who, therefore, is of one essence with the Father. He is the same personal agent as the Father, although he exists in a different mode of being, a revealed mode instead of a hidden mode. Jesus Christ is the God who reveals, not merely the medium through which God reveals. It is because of this different understanding of the identity of Jesus Christ that we label McIntyre's interpretation Antiochian and Welch's Alexandrian.

These contrasting opinions of the identity are paralleled by different views of the referent of the name "Jesus Christ" and its variants. For McIntyre, "Jesus Christ" denotes the purely human person who is different from God.

For Welch, this name usually denotes the incarnate Lord, God in his second mode of being. For Welch, in so far as this name denotes a person, this person is God himself, not a human person who is united with God. However, Welch sometimes seems to speak as though these names can also denote the human form of revelation, and thus it is not clear whether these names might be used to name two persons, a man and God.[1] Whether or not Welch does use these names to denote two persons, it is clear that it is possible to "read" Barth's use of "Jesus Christ" and its variants in two distinct ways. This raises the question of whether Barth means for these names to denote the divine person or the human person. Or, perhaps, does Barth sometimes use these names to denote the human person and sometimes the divine person?

Given these views regarding the identity of Jesus Christ and the referent of the name "Jesus Christ," the difference between McIntyre and Welch on Barth's notion of the unity of the person of Christ is clear. McIntyre interprets the relation between the two natures of Christ as a relation between two persons, the person God and the human person Jesus, who is the form of revelation. This relation should not be understood as Nestorian he thinks, because the two persons are not present in exactly the same way at the same time. The person Jesus is present as are other persons, but God is present "revelationally." On the other hand, Welch's views, which are not spelled out in detail and are, therefore, somewhat obscure, seem to be that the unity of Christ is constituted by the relation between God the Son and his human nature. Although Welch does not explicitly deny that the human nature is a complete human person, the structure of his argument suggests that it is other than a person in itself. As the form of revelation, the human nature is not separate from Jesus Christ; it is an aspect of his being. Jesus Christ possesses a divine and a human nature, and as this one who is both divine and human he is both the revealer and the form of revelation. Jesus Christ is the God who is in himself a person and who, in becoming man, unites to his divine person and divine nature a human nature which is not an independent person.

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[1] Welch, p. 222. Here Welch seems to use these names to denote the human person as well as the divine agent. He says that the trinity affirms three different "him's," the "him who stands above and apart as the one to whom Jesus points . . . ; him who confronts man in Jesus Christ . . . ; and him who seizes and possesses man." In the second phrase, the "him" seems to denote the divine agent, while "Jesus Christ" appears to refer to the creaturely medium of revelation. See also p. 184 where Jesus Christ is explicitly called the form of revelation in which God acts.

If this understanding of Welch is correct, it seems that Barth's doctrine is susceptible to two different interpretations in regard to the unity of Christ. Our investigation will attempt to determine which one is the more accurate.

Finally, we come to the concept of the divinity of Christ. Apparently McIntyre and Welch disagree not only about whether Barth provides a valid justification for the divinity of Christ, but also about what the concept of the divinity of Christ entails. While McIntyre does not carefully define this concept, it is clear that he thinks Barth attributes divinity to the man Jesus Christ because he is the form of revelation. This implies that he thinks that Barth defines the divinity of Christ as his capacity to reveal the Father, who is other than himself. Although McIntyre doesn't mention them, there are some statements in Barth which convey that impression.[1] On the other hand, Welch states that Jesus Christ is divine because he is of one essence with the Father and the Holy Spirit.[2] On the surface these two notions appear to be distinctly different. In the latter case, Jesus Christ is divine because he possesses the inherent quality of divinity. This notion of divinity is consistent with the idea that Jesus Christ is an agent who reveals himself through a form. In the former case, divinity is associated with a role or function rather than with an intrinsic quality. This concept of divinity would seem to be applicable to any creaturely form through which God reveals himself.

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[1] See, for example, CD 1/1, p. 443 (KD, p. 406), where Barth defines Jesus' divinity as his capacity to reveal and represent the Father.

[2] Welch is also aware that Barth defines the divinity of Jesus as his capacity to reveal the Father. How this concept of divinity is related to a concept of divinity as essence is unclear.

These contrasting interpretations of Barth suggest that there are diverse elements in his concept of the divinity of Christ. How these elements are related should be clarified.

Method and Order

In this study we shall focus upon Barth's mature christology as it is found in Church Dogmatics. This major theological work has been the principal source of both Antiochian and Alexandrian interpreters of Barth, and analyzing the evidence found here for both these ways of understanding Barth is a significant undertaking in itself. In addition, the Church Dogmatics is generally recognized as "the clearest and most reliable guide to the substance and development of his [Barth's] thought."[1] While occasional references will be made to other works of Barth, the principal purpose in such references will be to illustrate the teachings of the Church Dogmatics, not to provide either a synthesis of all of Barth's writing on these issues or a survey of the historical development of his thinking.

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[1] Paul Lehmann, "Changing Course of a Corrective Theology," Theology Today 13 (October 1956):332.

The principal purpose of our next chapter is to show that a persuasive argument can be made for the claim that Barth's christology is primarily Antiochian rather than Alexandrian. We shall begin by discussing the characteristics of Antiochian and Alexandrian christologies, and then we shall construct an Antiochian interpretation of Barth's doctrine of the divinity of Jesus Christ, his concept of the unity of the person of Christ, and his use of the name "Jesus Christ" and its variants. This procedure will demonstrate that there is a considerable amount of data which supports this interpretation of Barth, and that it is not limited to just one or two of the three issues under consideration.

In the third chapter we shall begin our response to this serious challenge by contending that Barth's doctrines of the divinity of Jesus Christ and the unity of his person are predominantly Alexandrian. Although there are important Antiochian elements present, they fit within an Alexandrian framework.

In the fourth chapter we shall carry our defense of the Alexandrian character of Barth's theology into the area of christological language. First, we shall consider some relevant aspects of Barth's theory of language about Christ, and then we shall look at the ways that he uses "Jesus Christ" and its variants. We shall argue that the major principles which govern Barth's language reveal its Alexandrian nature.

In our discussion of both the Alexandrian and Antiochian interpretations of Barth, we consider the doctrines before the language. This should not be understood to mean that Barth's use of "Jesus Christ" contributes less than his doctrine to an investigation of the question of whether he is Alexandrian or Antiochian. In our judgment, there is a dialectical relationship between Barth's language and his doctrine of Christ. It does not appear possible to come to an educated conclusion about the character of Barth's doctrine without making some important assumptions about the meaning of his language. The reverse is also the case. It is not possible to analyze and understand Barth's use of "Jesus" and its variants without coming to some conclusions about his understanding of Christ. Individual statements about Jesus can be understood in different ways if they are taken in isolation from the whole configuration of Barth's thought. Thus, one cannot proceed in a linear fashion from the doctrine to the language or from the language to the doctrine. One must make a judgment, or have a flash of insight, about both at once. As a result, what we say about the doctrine of the divinity of Christ and the unity of his person in each of the two possible interpretations of Barth depends upon what we say about the way each understands Barth's language. It would have been possible to start with the language rather than the doctrine. However, because one needs to refer to the doctrines in order to explain the language, beginning with the doctrines seems to promote greater clarity than the reverse order.

In our last chapter we shall deal with the significance of Barth's Alexandrian christology. At the outset we shall show that a recognition of the Alexandrian character of this christology assists in a proper understanding of Barth's theology as a whole. Although it is not possible for us to show the implications of Barth's Alexandrianism for all his doctrines, we can indicate, for example, its relevance for his treatment of revelation. We shall also deal here with the strengths and liabilities of Barth's christology. His position possesses some of the assets which have contributed to the success of Alexandrian theology through the centuries. For example, the absolute divinity of Christ and his uniqueness are accentuated in Barth's dogmatics. On the other hand, it must be asked whether the humanity of Christ is given due emphasis.

CHAPTER II

An Antiochian Interpretation of Barth's Christology

Introduction

In this chapter our principal purpose is to construct an Antiochian interpretation of Barth's christology. While other commentators have pointed out particular aspects of Barth's thought which they think are Antiochian, no attempt has previously been made to develop these isolated observations into a systematic picture. Once a coherent presentation of an Antiochian interpretation is before us, it will be possible both to see more specifically what elements in Barth support it and also to make a judgment about its reliability.

Our hypothesis is that an Antiochian interpretation of Barth revolves around the basic assumption that Barth understands Jesus Christ as a complete human person who is distinct from the person God. Perhaps the single item of evidence which gives the most justification for this conclusion is Barth's characterization of the specimen of human nature which the eternal Logos assumed in the incarnation. According to the Antiochian view, Barth ascribes to this human nature a will, personality, and self-consciousness, in addition to a mind, soul, and body. Consequently, the Antiochian interpretation concludes that this human nature is itself a person. How, this position asks, could a human nature which has a will, personality, and self-consciousness be less than a complete individual person?

We shall begin this chapter by discussing the major differences between the Alexandrian and Antiochian schools of theological thinking. Our goal here is to augment the bare outline we presented in the introduction by filling in more of the details. At the same time, we shall indicate that our characterizations of these two theologies are grounded in the history of doctrine; they are not simply ideal constructions. Having more details of these two theologies before us will enable us to perceive more readily the Antiochian and Alexandrian elements in Barth's work. Once this foundation has been established, we shall turn to the major task of the chapter, the construction of the Antiochian theology which can be seen in Barth.

The Alexandrian and Antiochian Traditions

We re-emphasize that our characterizations of the Alexandrian and Antiochian perspectives are offered as definitions. It is not our purpose to give a detailed account of the historical debates between thinkers of these two schools, nor shall we attempt to refute those whose judgment concerning the basic features of these schools is different from ours.[1] To do so would require an in depth study of the involved terminology and arguments of leading representatives of each school, such as Cyril of Alexandria, who was the foremost defender of Alexandrian thought, and Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius, who were proponents of the Antiochian position. Such a procedure would take us far afield from the main object before us. Nevertheless, we believe that our characterizations are historically as well as theoretically valid, and we shall give brief documentation for them.

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[1] Several reputable scholars argue that Antiochian theologians did not conceive of the reality related to God in the incarnation as a complete human person, but as a human nature which was less than a person. These interpreters tend to think of the differences between the two schools of thinkers as being primarily matters of terminology and emphasis. For example, J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines*, 2d ed. (New York: Harper & Bros., Publishers, 1958), p. 317, states that Nestorius did not conceive of the human nature as a distinct person. R.V. Sellers in his two works, *Two Ancient* Christologies (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1940) and *The Council of Chalcedon* (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1953) stresses that these two theologies are in agreement on the basic questions. For a survey of the scholarship, see Richard A. Norris, *Manhood and Christ, A Study in the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 246-61.

Our discussion of the Alexandrian and Antiochian christologies will be organized under the headings of the three principal issues we have mentioned previously. Since the question of the unity of the person of Christ has occupied the center of the stage in the classical debates between Alexandrian and Antiochian theologians, it is fitting to begin with it. Then we shall turn to the doctrine of the divinity of Jesus Christ and the use of the name "Jesus Christ."

The Unity of the Person of Jesus Christ

The way a theology conceives the unity of the person of Christ is substantially determined by the way it understands the identity of Jesus Christ. In fact, in one sense of the meaning of the concept of unity, the unity of the person of Christ is presupposed before the question of the relation of the two natures arises. In Antiochian thinking, Jesus Christ is a single, unified, human person apart from his relation to God and the divine nature. In Alexandrian thinking, Jesus Christ is the eternal Logos who already possesses his unity before he becomes related to the human nature in the incarnation. Pittenger describes these two ways of conceiving the oneness of the person Jesus Christ in these words:

> One group of Christians has tended to say that this person is God living and acting humanly. Another has tended to say that this person is the Man in whom God lives and acts. The difference between the two ways of phrasing the fact which Christians have encountered has led to almost interminable theological argument, which has been as little enlightening as it has been little edifying. Each Christian, even today, will prefer one or the other way of phrasing the fact. But at least the fact is constant. We may say that the former style is more Alexandrine or Cyrillian, the latter more Antiochene or Nestorian (or better, more like the thought of Theodore of Mopsuestia); and we may believe that there will always be some who are of the former way of thinking and some who are of the latter.[1]

The issue of the unity of the person of Christ is not, however, reducible to the question of who Jesus Christ is. It also involves the way the "two" in the God-man are united. Consistently with its view that Jesus is essentially and primarily a human person, Antiochian theology has tended to conceive the relation between the divinity and the humanity as a unity between two persons, God the Word and the man Jesus. On the other hand, in Alexandrian theology, the human reality which is related to the eternal Logos is not, in itself, fully and completely a man. It is a human nature, something other than an individual man. Of course, for the

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[1] W. Norman Pittenger, The Word Incarnate (New York: Harper & Bros., Publishers, 1959), pp. 12-13. Pittenger makes it clear that he prefers the Antiochian view.

Alexandrian view, there is a man Jesus; but this man is the Word himself, the Word who became man when he united himself with human nature. In order to point out in a graphic way the contrast between these two conceptions of the unity of the person, some interpreters have used the symbol "Word-flesh" or "Person-nature" for the Alexandrian position and "Word-man" for the Antiochian.[1]

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[1] For example, Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition from the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451) (London: A.R. Mowbray & Co., 1965) and Kelly use the terms "Word-flesh" and "Word-man" to indicate the Alexandrian and Antiochian theologies respectively. Kelly points out, however, that they must be used with care because they can be misleading (p. 281). The term "Word-flesh" is more appropriate, he thinks, for the thought of Origen and Apollinarius than it is for Cyril. This is the case because Origen and Apollinarius held that what was united to the Word was flesh, not a complete human nature. Apollinarius, as is well known, argued that the flesh had no human soul or mind, while Cyril thought that the human nature involved in the incarnation had its own soul and mind (Kelly, pp. 289-95, 317).

Since Cyril and his modern defenders (for example, see Herbert Maurice Relton, A Study in Christology: The Problem of the Relation of the Two Natures in the Person of Christ, with a preface by Arthur C. Headlam [New York: Macmillan Co., 1934]) conceive the human nature as complete, perhaps the terms "Word-nature" or "Person-nature" are more appropriate for the Alexandrian position than "Word-flesh." "Person-nature" is used by Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, trans. with an Introduction by Cornelius Ernst, 6 vols. (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961-67) 1:149-200. In this formula, "Person" designates the divine person, the Word. Throughout his discussion, Rahner makes it clear that he thinks that the Chalcedonian solution affirmed a relation between the divine Word and a human nature. He understands this human nature to be something other than an individual person.

In the Alexandrian framework, because the divine Logos is already a whole person and the human nature which he assumes is not a person, it is clear that the Logos is the dominant factor in the union. The human nature is not so free and independent as to be able to act on its own. It simply follows the will of the Logos, as a man's hand follows his commands. As a result, the actions of the man Jesus, his speaking and healing, and even his sleeping and eating, are actions of God himself, the Logos, in his unity with human nature. Because God is the agent, he is able to redeem man, and it is possible to attribute salvation to Jesus Christ and to worship him. If Jesus Christ were simply a man in whom God was present, he would be unable to accomplish salvation for us, and it would be improper to worship him.[1]

For Antiochian thought, on the other hand, the man Jesus is related to God through divine "good pleasure" and his own faithful response. The man Jesus is indwelt by God the Word, and the relation between the two is one of fellowship and harmony. Through God's guidance and protection, Jesus' will was at one with God's will for him, and he was completely obedient. The relation between the two is not a mixture but a "conjunction," and it is permanent and indivisible. Nevertheless, in this unity Jesus Christ remains a man. He is capable of all the actions and feelings common to all human beings. He was hungry, he was tempted, he suffered, but he was unique in that he did not sin.[1]

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[1] For brief summaries of Alexandrian Christology, particularly as it is elaborated by Cyril of Alexandria, see Kelly, pp. 317-43, and Grillmeier, pp. 400-417. For a more thorough study of Cyril, and a comprehensive bibliography, see Robert L. Wilken, Judaism and the Early Christian Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 201-21.

Given these basic features of the two schools on this issue, it is easy to understand the criticisms they have leveled at each other. Alexandrian theology has historically been accused of mitigating the significance of the humanity of Christ, and Antiochian christology has been accused of slighting his oneness. In the first case, since the agent who acts through the divine and human natures is the eternal Word of God, there is no corresponding, purely human agent who acts through the human nature. The human agent, critics claim, is "swallowed up" into the divine agent. In the second case, since the Antiochians affirm that there are two subjects and agents in Christ, it is difficult to see how these two persons can be one person. As a result, Antiochians have been accused of professing two Sons or two Christs.[1]

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[1] For brief summaries of the Antiochian Christology, see Kelly, pp. 301-17, and Grillmeier, pp. 338-88.

In our interpretation of the basic characteristics of Antiochian thought we have relied heavily on the work of Norris and Pittenger. Both of these sympathetic commentators upon Antiochian theology argue that it is characterized by an emphasis upon the separate individuality of Jesus the man in his unity with God the Word. Norris says that Theodore understands the two natures as two agents in a single work, p. 196. See also, pp. 199-201.

One of the main reasons why the Alexandrians thought that their opponents divided Christ into two was the Antiochian insistence that there were two hypostases and two natures after the union. Since both of these terms could be understood to mean a concrete existing individual, Cyril preferred to say that there was one hypostasis and one nature after the union. This claim indicates the close relation of Cyril's thought to his predecessor Apollinarius and his successor Eutyches.[2]

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[1] Pannenberg, pp. 286-87, states that christologies which affirm that the two realities united in the one Jesus Christ are complete in themselves encounter insoluble difficulties. Two whole beings cannot come together to form a complete whole. As a result christologies have "either combined the two natures to form a third or split the two natures and oriented the concrete picture exclusively to one or the other."

[2] For example, in his famous third letter to Nestorius, Cyril stated that "All the terms used in the Gospels are to be referred to one Person, the one incarnate hypostasis of the Word." This proposition is recorded in Edward Rochie Hardy and Cyril C. Richardson, eds., Christology of the Later Fathers, Library of Christian Classics, vol. 3 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954), p. 352. The editors also comment that Cyril was just as willing to speak of one nature after the union. He used the phrase "one nature of the Incarnate Word." This wording originated with Apollinarius and was later emphasized by Eutyches. It became a Monophysite slogan. (See Hardy and Richardson, p. 352, and Kelly, pp.

The Antiochians used the term prosopon to refer to the unity of the Logos and the man Jesus Christ. This term was flexible enough to allow for the relative independence of the man and God. As Sullivan has shown, Theodore of Mopsuestia used prosopon in his scriptural exegesis to indicate the subject of whom or to whom a psalm is spoken. This subject might be an individual, a group, or even a multitude. In the same way, Jesus and God constitute one grammatical subject of whom we may say whatever pertains to each of them, although they are not one person in the usual sense of "person."[1]

319, 330-34.)

The commitment to the claim of one nature or one hypostasis is present in Cyril's fifth anathema. He said: "If anyone dares to say that Christ was a God-bearing man, and not rather God in truth, being by nature one Son, inasmuch as the Word became flesh, and is made partaker of blood and flesh precisely like us, let him be anathema."

Nestorius took up the challenge on this point, producing his counter anathema. "If anyone dares to say that after the taking of manhood, the Son of God is one by nature, when he is also Emmanuel, let him be anathema." For this interchange between Nestorius and Cyril, see Hardy and Richardson, p. 353.

[1] Francis Aloysius Sullivan, The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Analecta Gregoriana, vol. 82 (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1956), p. 263. Another implication of the term prosopon, when it was used by the Antiochians in reference to the unity of the two natures, had to do with the external form or appearance of a thing. Thus, since God is invisible, the prosopon of the God-man would appear as that of a man, although God was present in a unique way. See Kelly, p. 313.

Prosopon could also be used by the Antiochians in

The Antiochians' response to the accusation that they were professing two Christs did not disavow that the man Jesus and the Logos were two active subjects in one *prosopon*. Theodore, for example, said that there were not two Sons here because the two were not members of the same class; one of the two is God by nature and the other is man by nature. The Logos is the Son by nature, and the man Jesus participates in his sonship. Because of his relation to the Logos, it is proper to say that Jesus is the Son, but it must be recognized that he is the Son only by grace, not by nature.[1]

Another basis for the Alexandrian objection that the Antiochians divided Jesus Christ into two Sons was the Antiochian use of the term "conjunction" in reference to the unity of the two natures. Nestorius was willing to use the term "union," but he preferred "conjunction" since it avoided the idea that the two natures were united as in a mixture. Although Nestorius described this conjunction as perfect,

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much the same sense as *hypostasis*, to indicate an existing being. For example, an individual human person could be properly designated as an *hypostasis* and also as a *prosopon*. Using the term in this way, Antiochians such as Theodore and Nestorius said that the human nature united to the divinity had its own *hypostasis* and its own *prosopon*. In the same way, it was proper to speak of the divine nature as an *hypostasis* and a *prosopon*. Thus, the unity of the two natures was a unity of two *hypostases* and two *prosopa*.

[1] Norris, pp. 212-13.

exact, and continuous,[1] it still seemed to the Alexandrians to be merely a moral union of two wills. Consequently, they argued that in the Antiochian view the union was merely an association, an external and accidental union. Jesus became simply an organ or instrument through which God acted. In contrast, the Alexandrians claimed that the union was a natural reality; it was internal and permanent. To emphasize that the union was not merely artificial, Cyril stated that it was "hypostatic" and "natural." He preferred the analogy of the soul and body of a person, for it seemed to him to underscore the unity and preclude any suggestion of a mechanical connection.[2]

The Antiochian view of the unity of the man Jesus with the Logos understandably provided the occasion for the Alexandrians to claim that the Antiochians thought of Christ merely as an ordinary man who was indwelt by God. Consequently, the Alexandrians continued, the uniqueness of Christ is threatened. He was no different, in fact, from the saints and the prophets who were indwelt by the Spirit of God. If he were such an ordinary man, asks Cyril, how could it be said that he was the savior? Only the uncommon man, the second Adam, could conquer death and redeem man.[1]

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[1] Kelly, p. 314.

[2] Ibid., pp. 314, 320-21.

Theodore anticipated this criticism, along with the possible charge that he was guilty of adoptionism. In response, he attempted to clarify the uniqueness of Jesus' relation to God. While God may indwell the saints and prophets, assisting them through his will and working together with them, his dwelling in Christ is unique in that it takes place "as in a Son."[2] This means that the Logos, because of his good pleasure, voluntarily united himself with Jesus from the moment of his formation in the womb. This union preceded the obedience of Jesus as a man and provided a basis for it, while in other cases, God's good pleasure and consequent indwelling accompany obedience. Thus, it is not proper to overlook the uniqueness of God's relationship to Jesus Christ, nor can it be said that the union is constituted by moral harmony. The moral harmony of the two wills is the result of the union of God with Jesus which precedes it and makes it possible. For the Antiochians, the union is not common, external, or accidental.[1]

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[1] Wilken, pp. 216-17. "To Cyril's way of thinking, the chief difficulty with Nestorius' view of Christ was that it could not account for the uniqueness of Christ. Nestorius could not show why this one man overcame death when others did not. If Christ were an ordinary man linked to God, he would hardly be unique. He would have been like other great men--Abraham, Moses, the prophets--who were incapable of meeting the challenge of death. The typology of the second Adam establishes that Christ is the unique and extraordinary man, because he has come from heaven. He is God's Son. In the controversy with Nestorius Cyril returns to this point over and over again. Nestorius' Christology does not explain the redemption of mankind, nor does it take into account the biblical data concerning Christ."

[2] Norris, p. 221.

It is clear, then, that the Antiochians and the Alexandrians conceive the unity of the person of Christ differently. The latter emphasize the oneness, while the former stress the duality. Each side attempts to deal adequately with the opposite emphasis.

The Divinity of Jesus Christ

It is apparent that Alexandrian thought emphasizes the divinity of Jesus Christ while the Antiochian stance is more concerned with his humanity. The principal problem for the Alexandrian position is how to give proper consideration to Jesus' humanity. In contrast, the major problem for the Antiochian system is how to account for Christ's divinity.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 219-27. The following comment, from p. 222, is especially instructive: "First, then, Theodore simply asserts that in the case of Christ, the indwelling is a union of the Word and the Man. *He does not allude to the idea of 'co-operation' as in any sense constitutive of this union*. What is to the fore here is not any mutual or reciprocal action of God and the Man, but simply the action of the divine Son, who himself, by the disposition of his will, unites the human nature to himself. It is this fact which, as Theodore sees it, distinguishes the divine indwelling in Christ from other instances of his indwelling. The union is logically prior both to the prosopic unity which it effects, and to the sort of co-operation to which, as we have seen, Theodore alludes in other passages."

These different emphases are reflected in the grounds upon which divinity is attributed to Jesus Christ in these two schools of thought. In our view, the contrast between the two can be characterized by saying that in Alexandrian thought divinity is a "real" predicate of Jesus Christ. He is intrinsically and inherently divine, divine by nature. On the other hand, for the Antiochian view, divinity is attributed to Jesus Christ because of his relation to the Logos. Although his nature is human and not divine, the predicate of divinity is "lent" to him; it is his by association.

For Alexandrian thinking, Jesus Christ is fully identical with the Word and Son of God. He is the "second" of the trinity, and therefore he is of the same essence as the Father and the Holy Spirit. As a result, he is divine as they are divine. He becomes flesh and participates in human existence, but this involvement does not mitigate his divinity in any way. He is not changed into a creature. He simply adds human nature with all its qualities and capabilities to his divine nature, and his divine nature maintains complete control of his human nature. The appearance of Jesus Christ in human form as a man is simply a second stage in his divine existence.[1]

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[1] Kelly, pp. 317-23, especially pp. 319-21.

The logic of the Antiochian view of the divinity of Jesus Christ is expressed admirably by Theodore of Mopsuestia. Theodore makes a distinction between what can be predicated to Jesus Christ "by nature" and what can be predicated of him "by relation."[1] By nature, Jesus Christ is a man who enjoys a unique relation to God and a special place in God's plan for all men. In this relation, he does not become divinized, nor does he become God himself. Yet, because of God's continual presence and action in and through him, it is correct to say that he is divine. In explanation of this basis for maintaining the divinity of Christ, Theodore often speaks of the honor which the man Jesus shares with God because the Logos dwells in him.[2]

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[1] Not all Antiochian theologians accepted Theodore's view of the two types of predication. Some of them held that the only proper predication is based upon the nature of the subject involved. Thus, only that which belongs to the Word "by nature" can be attributed to him, and only that which belongs to the man Jesus "by nature" can be attributed to him. Wilken, pp. 205-9, discusses this position. His comments about Eustathius are particularly instructive, p. 206. "Take the case of Eustathius of Antioch. He . . . did not think it was possible to distinguish two types of predication. What is predicated of the Logos is predicated kata physin. If this were so, then predicates such as passibility, hunger, thirst, etc. would limit the deity and make him something less than God. The Arians would be correct: the son is not God. Eustathius answered that the 'Word' is not the subject of the human actions or sufferings of Christ. Passages in the Scriptures which speak of Jesus' suffering must not be attributed to the Logos, either by nature or according to the flesh; they must be ascribed to the man Jesus. It is Jesus who advances in wisdom, who hungers and thirsts, and who suffers."

[2] Norris, p. 232.

Because of his relation to God, it is proper not only to affirm the divinity and sonship of the man Jesus, it is also correct to attribute to him those actions which can be performed only through divine power. Jesus forgives sins, heals diseases, and he also demands worship and obedience. He is the secondary subject of these actions, while the Logos is their direct subject. Conversely, the actions of the man Jesus can also be predicated of the indwelling Logos. God the Word ate, slept, talked, and suffered. He was the subject of the actions and passions in a secondary and indirect way, because of his relation to Jesus who was their direct and immediate subject. Of course, God is also the ultimate subject of these actions, since he established the union between himself and Jesus, making this indirect participation possible.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 216. Norris explains how Theodore justifies applying the predicates of divinity to Jesus and the predicates of humanity to the Logos. He states that Theodore "denies not that the Word can be called the Son of Mary, or that he may be said to have suffered, but that these properties can be predicated of him by nature. They are his only in a derivative sense--only by reason of his relation to the Man of whom they are predicated directly. Just as, because of the union, the Man shares in the honour of the divine form, so, for the same reason, what belongs to the humanity may be attributed to the Word 'by relation.' The Word associates Himself with the assumed Man: and therefore what happens to the man has reference also to the Word who indwells him. But it does not 'happen to' the Word. He is in no sense the natural subject of these properties, any more than the Man is naturally possessed of divine Sonship."

A succinct statement of Theodore's distinction between the two types of predication is found in a discussion of the familiar question of whether Mary should be called theotokos. He states:

> So when they ask, "Is Mary the Mother of God or the Mother of man?"--let us say "Both": the one by the nature of the thing, the other by relation (’αναφορᾷ). For she is the mother of man by nature, since what was in the womb of Mary was a man. . . . But she is the mother of God, since God was in the man who was born, not confined within him by nature, but in him by the disposition (σχέσιν) of the will. Therefore it is right for both to be said, but not in the same respect. . . . The same answer is to be given if they ask, "Was God crucified or man?"--namely, "Both, but not in the same respect." For the latter was crucified inasmuch as he suffered and was nailed to the Tree and held by the Jews; but the former because he was with him for the reason we have given.[1]

The traditional Antiochian justification for attributing divinity to Jesus Christ is still prevalent in the modern period. For example, W. N. Pittenger defines the divinity of Jesus Christ as the presence and action of God in him. "That which the divinity of Christ denotes is the act of God the Word in him."[2] For Pittenger, this means that God is objectively present in Christ. It is not as though we simply learn about God through Christ, so that God's presence in Christ was only subjective. While God is also objectively present elsewhere, his presence in Christ is of greater intensity than anywhere else. Therefore, the divinity of Christ is unique.

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[1] Ibid., p. 215.

[2] Pittenger, p. 181. See also pp. 32, 87, 194, 221.

The Use of the Name "Jesus Christ"

There are two basic differences between the Alexandrian and Antiochian interpretations of language about Jesus Christ. First, the Alexandrians think of the various names and titles of Jesus Christ as denoting one single agent, the Logos. In contrast, the Antiochians think of these names and titles as denoting two individual persons, as well as their unity. Second, the Alexandrians think of the various predicates of Jesus Christ as being assigned to one subject according to two natures. On the other hand, the Antiochians think of the various predicates as being assigned to two persons who are united in an inseparable manner.

For the Alexandrian position, there is only one truly personal subject involved in the two natures of the God-Man, and he is God the Word. Both before and after he unites an "impersonal" or "non-personal" human nature to himself, he is one agent. He can be denoted by such terms as "Son of God," "Word of God," "Lord," "Savior," "Jesus Christ," "Jesus," "Jesus of Nazareth," "the man Jesus," and "Christ."

In contrast, for the Antiochian view, there is God the Word and there is also the man Jesus. Because there are two subjects of attribution and also two centers of action here, the meaning of the name "Jesus Christ" becomes quite complicated. Who is Jesus Christ? Is he God the Word, or is he the man Jesus? The traditional Antiochian response to this difficulty has been to propose careful and precise terminological distinctions. To refer to the God who is present in and with man, it is best to use "Logos" and "Word." To refer to the man who is present with God, it is best to use "Jesus," "Jesus of Nazareth," "the man Jesus," or "the human nature." To refer to the unity of the two, it is best to use "Jesus Christ," "Emmanuel," or "Christ." These terms denote the man Jesus in his special relation to God the Word and also the grammatical subject to which can be predicated the attributes of both Jesus and God the Word. Thus, when we say that Jesus Christ is fully God and fully man, we mean that the unity of the two is fully God and fully man. It would not be proper to say that God the Word in himself is fully God and fully man, just as it would not be correct to say that Jesus of Nazareth in himself is fully God and fully man.[1]

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[1] Pittenger, pp. 91, 187. In the first of these references Pittenger reports that Nestorius thought "Jesus" should be used to denote the man, "Lord" the uncreated Word, and

Because there are two subjects involved in the Antiochian concept of Jesus Christ, it is important to distinguish Biblical statements according to which subject is intended. When the Bible says that Jesus wept, it is referring to the man Jesus. Conversely, the statements concerning Jesus Christ's divine actions, such as forgiving sins, have to do with God the Word.[1]

For Cyrillian thought, on the other hand, all the Biblical statements about Jesus Christ are about one subject, not two. Consequently, in his fourth anathema, Cyril attacked the Antiochian practice of "dividing the sayings." He declared:

"Christ" the union of the two, the incarnate savior. In the second, Pittenger states that he prefers to use "Son" to denote the man Jesus rather than the agent God. "If we should speak of Jesus as the 'Son,' meaning the humanity of our Lord; of the divinity which was his, or in him, as the Word or Logos or Self-Expressive Activity of God; and of the unity of these in the one total life as Jesus Christ or Emmanuel (as Nestorius himself would have wished)--if we do this, we shall (I think) have come to some manageable terminology, at any rate."

[1] Norris, pp. 190, 198, speaks of Theodore's exegetical practice of "dividing the sayings" about Christ in scripture. Theodore says: "When . . . we hear the Scripture saying either that Jesus was honoured or glorified . . . let us not understand God the Word, but the assumed Man." See our earlier discussion of Eustathius, p. 51 n. 1.

> If anyone distributes between two persons or *hypostases* the terms used in the evangelical and apostolic writings, whether spoken of Christ by the saints or by him about himself, and attaches some to a man thought of separately from the Word of God, and others as befitting God to the Word of God the Father alone, let him be anathema.[1]

In spite of this opposition to the Antiochian way of interpreting language about Christ, however, the Alexandrians wanted to distinguish the two natures and also two types of statements about Christ. According to them, predicates of each of the two natures can be assigned to the one person. Some predicates belong to the Logos because of his divine nature, and others belong to him because of his human nature. Those predicates which speak of Jesus eating, growing, weeping, and so forth, do not imply that he is a separate man, subordinate to the Father. They simply tell us about the eternal Logos in his being as a man. They speak of the Logos "according to the flesh," or "humanly." The Logos does some things "divinely," through his divine nature, and some things "humanly," through his human nature.[2] Thus,

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[1] Hardy and Richardson, p. 353.

[2] William Telfer, ed., *Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa*, The Library of Christian Classics, vol. 4 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), p. 104. Cyril states: "Christ was twofold. As to what was visible, he was man, as to what is invisible, he was God. As man, he ate genuinely as we do, for he had the same fleshly needs as we have, but as God he made five loaves feed five thousand men. As man he truly died, and as God, on the third day, he raised to

Cyril could say that the Word did not suffer according to his divine nature, but that he did suffer according to his human nature. This is what Cyril meant when he said "He suffered without suffering."[1]

To conclude, in this section we have presented historical evidence for the hypothesis that the basic differences between the Antiochian and Alexandrian theologies have to do with the way they conceive the identity of Jesus Christ. For Antiochian thought, Jesus Christ is the rabbi from Nazareth who had a special place in God's plan for all men. For Alexandrian thought, Jesus Christ is the God who descended to earth and lived as a man.

Barth's Concept of the Divinity of Jesus Christ in an Antiochian Perspective

Turning now to our development of an Antiochian interpretation of Barth's christology, our first task is to show the evidence for classifying Barth's concept of the divinity of Jesus Christ as Antiochian. Then we shall consider those

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life his body that was dead. As man he was really asleep in the boat, while, as God, he came walking upon the waters."

[1] Wilken, p. 184. See also pp. 189-90. Here Wilken reports that Cyril, in his commentary on Luke 5:12, stated, "Divinely the Son is said not to suffer, but humanly he is said to suffer."

factors which support an Antiochian understanding of Barth's doctrine of the unity of the person of Christ and his use of the name "Jesus Christ" and its variants. This procedure will require the explication of important concepts and passages found in Barth's Church Dogmatics.

In an Antiochian perspective, considerable emphasis is placed upon the rather remarkable fact that Barth affirms the divinity of the Bible and proclamation as well as the divinity of Jesus Christ. Since proclamation can occur through many creaturely media, such as the bread and wine of the Lord's supper, the water of baptism, and the words of preaching, it follows that many finite realities can be said to be divine. According to the Antiochian understanding of Barth, the grounds for affirming Christ's divinity are essentially the same as those used to establish the divinity of other creaturely media. These creatures are said to be divine because of their relation to God, not because of their inherent being. They participate in the act in which God speaks, and consequently they become God's divine Word. This concept of divinity can be designated "participatory divinity."[1]

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[1] There is a sense in which God and, therefore, divinity participate in the creaturely realm. In fact, it is because of God's act ad extra and his participation in creaturely existence that creatures can be said to participate in

In order to show that Barth makes this interpretation possible, we shall look first at the way he describes the divinity of Jesus Christ, the Bible, and proclamation. Then we shall discuss the following topics: the forms of revelation, indirect identity, the "is" of becoming, analytic statements, and the uniqueness of Jesus. An account of Barth's treatment of these subjects will contribute to an understanding of his concept of the divinity of Jesus Christ, since they are directly related to it. In this discussion, we shall point out the evidence for including Jesus Christ in the same category with the Bible and proclamation. In the next chapter we shall present the Alexandrian case for placing Jesus Christ in a category by himself.

The Definition of Divinity

An Antiochian interpretation of Barth is made plausible, in the first place, because of his correlation of the divinity of Christ, the Bible, and proclamation with the event of revelation. Speaking specifically of the deity of Christ, Barth states, "The essence of the Divinity ascribed to Jesus is to make clear, impart, and carry out who God the

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divinity. Our term "participatory divinity," however, is intended to direct the reader's attention to the resulting participation of the creatures in God's divinity, not the originating participation of God in the creaturely realm.

Father, God in the proper sense is, and what He wills and does for man, to represent this God the Father."[1] This definition of divinity seems to imply that Jesus can be said to be divine because he reveals God the Father. Yet he is not God in the proper sense, for this God is the Father. "True and real divinity, as expressed in the predicate Kyrios, the NT already ascribes in the first instance to a completely Other than Jesus."[2] Thus, it seems evident that Jesus is divine because of his relation to God in revelation, not because of his inherent nature.

Barth also states that the Bible and proclamation are divine in this sense. This conclusion is asserted most forcefully in the third and fourth chapters of the Church Dogmatics where Barth deals explicitly with these topics. For example, Barth maintains the divinity of the Bible in these words:

> As the Word of God in the sign of this prophetic-apostolic word of man Holy Scripture is like the unity of God and man in Jesus Christ. It is neither divine only nor human only. Nor is it a mixture of the two nor a tertium quid between them. But in its own way and degree it is very God and very man, i.e. a witness of revelation which itself belongs to revelation.[3]

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[1] CD 1/1, p. 443 (KD, p. 406).

[2] Ibid., p. 442 (KD, p. 405).

[3] CD 1/2, p. 501 (KD, p. 555). See also pp. 463, 685 (KD, pp. 512, 768). Here Barth speaks of the "divinity of Holy Scripture."

He affirms the divinity of proclamation in this way:

> It is only from the belief that the Church's proclamation is really divine that the recognition of the hopelessness of its humanity follows, and therefore the recognition that in its humanity it can live only by its divinity, that is, by the grace of the Word of God given to the Church.[1]

In both these cases, divinity is attributed to creaturely forms because of the presence of God's Word revealing himself. This point will become clearer below.

When Barth speaks of the divinity of the scriptures, proclamation, and the human Jesus, the Antiochian points out, he does not mean that these creaturely realities possess some quality that can be labeled as "divinity." Barth states, "God is not an attribute of something else, even if this something else is the Bible."[2] Nor does this divinity have anything to do with the creaturely excellence of scripture, proclamation, or the man Jesus. The most perfectly written and wisest thoughts in the Bible or in preaching are not, for all that, divine. Nor is the divinity of Jesus dependent upon his heroic personality or his wisdom.[3] What is important about

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[1] Ibid., p. 752 (KD, p. 841).

[2] Ibid., p. 513 (KD, p. 569). See also p. 530 (KD, pp. 588-89). Jesus of Nazareth is not divinized by his unique relation to God. CD 4/2, p. 153 (KD, p. 171). Nor does he exercise divine sovereignty. CD 4/2, p. 161 (KD, p. 180).

[3] CD 1/2, p. 21 (KD, pp. 23-24).

Jesus, the Bible, and proclamation is that God speaks through them, making himself known through his Word. In these moments, they become witnesses to revelation.

Finally, when Barth affirms that the Bible, proclamation, and Jesus Christ are divine, this does not mean that their humanity is destroyed or transformed into divinity. The scriptures were written by men, and therefore they are fallible as men are. As any historical document, the Bible is limited by the fact that its writers were conditioned by their finiteness and by their historical situation. Many of their beliefs appear to us today to be false.[1] In the same way, the human words of preaching are far from perfect, even if they are modern and enlightened. They are liable to proclaim misjudgments. Nor was the man Jesus transformed into God himself, although he was sinless. He still was a finite creature, with limited knowledge and resources, subject to the same limitations as other men.[2]

There is some justification, then, for classifying Barth's concept of the divinity of Christ as Antiochian. He seems to promote a notion of participatory divinity rather than intrinsic divinity. This conclusion is given additional support in the fact that Barth clearly includes Jesus Christ among the forms of revelation. We turn next to that topic.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 508-9 (KD, pp. 564-65).

[2] CD 4/2, pp. 91, 95 (KD, pp. 100, 105).

The Forms of Revelation

In this section we explore more thoroughly the notion of participatory divinity by examining Barth's treatment of the forms of revelation. We shall mention specifically three points. The forms are not God, they are knowable as other creaturely realities are known, and they can reveal God only through his power and decision, not through their own power. All these points support an Antiochian interpretation in that they show that these forms are not inherently divine. When we come to the next section on the idea of indirect identity, then we shall see more clearly the basis for predicating divinity to these forms. Throughout this discussion, we shall point out that Barth includes Jesus Christ among the many possible forms of revelation.

As we shall see in our treatment of these subjects, Barth sometimes speaks as though the human nature of Christ is the form of revelation, while at other times he implies that it is the man Jesus who is the form. In the Antiochian interpretation, this manner of speaking indicates that Barth conceives of the human nature of the Logos in a concrete sense, as an individual human being. Since Barth also states that the human nature of the Logos has its own personality, will, and self-consciousness, this seems to be a plausible conclusion.[1] If it is correct, Barth follows a pattern that has been prevalent among Antiochian theologians since Theodore of Mopsuestia.[2] According to this pattern, whatever Barth says about the human nature of the Logos applies to the man Jesus.[3]

Barth argues that God is not known directly but through creaturely forms which are not in themselves divine. In his presentation of this point, Barth often lists Jesus or the human nature of Jesus among the creaturely forms through which God reveals himself. For example, Barth states:

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[1] Later in this chapter we shall discuss in more detail the basis for concluding that Barth names the human nature "Jesus" and thereby indicates that it is a complete human person. See pp. 144-50.

We shall also discuss in more detail the personality, will, and self-consciousness of the human nature. See pp. 99-101, 103-6, 189-93 below.

[2] Norris, p. 200. "In the Interpreter's terminology, 'human nature' essentially means 'the assumed Man' (i.e. Jesus), just as 'divine nature' essentially means 'God'. . . . Such phrases signify not merely the totality of human or divine properties, but concrete human or divine subjects." "The Interpreter" refers to Theodore of Mopsuestia.

[3] Barth might also speak of human nature in a general sense, with regard to the nature of all men. But when he speaks of the human nature of the Logos, the Antiochian interpretation assumes that he means the man Jesus.

> We hasten to add that also there is no Word of God without a physical event. We are reminded of that by the homogeneity of preaching and sacrament. We are reminded of that by the verbal nature of Holy Scripture. We are reminded of that finally and most highly of all by the corporeality of the man Jesus Christ.[1]

The fact that Barth often mentions the man Jesus along with the Bible, preaching and the creaturely elements of the sacraments should not be interpreted to mean that God reveals himself only through these forms. The prominent forms of the Old Testament are the words of the prophets, Moses, the angel of the Lord, the name "Yahweh," and Yahweh's attributes. In addition, "God may speak to us through Russian communism or a flute concerto, a blossoming shrub or a dead dog. We shall do well to listen to Him if He really does so."[2]

While it is clear that Barth includes the man Jesus among the many forms through which God has manifested himself, it must also be said that he is unique among them. God's revelation through Jesus is "incomparably more direct, unambigious, palpable"[1] than his revelation through other forms. Barth makes this assertion in a comparison of the name "Yahweh" and the man Jesus. The name "Yahweh" is the form which stands out above other forms in the Old Testament.[2] Yet, in spite of the fact that this name is inherently related to Yahweh himself, it is still merely a linquistic and therefore an intellectual and theoretical phenomenon. In the New Testament, the form which stands out is Jesus. He takes the place of the name "Yahweh," and his "contingent, somatic, human existence" is "so much more direct" that other forms appear to be mere "shadows" in relation to it.[3]

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[1] CD 1/1, p. 151 (KD, p. 138). If it were not so, says Barth, the Word would not be real for us. For a clear statement that this "physical event" involves a creaturely form, we quote from p. 188 (KD, p. 171-72). "We do not possess the Word of God otherwise than in the mystery of its worldliness. . . . we always have it in a form which as such is not the Word of God and as such, moreover, does not betray that it is the form precisely of the Word of God."

[2] Ibid., p. 60 (KD, p. 55).

According to an Antiochian interpretation, Barth's explanation of the uniqueness of Jesus in relation to the name "Yahweh" does not emphasize that Jesus is a divine reality or that he is more than a man. Jesus is more direct than "Yahweh" because he is a man with a physical existence. Consequently, Barth's views do not conflict with the Antiochian belief that Jesus is a person distinct from God.

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[1] Ibid., p. 365 (KD, p. 335).

[2] Ibid., pp. 364-65 (KD, pp. 334-35).

[3] Ibid., pp. 365-66 (KD, pp. 335-36). Note especially these words: "Into the place--not of *Yahweh* on Sinai or in heaven, but certainly of the name *Yahweh* . . . --there now comes the existence of the man Jesus of Nazareth."

The way the creaturely forms are known indicates that they are not transformed into divine realities by the revelatory presence of God. When God assumes a form, the creatureliness of the form is not distinguished in a way which makes it unambiguously clear that God has assumed it. The Bible, preaching, and Jesus do not differ from other words, events, and persons in a way that prevents them from being interpreted simply as ordinary phenomena. Barth states:

> When God speaks to man, this happening is never so marked off from the rest of what happens that it might not promptly be also interpreted as a part of this other happening. The Church in fact is also a sociological entity with definite historical and structural features. Preaching in fact is also an address. Sacrament in fact is also a symbol in compromising proximity to all other possible symbols. The Bible in fact is also the document for the history of the religion of a tribe in Nearer Asia and of its Hellenistic offshoot. Jesus Christ in fact is also the Rabbi of Nazareth, historically so difficult to get information about, and when it is got, one whose activity is so easily a little commonplace alongside more than one other founder of a religion and even alongside many later representatives of His own "religion."[1]

Because the forms of revelation are not marked off in some obvious way as an event of God's speaking, a neutral observer apprehends only the form and does not interpret it as a form of revelation. He sees the Bible as only a human, historical document, not as a book chosen by God to witness to his revelation. Nor does he understand Jesus as other than a first-century religious visionary. Barth affirms:

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[1] Ibid., p. 188 (KD, p. 171).

> What the neutral observer of these events might apprehend or may have apprehended of these events was the form of the revelation, not regarded by him as such and, moreover, not to be regarded by him as such, some sort of happening unrolling itself in the human sphere, having all the possibilities of interpretation appropriate to this sphere, but in no case revelation as such. . . . Thousands may have seen and heard the Rabbi of Nazareth. But this historical element was not revelation.[1]

Finally, even though God reveals himself through a form, this does not mean that the form has the power to reveal God. God is hidden in his unveiledness. He remains free to reveal or not to reveal himself in the form which he assumes. His revelation of himself is always a fresh decision on his part to make himself known. "It is not the form that reveals, speaks, comforts, works, helps, but God in the form."[2]

This limitation of the power of the form applies even to the human nature of Christ. The man Jesus has only creaturely power, and he has no way of evoking God's decision to reveal himself. Barth makes this clear in his discussion of God's freedom in relation to Jesus Christ. He states that Jesus was the revelation of God because of "the power and continuity of the divine action in this form and not in the continuity of this form as such." In the New Testament, revelation "is clearly not in itself or directly ascribed to His [Jesus'] existence as such." It is a "constantly recurring new thing, that becomes real from God's side in definite circumstances."[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 373 (KD, p. 343).

[2] Ibid., p. 369 (KD, p. 339).

Nevertheless, the form of revelation is not superfluous, nor can the content of revelation be separated from the form. This is a general condition which applies to the principal revelation through Christ. Barth states that the content of the revelation of the Father is

> completely limited and tied down by its impartation in the Person of the revealer, Jesus of Nazareth. Its content cannot be abstracted from this form. There is here no question of any possibility of distinguishing content and form, and regarding the content as divine and necessary, the form as human and accidental; the former as the essence, the latter as the historical appearance of revelation.[2]

These observations about the way Barth characterizes the forms of revelation imply that the forms are creaturely realities which have their own nature and qualities, apart from their participation in revelation. They exist in relative independence, although God from time to time chooses to reveal himself through them. Since the man Jesus, who is eminent among these forms, can be recognized as an itinerant rabbi even by neutral observers, he seems to be a complete person in himself. When God speaks through him, he is recognized as the Word of God. The fact that the forms become the

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[1] Ibid., p. 371 (KD, p. 341).

[2] Ibid., p. 448 (KD, p. 411). See also p. 457 (KD, p. 419).

Word of God is the point to which we turn now.

Indirect Identity

Not only are the forms of revelation inseparable from God, who is the content of revelation, they are also, in a sense, identical with God himself. Therefore, it is proper to say that they are divine. The identity of a form with God, however, comes into existence only through God's decision. To point out this limitation, Barth states that the identity is indirect.

Barth uses the concept of indirect identity primarily in relation to the Bible, proclamation, and the humanity of Jesus. However, he also indicates that it applies both to the relation between Yahweh and the angel of Yahweh and also the relation between Yahweh and his name. In the former of these instances, Barth states:

> The "angel of the Lord" in [the] OT is obviously identical with the Lord Himself and not identical. It is quite impossible that the non-identity too should not become and remain visible.[1]

Because there is a difference as well as an identity here, it must be said that the identity is indirect.[2] In reference to "Yahweh," Barth explains that this name is "a separate being," yet it is "identical with Him [Yahweh] in a way not to be explained." A consequent of this identity is that predicates of Yahweh may be applied to the name "Yahweh."[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 344 (KD, p. 315). See also p. 342 (KD, p. 314).

[2] Ibid., p. 344 (KD, pp. 315-16).

Barth's clearest discussion of the indirect identity of the Bible and proclamation with the Word of God is found in the paragraph entitled "The Word of God in its Threefold Form."[2] In the following passage, he correlates the concept of indirect identity with that of becoming, stating that because the Bible and proclamation become God's Word, their identity with the Word is indirect.

> From the standpoint of the comprehensive concept of the Word of God we must say that here, in God's revelation, God's Word is identical with God Himself. Among the three forms of the Word of God that can be said unconditionally and with strictest propriety only of revelation, not with the same unreservedness and directness of Holy Scripture and Church proclamation as well. For if the same may and must also be said of them, it must at all events be added that their identity with God is an indirect one. Without wishing to deny or even merely to limit their character as God's Word, we must think of the fact that here the Word of God is mediated, through the human persons of the prophets and apostles, who received and handed it on, and again through the human persons of their expositors and proclaimers; that Holy Scripture and proclamation must always be becoming the Word of God in order to be it[3]

Barth is also explicit about the fact that the concept of an indirect identity applies to the relation between God and the humanity of Christ. In making this point, Barth compares the relation between God the Word and the humanity of Christ to the relation between the divinity and humanity of the Bible and proclamation. For example, Barth states:

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[1] Ibid., pp. 364-65 (KD, pp. 334-35).

[2] Ibid., pp. 98-140 (KD, pp. 89-128).

[3] Ibid., p. 349 (KD, p. 321). See also CD 1/2, pp. 368, 492, 500, 736, 743, 755 (KD, pp. 405, 545, 554, 826, 831, 844).

> Again it is quite impossible that there should be a direct identity between the human word of Holy Scripture and the Word of God, and therefore between the creaturely reality in itself and as such and the reality of God the Creator. It is impossible that there should have been a transmutation of the one into the other or an admixture of the one with the other. This is not the case even in the person of Christ where the identity between God and man, in all the originality and indissolubility in which it confronts us, is an assumed identity, one specially willed, created and effected by God, and to that extent indirect, i.e., resting neither in the essence of God nor in that of man, but in a decision and act of God to man. When we necessarily allow for inherent differences, it is exactly the same with the unity of the divine and human word in Holy Scriptures.[1]

In this passage, Barth denies that the identity of God and man in Christ is an identity of essence. The divinity attributed to Jesus and the Bible is not based on their natures but on their relation to God, a relation established by God's decision.

Although Barth does not, so far as we have been able to determine, state in so many words that the man Jesus of Nazareth is indirectly identical with the Word of God, the Antiochian view assumes that such a statement is possible. Since this claim can be made about the human nature, and since, according to the Antiochian interpretation, Barth understands the human nature in a concrete sense, as an individual person, it follows that the man Jesus is indirectly identical with God. He only becomes the Word of God when God decides to speak through him. In himself, he is an ordinary, first-century rabbi.

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[1] CD 1/2, p. 499 (KD, pp. 553-54). Since in this passage Barth speaks of an indirect identity between "God and man" in Christ, perhaps we should add the following quote in which Barth speaks explicitly of an indirect identity between the humanity and divinity of Christ. "If the humanity of Jesus is the image of God, this means that it is only indirectly and not directly identical with God." CD 3/2, p. 219 (KD, p. 261). See also CD 2/1, p. 486 (KD, p. 547).

The "Is" of Becoming

The concept of indirect identity implies that the "is" in the statements "The Bible is the Word of God," "Proclamation is the Word of God," and "Jesus of Nazareth is the Word of God" means "becomes." According to the Antiochian interpretation, Barth accepts this implication and acknowledges it in several ways. In reference to the Bible, he states, "The Bible therefore becomes God's Word in this event, and it is to its being in this becoming that the tiny word 'is' relates, in the statement that the Bible is God's Word."[1]

When Barth phrases this conclusion with respect to the human words of preaching, he compares the use of "is" here with that found in the doctrine of the two natures of Christ. In this way he indicates that preaching is the Word of God in much the same way that the man Jesus is the Word of God. Barth states:

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[1] CD 1/1, p. 124 (KD, p. 113).

> In and for all that it is in itself, it [human language] can only serve the actual Word of God. And that divine self-Word does not cease to be itself because it lets itself be served by human language. But because it permits this service on its part, It is itself this human language, and because this human language serves It, It is itself the divine self-Word.
>
> For the proper explanation of this "is," reference would have to be made thus early to the Christological "doctrine of the two natures."[1]

Again, an Antiochian interpretation of Barth would have to admit that Barth does not explicitly say that the "is" in "Jesus of Nazareth is the Word of God" is an "is" of becoming. Nevertheless, what he says seems to lead directly to that conclusion. Since Barth includes the human nature of Jesus Christ in the list of these forms which become divine because of their function rather than their essence, it follows that the same can be said of the man Jesus himself.

If it is true that statements such as "Jesus of Nazareth is the Word of God" affirm an indirect identity, the question remains as to whether the claim that Jesus of Nazareth is the Son of God is also an indirect identity. The Antiochian interpretation thinks so, and an evidence for this conclusion is that Barth clearly identifies the Son of God and the Word of God.[1] Consequently, Barth often makes statements such as the following: "God's Son or God's Word is identical with a man, with this man, whose name is Jesus of Nazareth."[2] It seems not to matter to Barth whether he speaks of an identity between Jesus Christ and the Word or between Jesus Christ and the Son. Both can be understood as affirming an indirect identity, based upon the "is" of becoming.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 57 (KD, pp. 52-53).

Another evidence that the identity of Jesus Christ with God is indirect can be found in Barth's claim that certain crucial statements of this identity are analytic. Barth's account of analytic statements can be used to support the Antiochian interpretation because included among them is the statement that the Bible is the Word of God.

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[1] See CD 1/1, p. 155 (KD, pp. 141-42). "'God's Son' in the language of the doctrine of the Trinity does not differ from 'God's Word.'" See also p. 493 (KD, p. 453), where Barth states that these terms point to one object.

[2] CD 1/2, p. 16 (KD, pp. 17-18).

[3] Prenter, pp. 30-32, proposes an interpretation of Barth's identification of Jesus Christ with the Son or Word of God which is similar to the one presented above. He argues that the "is" in such statements as "Jesus Christ is the Son of God" should be understood analogously. Jesus Christ is God's Son, Prenter explains, in the sense that he reflects and illustrates the Son. The "is" expresses conformity rather than identity. Since Prenter bases his conclusion upon Barth's doctrine of reconciliation in CD 4/2 and the interpretation presented above is based upon Barth's

Analytic Statements

Barth maintains that the statements which affirm an identity between Jesus Christ and God are analytic. Speaking of the New Testament witnesses, Barth declares: "On their lips the statement 'Jesus is God's Son' is entirely a self-authenticating statement as much as its counterpart: the Word became flesh. On their lips both of these are analytic, not synthetic statements."[1]

Barth's claim that these statements are analytic might be seen by some readers as a threat to the Antiochian view that they express an indirect identity. This is the case because predicates of analytic statements are often understood to affirm the essence of the subject. In fact, Barth seems to accept this definition when he states that certain statements "were not understood analytically, as if the subject were in essence what the predicate states concerning it."[2] If "Jesus Christ is God's Son" states that Jesus Christ is in essence the Son of God, this would imply that the divinity of Jesus Christ is his by nature, not just by relation. Consequently, the "is" would appear to affirm a direct, permanent identity, not an indirect identity of becoming.

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treatment of revelation in CD 1/1 and 1/2, this suggests that Barth understands the "is" in a technical sense, to express something less than a complete, direct identity, throughout the Church Dogmatics.

[1] CD 1/2, p. 22 (KD, p. 24).

[2] CD 4/2, p. 67 (KD, p. 72).

However, this threat to the Antiochian view is overcome by the fact that Barth also describes the identification of the Bible with the Word of God as analytic. He says:

> We have to admit to ourselves and to all who ask us about this question that the statement that the Bible is the Word of God is an analytical statement, a statement which is grounded only in its repetition, description, and interpretation, and not in its derivation from any major propositions. It must either be understood as grounded in itself and preceding all other statements or it cannot be understood at all.[1]

This quote implies that the operative element in Barth's understanding of analytic statements is that they are self-authenticating. In any case, the fact that Barth groups the identification of Jesus and the eternal Son in the same class with the identification of the Bible and the Word implies that the identity involved is indirect and that, therefore, the "is" means "becomes." It is clear that Barth does not mean that the Bible is in essence the Word of God. He emphasizes the humanity of the Bible too much for that interpretation to be given serious consideration.

Uniqueness of Jesus

While we have already mentioned one respect in which Jesus of Nazareth differs from other media of revelation, in that he is more direct and unambigious since he is a man,[2] it is appropriate for us to consider here some of the other aspects of his uniqueness. It is important to show that an Antiochian interpretation does not think that Jesus is like other creaturely media in all respects.

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[1] CD 1/2, p. 535 (KD, p. 595).

[2] See pp. 66-68.

Although Barth does not devote a single section to a thorough discussion of the uniqueness of Jesus as a form of revelation, he makes several observations with regard to this topic. Perhaps the principal difference between Jesus and other forms of revelation is that the revelation through Jesus is the original revelation. It is _the_ revelation, and all other revelatory events are witnesses to it. This point is made clear in Barth's discussion of "The Word of God in its Threefold Form."[1] Revelation through the Bible and proclamation are dependent on this original revelation, which is ontologically prior.

Secondly, Barth says that the revelation through the human nature of Jesus happened only once, while the revelations through the Bible and proclamation require repetition. This means that the original revelation of God through the life he lived on earth is past. It is complete and finished in a way that the Bible and proclamation are not, for they continue to exist in their natural form in the present. God does not have to assume human nature and act in a human way again, for he has spoken in a decisive way in the original revelation.

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[1] CD 1/1, pp. 98-140 (KD, pp. 89-128). See especially p. 127 (KD, p. 116).

Thirdly, the original revelation does not depend on faith. It exists apart from faith, while God's speaking through the Bible and proclamation must be successful in stimulating a response of faith in order to be described as God's Word and therefore divine. Both the second and third distinctions are expressed by Barth in these words:

> The Bible is not Word of God on earth in the same way as Jesus Christ, very God and very man, is that Word in heaven. The being of Jesus Christ as the Word of God even in His humanity requires neither promise nor faith. The act in which He becomes the Word of God in His humanity requires neither repetition nor confirmation.[1]

This third difference between Jesus and the other forms of revelation has to do with his being "in heaven." It is closely related to the fact that the human nature of Jesus is exalted in a way that the Bible and proclamation are not. The human nature of Jesus was exalted into a new fellowship with God, becoming obedient and sinless. Therefore, he is a perfect instrument for God. In this exaltation, Jesus in his human nature has the power to convey God's revelation by his presence. On the other hand, we can read the words of the Bible without hearing God's Word. Barth states:

> It is also that if we are serious about the true humanity of the Bible, we obviously cannot attribute to the Bible as such the capacity--and in this it is distinguished, as we have seen, from

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[1] CD 1/2, p. 513 (KD, p. 570).

> the exalted and glorified humanity of Jesus Christ --in such a way to reveal God to us that by its very presence, by the fact that we can read it, it gives us a hearty faith in the Word of God spoken in it.[1]

It is possible to understand these distinctions of Jesus and his relation to God without abandoning the Antiochian position. According to this interpretation, none of these unique features of Jesus threatens his being as a complete human person. He is ontologically prior to all other media through God's election of him from the beginning.[2] It is also clear that God does not need to recreate the life of Jesus on earth or establish a similar relation with another person. His presence in Jesus accomplished his purpose and does not need to be repeated. For the Antiochian view, the other two points, that Jesus is the Word of God independently of faith and that his humanity has the power to reveal God, have to do with Jesus' exaltation. Since his exaltation is the result of God's act, it is clear that the power of the human nature is lent to it by God's grace. In the final analysis, this power does not belong to him as such.

While Barth has more to say about the uniqueness of Jesus, we have mentioned the principal factors which arise in his discussion of Jesus as a form of revelation. We shall later take note of the concept of the incarnation and the light it throws upon this topic.[1]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 506-7 (KD, p. 562).

[2] See Barth's doctrine of election, especially "The Election of Jesus Christ," CD 2/2, pp. 94-194 (KD, pp. 101-214). We shall discuss this topic later; see pp. 84-90, 185-87 below.

In conclusion, it must be admitted that a rather persuasive case has been presented for the Antiochian view that Barth conceives of the divinity of Christ as a divinity of participation rather than a divinity of essence. Barth's close association of Jesus with the Bible and the creaturely phenomenon of proclamation throughout his development of the notions of the finite character of the forms of revelation and their indirect identity with God's Word suggests that Jesus is simply a man who occupies a special role in God's plan.

Strictly speaking, it is God's presence and action in Jesus and these other creaturely forms which are divine. However, since these forms actually do convey God's message in the moment of revelation, they become a part of that message. The content cannot be separated from these forms. Further, since God's message or Word is identical with God Himself, these forms must also become, in some sense, identical with God. Because of this identity, the predication of divinity to these forms is allowable. However, it must be clearly recognized that this divinity does not belong to them as such. In themselves, the forms have no divine power.

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[1] See pp. 112-14, 193-205 below.

Barth's Concept of the Unity of the Person of Jesus Christ in an Antiochian Perspective

Having discussed the Antiochian view of Barth's concept of the divinity of Christ, we turn now to the unity of his person. Since Barth identifies Christ with his history, his act, and his work, the concept of his unity covers considerable territory.[1] Our purpose here is not to investigate thoroughly all the dimensions of this subject but to focus upon those which are particularly relevant for an Antiochian interpretation. Because this topic has been and still is an important area of debate between Antiochian and Alexandrian ways of thinking, many aspects of it are pertinent for the question before us. In the Antiochian view, Barth's treatment of these aspects is intended to safeguard the independence of the man Jesus as a person distinct from God.

It is appropriate to begin with Barth's handling of the question of whether the eternal Son exists apart from his unity with human nature. Then we shall consider Barth's treatment of the incarnation. In this respect, the concepts of *anhypostasis* and *enhypostasis* are particularly significant, since they pertain to the nature of the existence of the human nature in its relation to the existence of the Logos. Next, as we deal with Barth's doctrine of the two natures, we shall follow his order by looking first at the relation between God and the human nature, second at the characteristics of the resulting unity of the two natures, and third at the accompanying coordination of the divine and human aspects of the one work of Christ. Finally, we shall discuss briefly the significance of Barth's claim that Jesus Christ is a history.

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[1] The identity of Christ with his history, act, and work will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III.

The Logos Asarkos

Since Antiochian theology emphasizes the distinction between Jesus and God, the Antiochian interpretation of Barth tends to minimize the implications of his rejection of the *logos asarkos*. It argues that Barth's affirmation of the *logos ensarkos* means that all the activities of the Logos are determined by his intention to become man. Therefore, the Logos with whom dogmatics deals is not without form and content.[1]

Since Barth accepts the concept of the *logos ensarkos*, this raises the question of the preexistence of the flesh. If there is no Logos without the flesh, it follows that the flesh exists, in some sense, throughout eternity, even prior to the incarnation. Barth accepts this implication, stating

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[1] The concept of the *logos asarkos* means that the Logos exists apart from the flesh which he assumes. Conversely, *logos ensarkos* means that the Logos exists in the flesh.

"But the man Jesus already was even before He was."[1] Does Barth mean that the man Jesus exists in a real sense, as a concrete being, before his temporal life as a man? In order to safeguard the importance of Jesus' life as a man in time, the Antiochian interpretation turns to the concept of God's intention. According to this view, Barth means that the man Jesus exists in God's plan before that plan is executed in time. Since God decides in his eternity for Jesus to exist as a man and play a significant role in the salvation of all men, it follows that Jesus exists in the mode of God's intention. However, this does not mean that he exists as a concrete being. This Antiochian interpretation of Barth can point to many specific texts for support.[2]

While arguing that the Logos does not exist and cannot be known apart from his unity with the flesh, Barth affirms the _logos_ _asarkos_ in a very limited, theoretical sense. He admits that the concept is necessary for theological reflection.[3] Although the _logos_ _asarkos_ is an abstraction, it safeguards the idea of the freedom of God. The Logos chose to become man; however, since he might have chosen otherwise, his flesh is not his by necessity but through his free choice. By nature, the Logos is divine.[1] The Antiochian view argues that the _logos asarkos_, even in the restricted form affirmed by Barth, denies that the man Jesus is a mere aspect of God's being. Therefore, it grants to Jesus a relative degree of independence.

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[1] CD 3/2, p. 464 (KD, p. 557).

[2] In our consideration of the Antiochian interpretation of Barth's development of the _logos_ _asarkos_ and the preexistence of Jesus, we shall utilize the analysis of Kehm, pp. 237-39, 313-19.

[3] CD 3/1, p. 54 (KD, p. 58). "It has to be kept in mind that the whole conception of the λόγος ’άσαρκος, the 'second person' of the Trinity as such, is an abstraction. It is true that it has shown itself necessary to the

Despite Barth's admission of a limited value for the _logos asarkos_ as an abstraction, his major concern is to point out the defects of the concept. Because the _logos asarkos_ is an abstraction, Barth explains, it has no form and content; it is an empty concept. Therefore, even when we are considering the eternal Word of God who precedes the activity of God in time and who participates in all God's work, it is "pointless" and "impermissible" to refer to the _logos asarkos_. The Logos became man, and it is this act and the decision which is presupposed by the act which give him form and content. If we attempt to go behind this act and

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christological and trinitarian reflections of the Church. Even today it is indispensable for dogmatic enquiry and presentation, and it is often touched upon in the New Testament, though nowhere expounded directly."

[1] CD 4/1, p. 52 (KD, p. 54). See also CD 1/2, p. 169 (KD, p. 185); CD 3/1, p. 54 (KD, pp. 57-58).

decision to a logos asarkos, Barth argues, then we are tempted to invent all sorts of content for him. That would make us guilty of worshipping an image of God which we have created for ourselves. It is hard to see how such an attempt to bypass the form and content which the Word has in the incarnation could be considered real faith and obedience. Furthermore, it would lead to the question of whether the logos asarkos might not reveal himself through other media than the man Jesus.[1]

In the eyes of an interpreter who sees Barth as an Antiochian, these explanations of the weaknesses of the idea of the logos asarkos do not imply that the man Jesus already exists in God before his incarnation in such a way that his existence in time is merely a revelation of what has already happened in God. Barth's reliance upon the concept of the decision of God, they point out, indicates that Jesus is present in the mode of intention.[2] The decision of the Logos gives him content and form even before this event is actualized in time.[3] Since he is the one who is to become incarnate, it is proper to say that he is fully God and fully man from eternity.[1]

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[1] CD 4/1, pp. 52-53 (KD, pp. 54-56).

[2] See for example, CD 4/2, pp. 32-33 (KD, pp. 34-35), where Barth uses the categories of God's "will" and his "resolve" to explain the presence of Jesus with God from all eternity. See also CD 3/1, p. 54 (KD, p. 58); CD 3/2, p. 477 (KD, pp. 572-73).

[3] Barth speaks of the eternal Son as the Word who will

Further, the Antiochian view argues, Barth uses other means to maintain a distinction between Jesus' life in time and his being in eternity. They point out that Barth states that Jesus' life is limited in time, just as that of other creatures.[2] Such a statement is difficult to make consistent with the claim that Jesus' primary existence is located in heaven with God prior to his incarnation, which implies that his time is unlimited. Thus, the Antiochian interpretation rejects the idea of Jesus' being with God eternally.[3]

Other means of maintaining the distinction between Jesus' existence in time and the existence of the Logos

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become incarnate, the *verbum incarnandum*. See CD 4/1, p. 66 (KD, p. 70); CD 4/2, p. 683 (KD, p. 773); CD 2/2, p. 108 (KD, p. 116).

[1] In his defense of an Antiochian view, Kehm attacks the claims of Gerhard Gloege, "Zur Prädestinationslehre Karl Barths, Fragmentarische Erwägungen über den Ansatz ihrer Neufassung," *Kerygma und Dogma* 2 (1956):212 and "Zur Versöhnungslehre Karl Barths (*Kirchliche Dogmatik* IV, 3)," *Theologische Literaturzeitung* 85 (1960):161-186; Robert W. Jenson, *Alpha and Omega: A Study in the Theology of Karl Barth* (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1963), pp. 66, 73; Regin Prenter, "Glauben und Erkennen bei Karl Barth; Bemerkungen eines lutherischen Boso zur theologischen Methode Karl Barths," *Kerygma und Dogma* 2 (1956):176-92; and Daniel L. Deegan, "The Christological Determinant in Barth's Doctrine of Creation," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 14 (June 1961):128. All these interpreters, Kehm reports, argue that Barth makes Jesus' preexistence so real that the significance of his existence in time is threatened.

[2] CD 1/2, p. 147 (KD, p. 161).

[3] Kehm, pp. 235-36. Such a view of Jesus' time, says Kehm, leads to docetism.

include the claim that Jesus is "not eternal as God is"[1] and the belief that Jesus' incarnation is a new actualization in history.[2] If Jesus' eternity is different from God's, and if his entrance into history is a really new event in time, then his being in eternity does not obscure the reality of his human existence as a man.

According to Kehm, moreover, we must not restrict Jesus' preexistence to his being in God's intention. His preexistence has two other forms. In the first place, he was prefigured in the history of the people of Israel. This does not mean that Israel performed the deeds that Jesus was to perform, but the covenant which was fulfilled and revealed in Jesus was operative in the relation between God and Israel. In the second place, Jesus' history was prefigured in the structure of creation. Because Jesus was the object of the divine will, creation was structured for the sake of the election of Jesus.[3] In none of these modes, however, is the significance of Jesus' existence in history undermined.

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 33 (KD, p. 34). Ogletree, pp. 177-78, relies heavily on this point, using it to show that Barth means that Jesus is eternal only in the sense that he exists in God's eternal decision and foreknowledge. He points out that Barth, in the passage noted, implies that Jesus is before all time only in the sense that "this is what God sees and wills."

[2] CD 4/2, pp. 119-20 (KD, pp. 133-34).

[3] CD 3/2, pp. 475-78 (KD, pp. 570-74). See Kehm, pp. 237-39.

Finally, in the attempt to show that Jesus' being with God prior to the incarnation does not undercut his relatively independent life as a human person in time, the Antiochian position might argue that the preexistence of Jesus should be contrasted with his existence after the resurrection. In the former existence, Jesus does not exist as an actual being in God, while in the latter he does. The resurrection is not merely a reinstatement of Jesus' eternal mode of being, it is the beginning of a new state. Jesus Christ now exists in the mode of God.[1]

The Incarnation

Although Barth's development of the doctrine of the incarnation involves concepts such as _theotokos_, _anhypostasis_, and _enhypostosis_,[2] which have traditionally been used to defend the Alexandrian viewpoint, there is considerable evidence for the claim that even here Barth stands within the Antiochian framework. Both the overall structure and also the details of his doctrine contain important Antiochian elements. In order to present a statement of Barth's doctrine of the incarnation which captures the pattern of his thinking and accentuates the features which support an Antiochian interpretation, we shall focus upon five points. First, we shall note Barth's emphasis upon the fact that the incarnation is an act of God himself in his second mode of being. Next, it is important to consider Barth's characterization of this act as an assumption. The third point has to do with the reality which is assumed in this act. Fourth, the concepts of anhypostasis and enhypostasis, which play a crucial role in Barth's doctrine of the incarnation and which offer grounds for debate between interpreters of Alexandrian and Antiochian persuasion, demand attention. Finally, we shall investigate Barth's claim that the subject who acts through the human nature is God himself.

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[1] This is the view of Kehm, pp. 240-47. He relies on CD 3/2, pp. 448, 624 (KD, pp. 537, 759-60).

[2] The last two of these concepts, defended most conspicuously in their formative years by Leontius of Byzantium (485-543), have often been used to indicate that the human nature assumed in the incarnation was not itself a person. See H.R. Macintosh, _The Doctrine of the Person of Christ_, 2d ed. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1913), pp. 217-18. Pittenger seems to assume that any theology which accepts these concepts is Alexandrian; for example, see p. 133.

The act of God the Word

Barth is noted for his emphasis upon the freedom, transcendence, and sovereignty of God. This theme expresses itself in Barth's treatment of this doctrine in the claim that the incarnation is the act of God alone. If God had not taken the initiative, making himself an object of man's knowledge, there is no way we could know him through our own powers of discovery. Nor is there any way that we could reconcile ourselves with God. Our knowledge of God, reconciliation, and redemption depend upon the fact that God becomes incarnate.

God's act in the incarnation is free. It stems from his will, yet it is not arbitrary, a mere whim. It executes the decision that God made in his inner being in eternity, and all other acts of God and men have their purpose and reality in it. God is not coerced by anything outside himself nor by any inner need to express himself in this way. His being lacks nothing, for he enjoys love and fellowship in himself. This act is the outward expression of his loving and graceful nature.[1]

In order to safeguard the divine character of this act, Barth is quite specific that there is a radical dissimilarity between the incarnation and the creation. The former is not simply the continuation of the latter. Jesus Christ as a man is not the result of the powers and possibilities of the created order. Jesus' life in history, his human existence, requires a new and special act of God, distinct from the creative act which brought the rest of the created order into being.[2]

Because it is necessary to affirm that the incarnation is the act of God alone, it is also important to indicate how this act is related to God's inner threeness.

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 45 (KD, pp. 47-48).

[2] Ibid., p. 37 (KD, p. 39).

Barth explains that all three "persons" of the trinity are involved in this act, each one in his own way. Through the principle of appropriations we affirm that it is the Word or Son of God, and not the Father or the Holy Spirit, who assumes human nature and becomes a man.[1]

These points are consistent with an Antiochian theology, for they emphasize the grace of God and the distinction between God and man. We have mentioned that Antiochian thought is characterized by an emphasis upon God's "good pleasure." This term indicates that it is through God's voluntary act that he became united to man in a special way in the incarnation. The union with Jesus precedes his birth in time, it is not merely the result of Jesus' obedience. Consequently, the incarnation stems from God's love and grace; it is not an act of man.[2]

Becoming and assuming

Alexandrian theology has tended to emphasize the scriptural proclamation that the Word became flesh. Antiochian thought, while arguing that it is the Word who acted in the incarnation, has tended to interpret that becoming as an

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[1] Ibid., pp. 43-44 (KD, pp. 46-47).

[2] Deegan, "Person of Christ," pp. 81-82, in his argument that Barth is basically Antiochian, relies heavily upon the idea that Barth understands the union of the two natures established by the incarnation as based upon grace.

"assuming." In that way, it avoided the implication that the Word was transformed into something other than himself when he became man.[1] Barth's interpretation follows this line. He emphasizes this "becoming," but he explains that it really is an "assuming." The concept of this assumption by God the Word plays a crucial role in his theology.[2]

The verb "becoming," Barth explains, designates a miraculous act. How can the Word become something different from himself without surrendering his divinity? The claim that the eternal Word of God has become flesh is startling and incomprehensible, for it declares that the eternal God exists in the same way that creatures exist. "He the eternal Subject now exists--a stumbling-block to all Jewish ears and foolishness to all Greek ears--just as anything else or anyone else exists."[1] Since becoming is a process usually ascribed to creatures rather than God, it is in tension with the concept of the Word and cannot be systematically coordinated with it.

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[1] Sellers, Two Ancient Christologies, pp. 182, 205-11. Sellers reports that Cyril emphasized the statement "The Word became flesh" as a polemic against the notion that there were two Sons. For him, this proposition indicated that the Son on earth was the same Son who had been in heaven previously. He said that the Antiochians did not really accept this verse. "He who divides the natures posits two sons; he does not believe the Scripture which says 'the Word became flesh'" (p. 207).

Theodore thought that the verb "became" implied a transformation of the Logos, and therefore it led to the notion that the divine nature was passible and mutable. He appealed to Phil. 2:7 and used the verb "took up" or "assumed" (labon) to interpret the meaning of "became" in "the Word became flesh" (pp. 205, 211). He said, "The Word 'became' can be interpreted only as meaning 'according to appearance.' . . . In appearance the Logos became flesh, and by 'appearance' we mean, not that the Logos did not take real flesh, but that He did not 'become' flesh. For when the Scripture says He 'took', it means that He took not in appearance but in truth. But when it says He 'became', then it is speaking 'according to appearance'; for He was not transformed into flesh" (p. 182).

Cyril thought that use of "took" or "assumed" implied that there was a mere association between the Logos and the man who was taken. Therefore, he opposed it (p. 211).

[2] G. Wingren, "Gott und Mensch bei Karl Barth," Studia Theologica 1 (1948):31-32, states that it is the central concept in Barth's theology.

Barth explains that the act of becoming is initiated by the Son or Word of God; it is not something which happens to him. However, the term "becoming" seems to imply passivity and dependency, and it is normally applied to realities which come into being through some power other than themselves. As a result, we must be quite clear about its meaning in this instance. "In the sense of the concept familiar to us, we can therefore assert 'becoming' only of the human being, in order by that very means to give expression to the inconceivable becoming of the divine Word." Barth appears to mean that "becoming" applies strictly to the human nature, and then secondarily to the Word because of his relation to the human nature. There is "no becoming which as such can be the becoming of the Word."[2]

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[1] CD 1/2, p. 159 (KD, p. 174).

[2] Ibid., p. 160 (KD, p. 175).

A closer and more exact characterization of this act, insofar as it is the act of the eternal Son, can be given by the terms "assuming," "adopting," "incorporating," or "taking up." Barth states:

> Accordingly we have to give a closer explanation of the act peculiar to this miracle, the incarnation of the Word. As the Word of God becomes flesh He assumes or adopts or incorporates human being into unity with His divine being, so that this human being, as it comes into being, becomes as a human being the being of the Word of God.[1]

These alternatives indicate that the Word or Son is in control of this action, and there is precedent for them in the scriptures and traditions of the church.[2]

Another advantage of the paraphrase "the Word assumed flesh" is that it guards against the misinterpretation that the incarnation is such a uniting of divine and human being that it produces a third kind of being. In the incarnation Jesus Christ is not a third being, rather he is the mediator between God and man in such a way that he is both God and man.[3]

In conclusion of this discussion of becoming and assuming, we should point out that Barth's position seems to imply a theory of predication similar to that of Theodore's. "Becoming" does not apply to the Word but to the human nature. However, since the Bible uses this term of the Word, this implies that all predicates which belong to the human nature can also be applied to the Word, although they do not apply to him in the strict sense. While Barth does not work out a detailed theory here, it is possible to conclude that he means that "becoming" applies directly to the human nature but indirectly and by relation to the eternal Word who is united to the human nature.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid. In support of this claim, Barth refers to Phil. 2:7, Heb. 2:16, Tertullian, Origen, and Hippolytus. He also states that the standard term in medieval and early Protestant scholasticism, is assumere or assumptio.

[3] Ibid., p. 161 (KD, p. 176). In his discussion of the incarnation in CD 4/2, Barth indicates that he still prefers to interpret the Word's becoming as an assuming. See pp. 45, 47-48 (KD, pp. 48, 50-51).

What is assumed

When Barth comes to this topic, he attacks the terminology favored by Theodore of Mopsuestia, who spoke of the Word assuming a man.[1] To say that the Word assumed flesh, Barth declares, does not mean that the Word assumed a particular man. The word "flesh" should not be understood to mean a man, but humanity or human nature, "that which makes a man man as opposed to God, angel, or animal."[2] If we were to suppose that God assumed an already existing man, this would lead to erroneous conclusions. In the first place, it would make one an adoptionist, suggesting the Pelagian overtones of that position.[1] Secondly, it would imply either that God was transformed into a man, surrendering his own existence and ceasing to be God, or that the Son of God was no longer existing as one but as a duality, maintaining his own existence alongside the existence of this individual man.[2]

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[1] Theodore characteristically spoke of the *assumptus homo*, the assumed man, rather than the assumed human nature. For example, see Kelly, p. 305, and Norris, p. 200.

[2] CD 1/2, p. 149 (KD, p. 163).

What existed over against God and what was assumed by God, Barth explains, was the possibility of being a man, the potentiality of human existence. Concretely, the potentiality over against God the Word in this particular case was

> the one specific possibility of the first son of Mary. The Word appropriated this possibility to Himself as His own, and He realized it as such when He became Jesus. In so doing He did not cease to be what He was before, but He became what He was not before, a man, this man.[3]

This explanation of what was assumed guards against the errors mentioned above. God does not merely approve of some man and adopt him into a special relation, nor does he change himself into a man. In the union, he is not divided into two; in fact the man which the Word became does not exist outside of his union with God. Barth states:

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[1] Ibid., p. 149 (KD, p. 164). "But precisely this concrete reality of a man, this man, is itself the work of the Word, not His presupposition. It is not (in the adoptianist sense) as if first of all there had been a man there, and then the Son of God had become that man."

[2] CD 4/2, p. 48 (KD, p. 51).

[3] CD 1/2, p. 149 (KD, p. 164). This is Barth's standard teaching on the issue, not an isolated observation. See CD 4/2, pp. 48-51, 54 (KD, pp. 51-55, 58).

> As the Son of God made His own this one specific possibility of human essence and existence and made it a reality, this Man came into being, and He, the Son of God, became this Man. This Man was thus never a reality by Himself, and therefore, since the Son of God became this man, He is not another being in Jesus Christ alongside of the Son of God.[1]

The creaturely reality assumed by God into unity with himself was not merely the possibility of the man Jesus but also the human nature and essence of all men; "it is not merely one man, but the humanum of all men, which is posited and exalted as such to unity with God."[2] Because the human nature of all men is involved, this act has universal significance.

Finally, Barth turns to the question of whether the human nature that was assumed is sinless or sinful. He chooses the latter alternative, concluding that the Son of God "though without sin . . . was made to be sin."[3] In his discussion of the ramifications of this choice, Barth makes a point which Antiochian interpreters consider to be quite significant because it suggests that the human nature of the Logos is a person. Barth states that the human nature has its own will, distinct from the will of God. If we did not maintain the existence of this human will, Barth thinks, then we would not be able to guarantee that Jesus was truly a man like us and therefore tempted, although he did not sin.

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[1] CD 1/2, p. 150 (KD, p. 164).

[2] CD 4/2, p. 49 (KD, p. 52).

[3] CD 1/2, p. 153 (KD, p. 167).

> It was in this wrestling, in which He was in solidarity with us to the uttermost, that there was done that which is not done by us, the will of God. . . . From this may be seen how right was the attitude of those who in the so-called monothelite controversy of the 7th century upheld and eventually led to victory the doctrine that along with the true human nature of the God-Man there must likewise not be denied His true, human will, different from the will of God although never independent of it.[1]

If one thinks of the will as the constitutive element of the self, it would seem to follow that the assumed human nature is a true, individual self, although it is also the human nature of all men. Austin Farrer, for example, argues that the will is the basic characteristic of a self because it provides continuity of the self through time.[2] Groff believes that the will is the "finite substance" which is the human subject or self, and he interprets Barth accordingly.[3]

In the next section on Barth's concepts of anhypostasis and enhypostasis, we shall encounter more information which

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[1] Ibid., p. 158 (KD, p. 173).

[2] Austin Farrer, Finite and Infinite: A Philosophical Essay, 2d ed. (London: Dacre Press, 1959), p. 229.

[3] Groff, pp. 148, 170, 209, 215. Barth does not explicitly argue that a will must be a person, but what he says about the relation of God's personal being to his decision seems to be consistent with such a theory. God is the only true person, Barth explains, because only he is determined solely by his decision to be who he is. Since this decision presupposes God's will, it is clear that God's will is an essential, if not the essential, aspect of his being and act. See CD 2/1, p. 271 (KD, p. 304).

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supports the idea that the human nature is a person. We shall also explain how Barth's claim that the Word assumes a possibility of a man rather than a man fits into an Antiochian framework. This position concludes that although the human nature is not a man before the act of assumption, it becomes a man in that act.

Anhypostasis and enhypostasis

There are three major topics in Barth's analysis of these concepts which bear directly upon the question of whether Barth is Alexandrian or Antiochian. They concern the relation of these two concepts to existence, the personality of the human nature, and the uniqueness of Jesus' existence over against the existence of ~~others~~ other creatures. We shall present Barth's position with respect to these issues, and then we shall indicate how the Antiochian perspective interprets it.

Barth turns to the concepts of anhypostasis and enhypostasis to defend his argument that the human nature which God assumed exists neither prior to nor apart from its assumption by God. According to Barth, anhypostasis states that the human nature has no independent existence, while enhypostasis states that the human nature has its existence in and through the existence of the eternal Son. Thus, these two ideas are integrally related to one another, and both are necessarily implied by a proper understanding of the act of the incarnation. Barth states:

> But from the utter uniqueness of this unity follows the statement, that God and Man are so related in Jesus Christ, that He exists as Man so far and only so far as He exists as God, i.e. in the mode of existence of the eternal Word of God. What we thereby express is a doctrine unanimously sponsored by early theology in its entirety, that of the *anhypostasis* and *enhypostasis* of the human nature of Christ. *Anhypostasis* asserts the negative. Since in virture of the ἐγένετο, i.e., in virtue of the *assumptio*, Christ's human nature has its existence--the ancients said, its subsistence--in the existence of God, meaning in the mode of being (*hypostasis*, 'person') of the Word, it does not possess it in and for itself, *in abstracto*. Apart from the divine mode of being whose existence it acquires it has none of its own; i.e., apart from its concrete existence in God in the event of the *unio*, it has no existence of its own, it is ἀνυπόστατος. *Enhypostasis* asserts the positive. In virtue of the ἐγένετο, i.e., in virtue of the *assumptio*, the human nature acquires existence (subsistence) in the existence of God, meaning in the mode of being (*hypostasis*, 'person') of the Word. This divine mode of being gives it existence in the event of the *unio*, and in this way it has a concrete existence of its own, it is ἐνυπόστατος . . . . The aim of the doctrine, erected into dogma at the Second Council of Constantinople in 553 (*Anath*. *de* *tribus* *cap*., *can*. 5, *Denz*. No. 217), was to guard against the idea of a double existence of Christ as Logos and as Man, an idea inevitably bound to lead either to Docetism or to Ebionitism. We have seen earlier that what the eternal Word made His own, giving it thereby His own existence, was not a man, but man's nature, man's being, and so not a second existence but a second possibility of existence, to wit, that of a man.[1]

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[1] CD 1/2, p. 163 (KD, p. 178). See also CD 4/2, pp. 49-50 (KD, pp. 52-53) where Barth gives another complete statement of the meaning of these concepts.

Barth usually employs *Natur*, *Wesen*, or *Sein* for human nature or being and uses *Dasein* and *Existence* to indicate what the human nature lacked when it was assumed by God and brought into existence. This is true of the passages above.

Concerning the relation of the two concepts to the personality of the human nature, Barth reports that some opponents of anhypostasis believe that it denies that the man Jesus is a real person with his own personality. Such an interpretation is based on a misunderstanding of the terms impersonalitas and individualitas; Barth explains:

> In recent times the doctrine of the anhypostasis and enhypostasis of Christ's human nature has occasionally been combated by the primitive argument, that if the human nature of Christ is without personality of its own, it is all up with the true humanity of Christ and the Docetism of early Christology holds the field. In other words we moderns should be aware that personality really does belong to true human being. This argument is primitive because it rests simply upon a misunderstanding of the Latin term impersonalitas used occasionally for anhypostasis. But what Christ's human nature lacks according to the early doctrine is not what we call personality. This the early writers called individualitas, and they never taught that Christ's human nature lacked this, but rather that this qualification actually belonged to true human being. Personalitas was their name for what we call existence or being. Their negative position asserted that Christ's flesh in itself has no existence, and this was asserted in the interests of their positive position that Christ's flesh has its existence through the Word and in the Word, who is God Himself acting as Revealer and Reconciler.[1]

Thus, the personalitas denied by the ancients referred to existence or being; personality, which they called individualitas, was not denied to the human nature.

Finally, the concepts of anhypostasis and enhypostasis are especially significant because they specify the uniqueness of the existence of the man Jesus and his human nature. Because Jesus is not independent of God's existence in the manner of other creaturely beings and because he has his existence only in the existence of God, Jesus Christ is identical with God in a way that distinguishes him from all other beings.

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[1] CD 1/2, p. 164 (KD, p. 180).

There is a unity of God with all creation, because God is present in it and because it has its existence through God. However, created being has its own existence which is different from God's existence. There is also a unity of God with the human words of preaching, the elements of the sacraments, and the hearts of believers. They are inseparably bound to God, but they also have their own existence and, therefore, are not identical with God.[1]

There are several reasons why Barth's development of the concepts of anhypostasis and enhypostasis seem to support an Antiochian interpretation. In the first place, since Barth attributes a personality, in addition to a will, to the human nature, it is clear that the human nature is personal, at least in a limited sense. Further, when we examine what Barth means by personality, and discover that he correlates this concept with self-consciousness and person, the impression that he conceives the human nature as a concrete individual receives reinforcement.

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[1] Ibid., p. 162 (KD, pp. 177-78).

When he discusses the doctrine of the trinity in the first part-volume of the *Church Dogmatics*, Barth states that the modern notion of personality differs from the ancient concept in that it adds the attribute of self-consciousness.[1] Similarly, in response to a question regarding the doctrines of appropriations and *perichoresis* in *Karl Barth's Table Talk*, he equates the modern notion of personality with "centre of consciousness."[2] Consequently, when Barth asserts above that the human element of the incarnation has what "we moderns" call personality and what the ancients called *individualitas*, he clearly means that it has its own self-consciousness.

The question now arises as to whether Barth thinks that self-consciousness is the essential characteristic of a person. He does not answer this question directly, but he often speaks as though personality and person were identical concepts. For example, in his principal elaboration of the doctrine of the trinity, Barth argues that God is one person and one personality. Understood in their modern sense, these concepts apply to God's essence rather than his threeness. Used in this way, they emphasize that God is a single willer and doer, one "I." If they were used in reference to the three in God, Barth explains, they would suggest there are three self-consciousnesses in God. The resulting doctrine would be open to the charge of tri-theism. Throughout this argument, Barth uses the terms "personality" and "person" interchangeably, and he gives no indication that they have different meanings.[1]

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[1] CD 1/1, p. 410 (KD, p. 377).

[2] Karl Barth, *Karl Barth's Table Talk*, recorded and ed. John Godsey (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1962), p. 49.

Whether or not Barth consistently defines a person as a being with a self-consciousness, some Antiochian theologians accept such a definition.[2] As a result, they are inclined to conclude that Barth's characterization of the human nature of the incarnation is consistent with their theological emphasis upon the distinction of the person Jesus from the person God.[3]

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[1] CD 1/1, pp. 408-15 (KD, pp. 374-81).

[2] Pittenger, p. 112. "Today 'person' tends to mean, both in popular usage and in theological discussion, the psychological centre of subjective experience; it has a primary reference to the conscious subject of these experiences, a subject which is distinct from yet in close relationship with other subjects. The 'person' of man--and by implication the person of God--is the organizing centre of the totality of experiences; it is the 'self.' But the emphasis seems to be placed upon the awareness of the 'self' and its capacity through that knowledge to direct the activities of the total organism. That is to say, 'person' has come to signify whatever it is that establishes self-consciousness and direction." See also p. 114.

John Knox, The Death of Christ (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1958), p. 70, presents a similar view. He argues that in order to be a man, Jesus must have had a human consciousness.

[3] Kehm, pp. 117-18, states that Barth's development of the concepts of anhypostasis and enhypostasis allows the human nature to be a self with its own personal center and subjectivity.

Therefore, if the human nature which God assumes is a person, why doesn't Barth call it "a man"? The answer to this question lies in the fact that Barth ties the concepts of anhypostasis and enhypostasis to the idea of existence. Consequently, these concepts deal directly with the exact moment in which God the Word comes to exist in time, the beginning of his life as a man. They are used to explain the character of that instant in which the human nature passes from a state of possibility into a state of existence. This use of anhypostasis and enhypostasis contrasts with their traditional function of describing the relation between the divine nature and the human nature during the life time of Jesus, between his birth and his death as a man.[1]

The fact that Barth uses anhypostasis and enhypostasis in this way gives considerable credence to an Antiochian interpretation. In such an understanding, Barth uses the concept of human nature rather than man because it does not imply that there was some individual, a man, who was in existence prior to the act of assuming. If he existed prior to this moment, he would have an independent existence, and thus the concept of enhypostasis would not apply. However, the Antiochian view believes that Barth means that once the human nature of Christ passed from a state of possibility to a state of existence, it became a complete human person who finds his fulfillment in his unique relation to God the Word.

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[1] Pannenberg, pp. 341-42, puts Barth's contrast with traditional views in this way: "In this way the enhypostasis becomes for Barth the designation of the miraculous invasion of the divine Lordship into our world, while quite the contrary to this the New-Chalcedonian Christology invented it as an explanation for the mode of coexistence of divinity and humanity in Christ."

As a result, Barth's denial that there was a man existing prior to the act of assumption poses no threat to an Antiochian theology, although it contradicts Theodore's usual manner of speaking. Antiochians are not necessarily adoptionists, and therefore polemics against adoptionism do not come to grips with the heart of Antiochian thought.[1] Antiochian theology at its best affirms that Jesus comes into being and accomplishes his mission through God's grace. He does not earn or merit his unique relation to God; this is chosen for him by God.

Nor do Antiochians claim that God transformed himself into a man. They argue that the Logos is still the Logos, unchanged in his nature, even though he is united to the man Jesus. Thus, the errors that Barth hopes to avoid by arguing that the Logos assumed flesh or human nature, and not a man, are errors that the Antiochians also wish to preclude.

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[1] Pittenger, p. 91, using E.L. Mascall as an example, reports that Alexandrians often argue against Nestorianism as though it were merely adoptionism. Such an argument, he thinks, is irrelevant, because Nestorians too affirm the need for grace.

In an Antiochian view, then, Barth's denial that the Logos assumed a man has rather limited import. It is understood to apply strictly to the moment in which the Word is incarnated. Barth does not deny, according to this interpretation, that after this initial moment there was a man named Jesus who was related to God. Although the human nature involved here was not a complete person before the act of assuming, it was after this event.

The question upon which the Antiochian and Alexandrian interpreters of Barth divide is this: does "a man" refer primarily to God the Word or does it refer to the human nature which is united with the Word? The Antiochians choose the latter alternative, the Alexandrians the former.

The Antiochian view, that after the initial instant of the incarnation the human nature is denoted by Barth with "a man," seems to be given support by Barth's treatment of the concept of becoming. We have noted that Barth thinks that "becoming" is misleading when it is applied to the Word. Since this term suggests that whatever "becomes" is subject to circumstances beyond its control, it applies directly to the human nature and indirectly to God the Word. When we speak strictly of the act of the Word, the term "assumes" is more appropriate.

If the predicate "becomes" applies, strictly speaking, to the human nature, it would seem to follow that the same principle operates with respect to the predicate "a man." The term "a man" also implies that the reality designated by it is subject to circumstances beyond its control, and that would apparently not be true of the Logos, at least not in the strictest sense. The Logos places himself under the conditions which determine men, of course, but he does not relinquish his control over these conditions. Thus, it appears that he can be said to be a man and subject to these conditions because of his relation to Jesus.

Further, if we say that it is the human nature which, in the correct sense, "becomes," the question arises: what does the human nature become? The Antiochian interpretation of Barth has a ready answer: a man. In the act of incarnation, the human nature of the Logos, that is, the particular possibility of the man Jesus, became what it was not before; it became the man Jesus. This particular specimen of human nature passed from a state of possibility into a state of existence.

The Antiochian view of Barth, then, understands the affirmation that the Word of God is a man in a secondary and derived sense. The Word of God can be said to be a man only because of his relation to the man Jesus. By nature he is divine, not human. This conclusion is consistent with the view that the identity of the Word with Jesus is an indirect identity, based upon the Word's act of assuming.

The Antiochian interpretation of Barth's treatment of the anhypostasis and enhypostasis is also supported by Barth's statement that humans become persons not in themselves but through their relation to God.

> Man is not a person, but he becomes one on the basis that he is loved by God and can love God in return. Man finds what a person is when he finds it in the person of God and his own being as a person in the gift of fellowship afforded him by God in person. He is then (in his own way as creature) a person wholly and exclusively in the fellowship of Him who (in His way as creator) is it in Himself.[1]

If one applies this to the incarnation, it seems to imply that the human nature which God assumed could become a person through its fellowship with God.

Given this perspective, some passages which seem to be directly opposed to Antiochian thought, because they deny that the human nature of Jesus is a person, can be interpreted in a way that makes them consistent with Antiochian beliefs. For example, when Barth states that "humanity, without being or having itself a person, is caught up into fellowship with the personality of God,"[2] an Antiochian can interpret this pronouncement as meaning that the human nature of Jesus is not a person in isolation or in separation from God the Word. But in its relation to the Word, the human nature of Jesus is understood to become a person who is distinct from the person of the Word himself.

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[1] CD 2/1, p. 284 (KD, p. 319).

[2] Ibid., p. 286 (KD, p. 321).

Similarly, when Barth denies that there are two beings "side by side" or "alongside" each other in Christ, the Antiochian interpretation focuses upon the "side by side" and the "alongside," rather than the "two." It believes that Barth is denying that there is a mechanical or external relation between Jesus and God, not that the man Jesus is a person over against God, and it assents.[1]

Although the Antiochian interpretation of Barth concludes that the human nature becomes a person who is distinct from the person of God, it does not assume that this person exists apart from or outside the existence of God. As a man, Jesus can be understood to exist within the existence of God the Word. This is the import of the concept of enhypostasis. What is crucial for the Antiochian interpretation of Barth is that it is a person, a man, who exists in the existence of God, not simply a human nature which is not fully individualized.

But how can the Antiochian interpretation of Barth give credence to the claim that the man Jesus has no independent existence? For this position, this affirmation means that the man Jesus was brought into being by God's creative act and that he existed in a unique and intimate relation to God himself. He did not exist outside, or independently of, the guiding power and influence of God himself. He was obedient to God in a unique degree, and through his service to God he accomplished a special mission. In his role as a revealer and reconciler he occupies a place in God's plan that is unique. Yet, in this relationship, the man Jesus enjoyed freedom and responsibility as did other men.

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 74 (KD, p. 80) and CD 1/2, p. 150 (KD, p. 164).

This interpretation of Barth believes that the claim that Jesus has no independent existence should be understood in a relativistic sense, to indicate that the difference between Jesus' relation to God and the relation of other creatures to God is a matter of degree. Jesus is less independent from God, and more closely bound to him, than any other creature, although this does not make him an aspect of God's being. He is still a man who is inseparably bound to God. But since it is also proper to say that the human words of the Bible and the creaturely phenomena of proclamation are inseparably bound to God, some means must be found to specify the unique degree to which Jesus is united with God. The concepts of anhypostasis and enhypostasis serve this purpose.

In the Antiochian interpretation of Barth, God's existence includes the man Jesus in such a way that this relation can not be fully understood and which is, therefore, a mystery. The concepts of anhypostasis and enhypostasis point to this mystery. They affirm that Jesus' relation to God is unique, but they do not specify exactly how this uniqueness is to be understood. In the final analysis, God's presence in Jesus and his relation to Jesus differ only in degree, not in kind, from his presence in, and his relation to, other creatures.[1]

A question arises regarding the boundaries of the concepts _anhypostasis_ and _enhypostasis_. Although it is clear from what we have said above that Barth's emphasis upon the idea of existence demands that these two concepts have direct implications for the instant in which God enters the creaturely realm, it is not so clear that the significance of these concepts is limited to this moment. Because Barth emphasizes the act of God and because this act can have duration in time, it seems unwise to restrict the incarnation to one moment. If _anhypostasis_ and _enhypostasis_ apply to the beginning of God's existence as a man in time, should they not also apply to the whole of God's existence as a man in time, that is, to the time of Jesus' life? It is our view that Pannenberg fails to take account of Barth's actualism when he limits the significance of _anhypostasis_ and _enhypostasis_, in Barth's theology, to the entrance of God into time.[2] It seems more reasonable to apply them as well to the mode of the relation between God and the human nature in the one life of Jesus Christ.

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[1] An Antiochian theology might be willing to use _anhypostasis_ and _enhypostasis_ to describe the relation of other creatures of God. For example, the words of the Bible and the creaturely media of the sacraments could be understood to be related to God in such a way that these two concepts might be used to describe the relation. Nevertheless, one would probably want to add that God's presence in Jesus is more determinative or more intense than it is in other creaturely media. Some means would have to be found to maintain the uniqueness of Jesus' relation to God.

[2] Pannenberg, pp. 341-42.

If the notions of anhypostasis and enhypostasis are intended by Barth to apply to the mode of the relation of the human nature to God, would that pose a serious obstacle to an Antiochian interpretation of Barth? We have seen that the application of these concepts to the beginning of Jesus Christ's existence as a man can serve an Antiochian's purpose. The Antiochian can agree that there was no man in existence before the event of the incarnation, while arguing that after the initial moment a particular man came into being and was established by God's grace in a special relation with God. If the notions of anhypostasis and enhypostasis apply to every moment of the life of Jesus as a man, would it follow that in every moment God the Word assumes a human nature? And if so, would it also follow that the human nature cannot become, itself, a man?

It is our view that the application of the concepts of anhypostasis and enhypostasis to the whole life of Jesus Christ as a man does not pose an insurmountable problem for an Antiochian interpretation of Barth. While it might appear that a renewed assumption of the human nature, instead of a man, in every moment would not allow any "time" for the human nature to become a man, actually it would allow as much "time" for the human nature to become a man as it allows for the Word to become a man. And Barth is quite clear that a man does come into being in this event. Thus, the Antiochian can apply the concepts of anhypostasis and enhypostasis to the whole life of Jesus Christ, understanding them as affirming that in each moment two things happen: first, the Word assumes a human nature, which is to say that the Word assumes the possibility of a man, and, second, the human nature which he assumes becomes a man.

Whether anhypostasis and enhypostasis are limited to the initial moment of Jesus Christ's existence as a man or whether they apply to every moment in his life, the Antiochian interpretation of Barth does not appear to be undermined. There may be elements of occasionalism in Barth, but this occasionalism allows the continual positing of the man Jesus who has a special relation to God the Word.[1]

In conclusion, it is clear that the concepts of anhypostasis and enhypostasis are not restricted to Alexandrian theology. They can be used to substantiate key points in an Antiochian position.[2] This is also true of Barth's treatment of the claim that God is the subject who acts through the man Jesus. To show how this is the case, we need to consider Barth's position on this topic.

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[1] For a study of the elements of occasionalism in Barth's theology, see Jerome Hamer, Karl Barth, trans. Dominic M. Maruca (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1962).

[2] For more details on the implications of these concepts for an Antiochian theology see Groff.

God is subject

Barth affirms that God is the subject of the qualities and actions of the man Jesus. This point is not simply a restatement of the fact that God initiates the incarnation by assuming flesh. It states that God also completes this work by existing in and acting through the human nature of Jesus. He is the dominant and decisive agent of the union. Barth's amplification of this idea consists of several steps.

Because God the Word assumes human nature and becomes identical with a particular man, it can be said that God exists as anything and everything else exists. He is visible just as other earthly forms are visible.[1] In fact, it is God's existence in an earthly form which gives reality to the human being and action involved.

> Thus the reality of Jesus Christ is that God Himself in person is actively present in the flesh. God Himself in person is the Subject of a real human being and acting. And just because God is the Subject of it, this being and acting are real. They are a genuinely and truly human being and acting.[2]

The beginning of the existence of the Son of God as a man was his birth from Mary. Because God is the subject of this event, it is proper to say that Mary is the Mother of God.

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 50 (KD, pp. 53-54).

[2] CD 1/2, p. 151 (KD, p. 165).

> He whom Mary bore was not something else, some second thing, in addition to His being God's Son. . . . In this case human being has an existence identical with the existence of the eternal Son of God.[1]

Because God himself is the subject who acts in and through the creaturely form, and because his existence is identical with Jesus' existence, the predicates which are attributable to men in general are also attributable to God. God has a human soul and body, and he is subject to the same limitations of temporality and environmental factors which impinge on the lives of ordinary men. Barth states:

> God's revelation to us takes place in such a way that everything ascribable to man, his creaturely existence as an individually unique unity of body and soul in the time between birth and death, can now be predicated of God's eternal Son as well.[2]

The fact that the qualities of human nature can now be predicated of God himself is startling and confusing to a mind characterized by ordinary thinking. We normally think that the qualities of the divine nature distinguish God from all reality which is not God, and that the qualities which belong to men in general distinguish them from God. Since these two sets of qualities are radically different, it is difficult to conceive how they could be said to belong to one subject. Barth admits this conceptual problem.

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[1] Ibid., p. 138 (KD, p. 152).

[2] Ibid., p. 147 (KD, p. 161).

> It is apparent at once that divine and human essence cannot be united as the essence of one and the same subject. Offence at the statement that Jesus Christ is the One who is of divine and human essence, in whom the two are united, is quite unavoidable.[1]

Nevertheless, the reality of Jesus Christ demands this statement. It is made not as a general statement about what may happen or about a unity which exists everywhere and at all times. Rather, the affirmation that Jesus Christ is both human and divine is an affirmation about this particular subject and what took place and still takes place in him.[2]

Because this statement can and must be made about this one subject, our willingness to make it is evidence that we are using reason correctly. Since reason should conform to its object, only a reason which is committed to certain general presuppositions, such as the view that divine and human essence cannot be united under any circumstances, will fail to acknowledge the reality of this particular object.[3]

Not only are the qualities of human nature in general predicable to God because of his identity with the man Jesus, the actions of Jesus are also attributable to him. When Jesus called his disciples, preached, walked, and ate, God was the agent. Further, the experiences of Jesus were also the experiences of God. Barth says:

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 61 (KD, p. 65).

[2] Ibid., pp. 61-62 (KD, pp. 65-66).

[3] Ibid., p. 62 (KD, pp. 66-67). See especially the footnote concerning *recta ratio*.

> God Himself is in the world, earthly, conceivable and visible, as He is this man. We have to do with God Himself as we have to do with this man. God Himself speaks when this man speaks in human speech. God Himself acts and suffers when this man acts and suffers as a man. God Himself triumphs when this One triumphs as a man.[1]

The fact that the eternal God himself existed in a human form which was characterized by man's fallen condition does not mean that God actually sinned. In Barth's understanding, the sinlessness of Jesus Christ is directly dependent upon the identity of Jesus Christ with God Himself. Because God is the subject who acts in Jesus, it is inconceivable that he could sin. Barth declares:

> This Man would not be God's revelation to us, God's reconciliation with us, if He were not, as true Man, the true, unchangeable, perfect God Himself. . . . In it [our human being] God Himself is the Subject. How can God sin, deny Himself to Himself, be against Himself as God . . . ?[2]

Through the presence of God in this human form, the human form which is common to all sinful people is made into a sinless human form.[3]

Because the subject who acts here is God himself, it cannot even be said that he was seriously tempted. Jesus Christ was bound to win in the struggle with temptation, because he is identical with God. Thus, even though we do not deny a distinct human will to the human nature which God assumed, there is an unavoidable contradiction between the claim that Jesus Christ is identical with God and the claim that "a true man had a serious struggle" with temptation. We cannot provide "a systematic connexion" between these claims, but only acknowledge them.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 51 (KD, p. 54). See also CD 1/2, p. 147 (KD, p. 161).

[2] CD 1/2, p. 155 (KD, p. 170).

[3] Ibid., p. 156 (KD, p. 170). "Our unholy human existence, assumed and adopted by the Word of God, is a hallowed and therefore a sinless human existence."

Because God is the subject who acts in and through the human nature which he assumed, we must also affirm that he maintains all his divine powers in this state. To do otherwise is to negate God's deity. This means, according to Barth, that we must deny the views of the so-called "kenotic" theology, according to which God the Son surrendered his majesty when he became a man. Nor should we accept the view that in the incarnation the eternal Son suspended the use of his divine powers although he continued to possess them. On the contrary, we should affirm that Jesus Christ, as the Son of God, continues to possess and use his divine powers in his incarnation, although he does so invisibly and in a way that is not directly apparent. By attributing these powers to Jesus Christ we undergird his unique relation with God.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 158 (KD, p. 173).

[2] CD 4/1, pp. 181-83 (KD, pp. 197-99). Here Barth discusses the controversy in the seventeenth century between the Giessen and Tubingen theologians and the later issues over kenosis in the nineteenth century. Barth opposes the views of the so-called modern "kenotics" and also those of the Giessen

Finally, because God is the subject who acts through Jesus, the event of Christ is of universal significance. Barth states:

> The human speaking and acting and suffering and triumphing of this one man directly concerns us all, and His history is our history of salvation which changes the whole human situation, just because God Himself is its human subject in His Son, just because God Himself has assumed and made His own our human nature and kind in His Son, just because God Himself came into this world in His Son, and as one of us "a guest this world of ours He trod."[1]

An Antiochian exegesis of Barth must admit that Barth's development of the idea that God is the subject of the actions and qualities of Jesus Christ contains nothing that specifically requires an Antiochian interpretation rather than an Alexandrian one. Barth does not say explicitly, for example, that God is the direct subject of the divine actions and the indirect subject of the human actions of Jesus Christ. On the other hand, since Barth does not specifically reject this Antiochian theory, it is possible to interpret his elaboration of this topic along Antiochian lines.

In this way of understanding Barth, the claim that God exists now in a way that he had not existed before is

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thinkers. He approves the Tubingen concept of an abstention by Jesus Christ "in the exinanitio only from the visible use, a retractatio and occultatio of the revelation of His power, or positively, a majesty of the Son of God which is, in fact, exercised and operative and actual, but concealed." p. 181 (KD, p. 198).

[1] CD 4/2, p. 51 (KD, p. 54).

permissible. This new form of existence is his because of his unique participation in the existence of the man Jesus. Similarly, the Logos possesses ordinary human qualities and performs all the actions attributed to Jesus in the New Testament, but he does so indirectly rather than directly. It is also proper to say that the Logos was born of Mary, and that Mary is the Mother of God, but, again, these statements are possible because of the unique relation of the Logos with Jesus.

The Antiochian view can also accept Barth's assessment of the role of reason in understanding the claim that God is the subject of Jesus' actions. It is inconceivable that God could be so intimately and uniquely related to this man that he experiences what this man experiences. The precise relation between God and this man remains beyond our power to comprehend. That the Word united with Jesus could not sin is clear, but how Jesus could be tempted and yet protected from sin remains a mystery. Jesus was guided and directed by the Word in such a way that he accomplished God's purpose; yet he did not become a mere automaton nor did he achieve his sinlessness through human power alone, in a Pelagian sense.

Finally, the Antiochian interpretation is not seriously threatened by Barth's belief that the incarnate Son exercises his divine power, although he refrains from its visible use. This perspective concludes that Barth attributes this power directly to God, but only indirectly to the man Jesus who is united with him.

With these remarks about Barth's understanding of God as the subject who brings the man Jesus into existence and acts through his humanity, we conclude our discussion of the incarnation itself. Now we turn more specifically to the question of how the unity of God with the human nature in the one person of Jesus Christ is conceived by Barth and interpreted in an Antiochian manner.

God the Word and the Human Nature

According to Barth, one must make a clear distinction between the union of God with the human nature and the union of the divine nature with the human nature. The union of God with human nature, the _unio hypostatica_, is different from the union of the two natures, the _communio naturarum_, in at least two ways. First, it has to do with "the direct unity of the existence of the Son of God with the man Jesus of Nazareth."[1] That is, it concerns the concept of existence, while the _communio naturarum_ deals with the concept of nature or essence. Second, it has to do with foundation of the _communio naturarum_. Because "it was not the divine nature, the _divinitas_, but the Word which became flesh," it follows that the _unio hypostatica_ precedes and establishes the _communio_ naturarum. Therefore, one should consider first "the union of the logos with the human nature" and then the communio naturarum which is included in it.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 51 (KD, p. 55).

Barth emphasizes that the union of the existence of God with his human nature is sui generis. Consequently, it cannot be understood on the basis of some other kind of union. To show that this is the case, Barth compares it with other unions, including the soul and the body and husband and wife. In each instance, Barth explains how these other unions differ in crucial respects from that between God and the human nature he assumes in the incarnation.[2]

The Antiochian interpretation of Barth accepts the central thrust of this discussion. It too considers it necessary to confess that the unio hypostatica is unique. It takes special interest in Barth's recognition that the Word has no need of human nature and that his uniting himself with the human nature is an act of love and grace. In this way, the unity established is different from the relation between the soul and body. The body is indispensable to the soul while the human nature is not indispensable for God. In addition, the eternal Son of God gives the human nature existence, while the soul does not give existence to the body.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 51-52 (KD, p. 55).

[2] Ibid., pp. 51-60 (KD, pp. 54-64).

[3] Ibid., p. 54 (KD, p. 58).

The Antiochian interpretation admits the appropriateness of Barth's assessment of the analogies which it prefers. The union of God with the human nature is different from the union of two human persons, such as friend and friend or man and wife.[1] The oneness of mind between two persons, Barth explains, rests upon mutual agreement or the power of attraction, while the union of God with the human nature in Christ rests upon the one-sided action of God in condescending to man. Another difference, Barth states, is that the two human persons involved in such unions are self-existent, while the human nature of Jesus does not exist independently from God.[2] In an Antiochian interpretation, Barth's analysis of the limitations of this analogy does not imply that Jesus is other than a human person, nor does it render the analogy valueless.

Another analogy which is attractive to an Antiochian interpretation of Barth is the relation between God and the creaturely elements involved in the sacraments. The Antiochian view notes that Barth admits that the sacramental union, or unio sacramentalis, is conceived by the older dogmatics in a way which makes it remarkably similar to that between God and the human nature of Jesus. Barth preserves the uniqueness of the latter by denying that there is any sacramental unity apart from Jesus Christ. There is only one unio sacramentalis, Barth declares, and that is the unio hypostatica. It cannot be admitted that the union of God and the human nature in the incarnation is analogous to that between God and the creaturely elements of the sacraments. This admission, Barth explains, would lead to the conclusion that the church must be understood as the prolongation of the incarnation. Since this doctrine of the church must be rejected, so also must this analogy.[1]

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[1] Theodore often used this analogy, emphasizing the scriptural affirmation that they became one flesh. See Norris, p. 229.

[2] CD 4/2, p. 53 (KD, p. 57).

The Antiochian view wishes to emphasize the relative value of this analogy, since it claims that Barth often groups the man Jesus in the same category with the Bible and the creaturely realities involved in proclamation. Since the sacraments are forms of proclamation, there can be an indirect identity of God with the bread and wine of communion, for example, just as there can be an indirect identity of God with Jesus. The Antiochian interpretation emphasizes that Barth does not rule out the relative value of this analogy by his argument regarding its logical consequences. An Antiochian theology does not have to hold that this unity can be established at will by the church, and it can indicate the uniqueness of Jesus among the sacraments by referring to Barth's claim that Jesus has no independent existence while the sacramental phenomena do.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 54-55 (KD, pp. 58-59).

The Union of the Two Natures

The Antiochian interpretation of Barth receives considerable support from the way Barth develops the concept of the union of the two natures in Christ. Barth historicizes and actualizes this concept, emphasizing both the integrity of each nature and also their fellowship with each other in a historical process. The two natures seem to be understood as independent and personal in such a way that they are two persons, God and Jesus, united in fellowship through historical time. In order to show that this is the case, we need to look more carefully at Barth's explication of this doctrine.

In explaining his innovative interpretation of the union of the two natures, Barth states that he uses the traditional concepts of the _unio hypostatica_ and the _communio naturarum_ "as concentrically related terms to describe one and the same ongoing process." This process is Jesus Christ, who is the history in which God became man and man is exalted. As this history, Jesus Christ includes in himself all men and all history, and he continues to exist now as he has in the past.[1]

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[1] CD 4/2, pp. 105-12 (KD, pp. 116-24). The quoted phrase is found on the first of these pages. For the claim that Jesus Christ includes all history, see CD 4/3,pp. 191, 214 (KD, pp. 218, 244). In the latter of these references, Barth states, "The history of Jesus Christ embraces

In this history, the two natures participate in each other. Because the Son of God became man, all the elements which are common to human beings are involved in the life of the Son. Therefore, the human essence participates in the divine essence. Conversely, the elements of the divine essence participate in the Son's life as a man. Therefore, they participate also in the human essence.[1]

When Barth explains the content of this participation, however, the basic thrust of his thought becomes clear. The human nature is exalted into fellowship with God. The mutual participation of the divine and human essence is the fellowship of God and man.[2] This fellowship is characterized more precisely by Barth in three steps.

Impartation

The first of these steps is the mutual impartation of the two essences. In this impartation, Barth explains, there is a giving and a receiving. The divine essence gives or imparts itself to the human essence, and the human essence receives the divine essence. Conversely, the human essence

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that of the world and all men."

For an attempt to differentiate Barth's unusual interpretation of the union of the two natures from the traditional understanding, see Jenson, pp. 126-30.

[1] Ibid., pp. 62-63 (KD, p. 67).

[2] CD 4/2, pp. 69-70 (KD, pp. 74-75).

imparts itself to the divine essence, and the divine essence receives the human. This relationship of openness to each other is the fellowship of God and man in history.[1]

This mutual impartation of the two natures also means that the qualities and actions of both natures can be predicated of the one Son, Jesus Christ. The impartation does not involve two Sons side by side.[2] Nor do the qualities of either nature become the properties of the other. If we assign divine qualities to the human nature, so that the human nature is said to be, for example, omnipotent, then we compromise both the humanity and the deity of Christ. The two natures are imparted to one another in the one Christ, but they maintain their separate identities.[3]

Address

The second step in Barth's detailed characterization of the fellowship and mutual participation concerns the address of God to man. An elaboration of this address requires the concepts of confrontation and determination, for Barth states that Jesus Christ is the history in which the two natures confront one another and are determined to one another through God's address.[1]

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 74 (KD, p. 80). This impartation is a "relationship of real giving and receiving, God and man in the fellowship of this history."

[2] Ibid., p. 74 (KD, p. 80).

[3] Ibid., pp. 77-83 (KD, pp. 83-91). Here Barth attacks the Lutheran notion of the divinization of the human nature.

The address is initiated by God, not by man. Through his grace, God condescends to man and confronts him. In this act, God determines to humiliate himself.[2] As a result, the divine nature is determined to the human essence, and the human essence is determined by the divine essence. To say that the divine nature is determined to the human nature is to say that the human nature is not without God's grace. God cares for man. God's attention is focused upon man, and man is not alone. To say that the human essence is determined by God's divine grace is to say that no other force or power controls and determines it. In the confrontation, the human nature is determined exclusively by the divine. God makes the human nature his own.[3]

The mutual determination of the two natures has four results. The first is that the human essence is exalted to a state of harmony with the will of God. By God's grace, the human nature is granted the freedom to obey God and become sinless.[4] When this occurs, the human nature is not changed or divinized. Sinning is not a necessary constituent of humanity, but a contradiction of it. The human nature which is freed to obey God is "our true human essence."[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 86 (KD, p. 94). "The actuality of the incarnate Son of God, the union of the two natures in Him, is the direct confrontation of the totality of the divine with the human in the one Jesus Christ."

[2] Ibid., p. 84 (KD, p. 92).

[3] Ibid., p. 88 (KD, pp. 96-97). See also p. 70 (KD, p. 76).

[4] Ibid., p. 93 (KD, p. 102).

A second result of the exclusive determination of the human essence by the divine is that it becomes a participant in the inner life of the trinity and in the outward works of the Father and Holy Spirit. As man, however, the Son of Man does not make the trinity into a quartet. The human essence participates in God's inner life, but it does not do so as a fourth mode of being.[2]

A third result of this mutual determination is that the human essence becomes the instrument of the eternal Son in his mediational act of revealing God to man and reconciling man to God. Because of its determination it receives the power and authority to render a faithful service to God. Through grace the human nature is an effective witness.[3]

This does not mean, however, that the human nature possesses the power that belongs to God himself. Barth places two restrictions upon that which the human essence receives when God makes it suitable as his medium of revelation. The first is that the human essence receives the power to attest God and witness to him only in the event of revelation. This power is not something which the human nature appropriates and makes his own.[1] The second restriction is that although the human essence receives divine power, authority, and universality, it does not receive the divine omnipotence nor does it become divine. "And it does not follow from this . . . that omnipotence and therefore divinity accrue to the human essence of this man as such."[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 93 (KD, p. 103).

[2] Ibid., p. 94 (KD, p. 103).

[3] Ibid., p. 96 (KD, p. 106).

A fourth result of the mutual determination is that the human nature is exalted to a dignity and majesty which is possessed by the eternal Son. As the human essence of the Son, it shares the precedence of God over the created order.[3]

Actualization

The final step in Barth's analysis of the fellowship and mutual participation of the two natures concerns the concept of actualization. According to Barth, the two natures achieve a new actualization in their union. Although the divine essence was actual previously, in this union it becomes the divine essence as it is determined by this act.[4] Similarly, although many other men bear human essence, and it cannot be said that the human essence is actualized only in Christ, but there is a new actualization in that the human essence is now exalted to fellowship with God. The human essence is determined by the divine essence and directed to the divine essence.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 97 (KD, p. 107).

[2] Ibid., pp. 98-99 (KD, pp. 108-10).

[3] Ibid., pp. 99-101 (KD, pp. 109-12).

[4] Ibid., pp. 113-14 (KD, pp. 125-26).

In this common actualization, each of the essences achieves a realization which is fitting for its own inherent being. In the one Jesus Christ, the divine essence "rules and reveals and gives" while the human essence "serves and attests and mediates." The two essences work together harmoniously in relation to each other, but each performs distinct functions. Barth states:

> The divine and the human work together. But even in their common working they are not interchangeable. The divine is still above and the human below. Their relationship is one of genuine action.[2]

The distinction of the two essences can be specified clearly through the concept of obedience. There are two wills involved in the one Jesus Christ, the divine and the human. The one commands and the other obeys.[3]

Now that the basic features of Barth's concept of the union of the two natures are before us, it is not difficult to see why some interpreters have considered him to be an Antiochian theologian. His analysis of this union is, at the same time, an analysis of God's relationship with men throughout the entire span of history. Jesus seems to be one among many, united with God in harmony because of his unique obedience. We wish to point out four principal characteristics of Barth's doctrine which support an Antiochian interpretation.

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[1] Ibid., p. 114 (KD, p. 127).

[2] Ibid., p. 116 (KD, p. 129).

[3] Ibid.

First, Barth carefully safeguards the differences between the two natures. Neither of them is transformed into the other, nor are they blended in such a way that their inherent distinctions are impaired. In this way, Barth allies himself with the traditional Antiochian opposition to any confusion or mixture of the two natures. At the same time, he makes it possible for the two natures to be understood as two distinct persons, God and Jesus.

Second, the way Barth historicizes the relation of the two natures grants to each of them a degree of independence which we might expect to occur in relations between persons. The contrast between Barth and older theologies on this point can be illustrated briefly by recalling Barth's rejection of the metaphor that the two natures are united as two planks glued together.[1] According to this metaphor, the two essences are externally compressed together in one visible form. By rejecting this figure, Barth appears to separate the two natures from each other, making them more distant from one another and giving each of them greater independence. This is not to say that God is not present in and through the human nature, for God is present everywhere, and he is present here in a unique way. Nor is it to deny that the two natures are related directly to one another. Yet, with the rejection of the analogy of the two planks and its replacement by a historical relation, the two natures stand apart from each other so that they can confront each other.

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[1] Ibid., p. 70 (KD, p. 75).

Third, the relationship between the two natures is active rather than static. It is an event, not a state, and therefore it is continually changing in significant ways.[1] In every moment, each nature actively responds to the other; the human nature responds in obedience. This is not to say, however, that the relation can cease or that it is in any sense contingent upon external factors which might affect it. Although the relation is dynamic, it has been firmly established. This conception seems to require the kind of independence between the two participants, and the kind of freedom on the part of each of them, that we find in persons.

Fourth, the way that Barth conceives the relation between the two natures as a relationship of confrontation and fellowship seems to support the Antiochian perspective. The notion of fellowship seems to require at least two personal realities to communicate with each other. Further, the way

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[1] Ibid., p. 109 (KD, p. 121).

Barth develops this concept, with its emphasis upon the two natures mutually interpenetrating one another, determining one another, and actualizing one another, lends itself to a personal interpretation. They are related in a way which might be described as an "I-Thou," a true meeting of persons.[1]

The Coordination of the Work

Since the unity of the person of Christ in Barth's theology involves the unity of his saving work, it is important to see whether his coordination of the divine and human aspects of this work can be interpreted in an Antiochian sense. The evidence for such an interpretation is found in the way Barth correlates the divine and human elements with Christ's two states, humiliation and exaltation, and his three offices, priest, king, and prophet. Barth distinguishes the two natures, the two states, and the offices of priest and king in such a way that there appear to be two agents involved, God and Jesus. To show how this is the case, we shall observe Barth's account more closely.

In the fourth volume of the _Church Dogmatics_, Barth discusses God's act of reconciliation. He begins with the first moment in that act, God's humiliation, his condescension toward creaturely reality. God, in his mode of being as Son, became a man; the Lord became a servant. By participating in creaturely life and accepting man's place on the cross, the eternal Son performed his role as priest. As a priest for man, the eternal Son overcame sin and accomplished the justification of all men before God.

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[1] See Prenter, "Zweinaturlehre," pp. 10-30, and Barr, p. 337.

In his condescension to man, the Son of God became the judge who allowed himself to be judged. In the place of sinners, the Son took the judgment upon himself that is due them. He became the rejected one. By performing this action, he exercised his true judgment in pronouncing us righteous.[1] In this act, God the Son fulfilled and revealed God's justice and love.[2]

The humiliation and condescension of the Son of God can be described in various ways. For example, it is discussed in scripture in financial terms, as the payment for sins, or in military concepts as the victory of God over sin. It can also be described in the language of the ritual of the Old Testament. The Son of God is the priest who intercedes for man. He offers a sacrifice on behalf of his people, but the sacrificial victim is himself rather than an animal. The act of sacrifice is his death on the cross, and this act, as the sacrifice of old, is a judgment upon men for their sins. The offering of this priest is perfect, and it is accepted by God as satisfaction for man's sins.[1]

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[1] CD 4/1, pp. 222-24 (KD, pp. 243-45).

[2] Ibid., pp. 231-73 (KD, pp. 254-301). See also CD 2/1, pp. 393-406 (KD, pp. 442-57).

The one reconciling act of God in Jesus Christ has a second dimension, the exaltation of human essence. By condescending to man, God at that moment exalts human nature into fellowship with himself. In this exaltation the Son of Man overcomes his sin of sloth and performs his kingly office. He rules his people and the cosmos, establishing their santification.

In his office as king, the Son of Man was present to other men in a royal manner. He could not fail to be seen and heard; he was among men in an inescapable way. He demanded decision from men, and he made a decision concerning them. He was with men in a way that cannot be forgotten or revoked. Although he has been present in this manner in the past, this does not mean that he is no longer present. As the living Lord, he is still present to men in the same way that he has been present in the past.[2]

As the royal man, Jesus' existence is analogous to God's existence and work. Like God, he is held in low esteem, and he ignored the important and wealthy people of his day in favour of the lowly, weak, and poor. He calls into question all man's institutions and beliefs, and he does so without opposing man but by standing with him.[3]

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[1] CD 4/1, pp. 273-83 (KD, pp. 301-11).

[2] CD 4/2, pp. 156-66 (KD, pp. 175-85).

[3] Ibid., pp. 166-92 (KD, pp. 185-213).

In his kingly being, the words and accomplishments of Jesus are united in one work, one life-act. This life-act is itself the being of Jesus Christ.[1] Finally, the kingly work of the Son of Man is sanctifying because it is performed in complete obedience to God's will.[2]

These two dimensions of the one act of God are associated with the divine and the human natures respectively. It is through his divinity that the eternal Son becomes man. This act reveals that his divinity is of such a kind that it can become participant in humanity.[3] This means, for Barth, that it is the eternal Son of God who becomes a man, not the Son of Man. On the other hand, it is the human nature and not the divine nature which is exalted into fellowship with God. This means that it is the Son of Man, who is exalted, not the Son of God.[4]

The prophetic work of Jesus Christ is the fact that this two-fold act of his, his humiliation and his exaltation, makes itself known as such. Christ's prophetic work is not simply his preaching as a man. It is not limited to his human words in the first century, as is often the case in older christologies which assign Jesus' prophetic office to his preaching, his priestly office to his death, and his kingly office to his resurrection and continuing lordship.[1] For Barth, the prophetic work is the self-declaration of the total act of Jesus Christ. In its downward and upward movements, this one act proclaims itself today as it has in the past.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 192-264 (KD, pp. 214-93).

[2] Ibid., p. 252 (KD, pp. 279-80); also p. 516 (KD, p. 584).

[3] CD 4/1, pp. 129-30 (KD, pp. 141-42). See also pp. 157-210 (KD, pp. 171-231).

[4] CD 4/2, pp. 6, 19-21, 28-30, 71 (KD, pp. 4-5, 19-21, 29-32, 77).

In an Antiochian interpretation, the way Barth restricts the humiliation and the priestly function of Jesus Christ to his divine nature, and the exaltation and kingly function to the human nature, indicates that there are two independent agents cooperating in one work. The divine nature apparently does not participate in the exaltation, and the human nature evidently does not participate in the humiliation. If this is what Barth means, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that reconciliation is exclusively a divine work. It is not the God-man who reconciles; it is God who reconciles and man who is reconciled.

Similarly, the prophetic office of Christ, in an Antiochian view, does not bind the two natures together in one person. Although both natures participate in the prophetic office, they do so as two separate movements in one event. The oneness is that of a single event, not a single agent.

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[1] CD 4/3, p. 15 (KD, p. 14).

As a result, there appear to be two distinct agents cooperating in one work. God is the priest who is humiliated, and Jesus is the exalted, kingly man.[1]

Jesus Christ as a History

In his development of the concept of the unity of Christ, Barth depicts Christ as the history and the act of God. Christ is not simply the man who is related to God in the event of reconciliation, he is the event of reconciliation itself. How can an Antiochian interpretation, which emphasizes that Jesus Christ is primarily a human person, incorporate this aspect of Barth's thought in a convincing manner?

We have noted earlier that the ancient Antiochians, notably Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia, used prosopon to designate both the unity of the Logos and the man Jesus and also each one as individuals. Barth's characterization of Jesus Christ as a history, an act, and an event can serve much the same purpose. If Jesus Christ is the history in which both God and the man Jesus are participants, it is proper to say that Jesus Christ is fully God and fully man. This history is both God and man in the sense that it includes the two personal realities.

Does this mean that this history is really a third kind of reality, neither God or man? And, is the name "Jesus Christ" simply placed upon a phenomenon which is not really a person in any real sense? Consequently, does this interpretation of Barth turn him into an Arian? An Antiochian interpretation can answer "No" to all these questions, basing this negative response on Barth's claim that a person is his act. Since Jesus Christ is his act and not simply a being behind an act, he is the act, and therefore the event, in which both God and man are present. He is this act and event without ceasing to be a person.

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[1] For a more thorough defense of this interpretation, see Prenter, "Zweinaturlehre," especially pp. 1-10, 43-64; Barr, pp. 39-41, 337-41; and Klooster, pp. 94-95.

An Antiochian view attempts to make this claim intelligible by arguing that a person should not be defined strictly in terms of an ego or self who exists apart from his acts, his relationship with other humans, and his environment. If one thinks of a person as identical with his life, then his being includes his interrelations with his fellows. Insofar as a person is his life, he is an event and a history.

When this concept is applied to Jesus, it is possible to understand him as an event. This is not to say that a mere happening is given the name "Jesus Christ." It is to say that the being of the human subject Jesus includes his history as well as the agent who acts in that history. Further, it is possible to say that Jesus Christ is divine in the sense that God is also present in this event. God is present guiding and directing the man Jesus. However, insofar as Jesus is an agent who is presupposed by his actions, he is not a divine agent but a human agent. This Jesus is, however, an abstraction from the event which he is.[1]

Barth's Use of the Name "Jesus Christ" in an Antiochian Perspective

In keeping with traditional Antiochian terminology, those who interpret Barth as a representative of this position believe that he uses different terms to distinguish the two persons, God and Jesus. Such terms as "Jesus," "Jesus of Nazareth," "the man Jesus," and "Son of Man" are understood to denote the individual human being who is related to God in the incarnation. Sometimes, "human nature" or "humanity" also seem to be used by Barth to denote this man. "Son of God," "Word of God," and "Logos" are thought to denote the agent God. "Christ" and "Jesus Christ" are somewhat more ambiguous, denoting the human Jesus and his history, the event in which he is related to his fellows and to God.[2] This event can be understood in both a narrow and a broad sense; it is the instant in which God speaks through Jesus to particular recipients,[1] and it is also the entire span of history, which is, in a sense, included in Jesus' history because of God's unique presence there.

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[1] The position we have sketched here is quite similar to that of John Knox, _Jesus, Lord and Christ: A Trilogy Comprising "The Man Christ Jesus," "Christ the Lord," "On the Meaning of Christ"_ (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1958), pp. 225-35. Here Knox considers "The Event and the Person." It seems apparent that Knox's view is Antiochian, according to the definition we have proposed.

[2] Prenter, "Zweinaturlehre," pp. 10,20, argues that

One principal factor which supports an Antiochian interpretation of Barth's language is that he often seems to substitute those names which appear to denote a human person for the human nature which God assumed in the incarnation. While Barth does not say explicitly that the human nature is named "Jesus" or "Jesus of Nazareth," the apparent substitution suggests that Barth thinks of the human nature in a concrete sense, as a complete individual.

This apparent substitution occurs primarily in two different contexts, revelation and reconciliation. In our discussion of these topics earlier in this chapter, we encountered this substitution, but we did not draw attention to it as such. Here we shall give examples, relying upon the

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Barth understands the two natures as two persons, and that "Son of God" names the divine person, while "Son of Man" denotes the human person. Similarly, Kehm, pp. 251, 319, gives explanations of "Jesus" and "Jesus Christ" which seem Antiochian. He says, "'Jesus' denotes a particular man who lived and died in a particular, limited span of creaturely time." He adds, "To sum up, the name 'Jesus Christ,' as Barth uses it, designates the earthly-historical Jesus, not a 'state of affairs' in God."

[1] Barth sometimes uses "Holy Scripture" and "proclamation" to denote not simply the creaturely media but the event in which God speaks through them. See CD 1/1, p. 104 (KD, p. 95).

earlier discussion for clarification.

As we have seen, Barth groups the man Jesus and the human nature of Christ among the creaturely forms of revelation. He seems to equate the two when he speaks of them in parallel constructions, apparently substituting the one for the other. For example, Barth says:

> We may at once conclude from the fact that such attempts at secularisation are not undertaken in the NT, that in it, too, the humanitas Christi comes under the reservation of God's holiness, i. e. that the power and continuity in which the man Jesus of Nazareth, according to the testimony of the evangelists and apostles, was in fact the revealed word, consisted here also in the power and continuity of the divine action in this form and not in the continuity of this form as such.[1]

In this quote, it appears that the form of revelation can be described either as the humanity of Christ or the man Jesus. If so, it seems that Jesus is a human person, and not a divine one.

Another example of an apparent use of "Jesus" to denote the human nature as though this human nature were a person in itself is found in Barth's discussion of the two types of christological statements. Barth mentions these two types in the context of an explanation of the mysteriousness of revelation. In order to understand his point, we need to say a word about the mystery.

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[1] CD 1/1, p. 371 (KD, p. 341). This is not at all an isolated case, but Barth's usual manner of speaking. See pp. 448, 457 (KD, pp. 411, 419).

Barth states that in revelation the form veils the content in such a way that we can know either the creaturely form or the divine content, but not both, at any given moment. "But if one moment the one becomes true for us in experience and thought, we must the next moment have faith in the other which does not become discernible by us."[1]

To illustrate the one-sidedness and mysteriousness of revelation, Barth turns to the two types of christological statements. These two types are of such a different character that there is no systematic connection between them. Both of them speak of the humanity and the divinity of Christ, but, says Barth, they do so with "such variety in the direction of interest and emphasis" that it is reasonable to assume that they are antithetical to each other.

> It is impossible to listen to the two statements at the same time, Jesus of Nazareth is God's Son, and, God's Son is Jesus of Nazareth. Here we listen to either the one or the other, or we listen to nothing at all.[2]

The point we wish to emphasize is that "Jesus of Nazareth" in the two types of statements might be understood to denote the human nature and its personality. If so, then Barth apparently personalizes the human nature, conceiving it as a person distinct from the person God.

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[1] Ibid., p. 205 (KD, p. 187).

[2] Ibid., p. 206 (KD, p. 188). We have noted earlier that the "is" in such statements is interpreted as an "is" of becoming. Now we wish to point out that the two titles or names involved here are understood as denoting two separate, distinct persons.

This interpretation is based upon the fact that Barth indicates that both statements are about the humanity and the divinity of Jesus Christ. Further, the statements are illustrations of Barth's claim that we can know or perceive only the form or the content of revelation at any given moment. The appearance of these sentences in this context implies that the term "God's Son" denotes the content of revelation, and "Jesus of Nazareth" denotes the form.

If this is the way Barth intends for these terms to be understood, then the Antiochian interpretation of the two types of christological statements is complementary with its view of Barth's concept of indirect identity. If the "is" in the christological statements means "becomes," then it seems clear that "God the Son" denotes the divine person and "Jesus of Nazareth" denotes a human person.

Turning now from revelation to reconciliation, we note that Barth's language implies that there are two agents involved in the reconciling event. Barth explains that it is the divine nature which is humiliated and the human nature which is exalted. The divine nature is not exalted, nor is the human nature humiliated. In explanation of these distinct roles, Barth states that it is the Son of God who is humiliated and the Son of Man who is exalted. For example, "The atonement as it took place in Jesus Christ is the one inclusive event of this going out of the Son of God and coming in of the Son of Man."[1] It is possible to conclude from this manner of speaking that Barth is substituting "Son of Man" for "human nature," and that he means, therefore, that the human nature is itself a concrete person with his own name.

Because of the reconciling act of God in the incarnation, a unity has been established between God and men, and also between the divine nature and the human nature. In discussing this unity, Barth appears to substitute "Jesus," "Jesus of Nazareth" and "Son of Man" for the human nature and "God" and "Son of God" for the divine nature. To illustrate this flexibility in Barth's language, we offer two examples. In the first Barth talks of the unity of the human nature with the Son of God.

> What happens to the familiar cosmic reality now that the human nature in Christ is adopted and taken up into unity with the Son of God, is substantially a restoration and confirmation of its original connexion with God.[2]

In the second example, Barth talks of a unity of the Son of God with the man Jesus. He says:

> The Son of God in His unity with the Israelite Jesus exists in direct and unlimited solidarity with the representatively and manifestly sinful humanity of Israel.[3]

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 21 (KD, p. 21).

[2] CD 1/2, p. 37 (KD, p. 41). See also pp. 161-62 (KD, pp. 176-78).

[3] CD 4/1, p. 172 (KD, p. 187). See also p. 175 (KD, p. 191); CD 3/2, p. 483 (KD, p. 581); CD 2/2, p. 8 (KD, p. 7).

In this second example, Barth seems to be talking of two persons who are united. There are two names involved here, and the implication is that two persons are related in some direct way. In ordinary language we would not speak of one person being united with himself by using two different names to refer to the one person.

Once the Antiochian interpretation has concluded that Barth uses these names to denote two persons, it uses this principle as a key for understanding his christological language. When Barth speaks of "Jesus" or "Jesus of Nazareth" having human qualities and performing human actions, it is assumed that he is speaking of the human person. When he ascribes divine predicates to "Jesus" or "Jesus of Nazareth," it is assumed that these apply directly to the divine person but indirectly to Jesus because of his relation to God.

Conclusion

In the first section of this chapter we discussed the basic features of Antiochian and Alexandrian christologies. We introduced evidence to support our hypothesis that the different ways these two schools of thought approach the doctrine of the divinity of Jesus Christ, the unity of the person of Christ, and the meaning of the name "Jesus Christ" are directly related to the way they conceive the identity of Jesus Christ. For Antiochian thought, Jesus Christ is a human person distinct from God. Therefore, he can be said to be divine only because of his relation to God, not his essence. The unity of Jesus with God is a fellowship of a divine person with a human person, established by God's grace. The name "Jesus" denotes a human person, not a divine one. For Alexandrian thought, on the other hand, Jesus Christ is directly identical with the eternal Son of God. He is divine by nature, and in his second stage of existence he unites to himself a human nature which is other than a complete person. "Jesus" and its variants denote this divine person, not a human one.

In the rest of the chapter we have constructed an Antiochian interpretation of Barth's treatment of the divinity of Jesus Christ, the unity of his person, and the meaning of the name "Jesus Christ." The way Barth groups the man Jesus among the creaturely forms of revelation suggests that he is a complete human individual who becomes identical with God's Word when God speaks through him. His divinity appears to belong to him because of his participation in the revelatory event. Similarly, when Barth explains God's assumption of the human nature in the incarnation, he grants to the human nature a will, personality, and self-consciousness. As a result, although the human nature is not an existing person before the incarnation, it seems to become one in this event. Further, the way Barth historicizes the resulting relation between the Word and the human nature indicates that the human nature is a subject capable of responding to the Word in faith, obedience, and fellowship. The impression that there are two persons involved in this union is reinforced by the way Barth correlates the divine nature with the humiliation and priestly office of the Son of God and the human nature with the exaltation and kingly office of the Son of Man. Finally, Barth seems to use "Jesus" and its variants to denote the human nature of the Logos, implying that he is a person who is relatively independent from the person God.

CHAPTER III

Barth's Alexandrian Christological Doctrine

Introduction

In spite of the formidable data which support an Antiochian interpretation of Barth, it is our view that his position is basically Alexandrian. The structure of Barth's doctrine of the divinity of Jesus Christ, his concept of the unity of the person, and also his language about Christ support this conclusion. In this chapter we shall present evidence for an Alexandrian interpretation of Barth's development of the first two of the three topics mentioned. Our analysis of his christological language will be found in the fourth chapter.

Our principal thesis in this chapter is that Barth conceives of Jesus Christ as directly identical with God. Both in God's inner-trinitarian life, and also in his existence as a man in time, Jesus Christ is the person God and the act of God. In order to show that Barth understands Christ in this way, we must examine his claim that Jesus Christ is the act of God.

In the first section of the chapter we shall show that Jesus Christ is the act of God and therefore the essence of God. The phrase "essential divinity" in the title of this section indicates that Jesus Christ is divine by nature, not by relation. Divinity is predicated to him because it belongs to him, not simply because God is present in and with him. In Barth's analysis, the act of Jesus Christ is his essence and also his divinity. This act is fully divine because it is the trinitarian act which constitutes God's being. Although Jesus Christ is divine, there is no opposition between this claim and belief in one God. The divinity of Jesus Christ is directly identical with the divinity of God.

In the second section of this chapter we shall turn to the unity of the Son of God with the human nature which he assumes. Here we shall argue that Jesus Christ is directly identical with God because his existence is the existence of God and because he is the divine subject who acts through his human nature. Although the human nature is the subject of human actions and qualities, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that it is a complete human person. The bearer of the human nature is God, not a man who is a person distinct from God.

The Essential Divinity of Jesus Christ

We shall begin our discussion of Barth's concept of the essential divinity of Jesus Christ by showing that Barth identifies Jesus Christ with God's act. Then we shall consider his claim that Jesus Christ is the act which is the essence of God, not simply one of many acts of God. Barth's grounds for making this affirmation are found in the event of revelation. An analysis of this event leads to a concept of the trinity, and this doctrine affirms that Jesus Christ is both the act of God and the essence of God. The divinity of Christ is the essence which he shares with the Father and the Holy Spirit. The fact of Christ's essential divinity will be reinforced, and its nature clarified, by a discussion of Barth's identification of God's act with his being. This equation leads to a consideration of God's act of positing himself and loving himself in Jesus Christ. Next, we shall turn to Barth's claim that the one act of God has two dimensions, an inner and an outer, and that these dimensions are two moments in the divinity of Jesus Christ. Finally, we shall show that Jesus Christ is the person God.

Jesus Christ as the Act of God

Since the concept of the essential divinity of Jesus Christ is dependent upon the claim that Jesus Christ is the act of God, it is important to show that Barth explicitly emphasizes this identity. Particularly important statements of this relation are found in Barth's development of the doctrines of reconciliation and revelation, and therefore we turn to them.

Barth declares that Jesus Christ is the history of reconciliation in which God condescends to man and exalts man to himself.

> In every theological context in which we must name the name of Jesus Christ--and there is none in which we do not have to name it at the decisive point--it is this history which is meant according to our assumption: the act of God in which the Son of God becomes identical with the man Jesus of Nazareth, and therefore unites human essence with His divine essence, and therefore exalts the human into fellowship with the divine; the act of God in which He humbles Himself to exalt man. The Subject Jesus Christ is this history.[1]

This history of reconciliation is also the event in which God reveals himself to man. Reconciliation, revelation, and Jesus Christ are identical. "Revelation in fact does not differ from the Person of Jesus Christ, and again does not differ from the reconciliation which took place in Him."[2]

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 107 (KD, p. 118). In this discussion of Jesus Christ as the act of God, Barth speaks of Jesus Christ as the event (*Ereignis*) of revelation, the act (*Tun*, *Tat*, *Akt*) in which God reveals himself, and the history (*Geschichte*) in which God deals with man. See pp. 105-9 (KD, pp. 116-21).

See also CD 1/2, pp. 167-88 (KD, pp. 183-84); CD 4/1, p. 35 (KD, p. 35); CD 4/3, pp. 7, 40 (KD, pp. 6, 42).

[2] CD 1/1, p. 134 (KD, p. 122). For additional statements of the identity of Jesus Christ with revelation, see pp. 131, 155 (KD, pp. 119, 141).

Barth also identifies Jesus Christ and revelation with the Word of God. See pp. 131-33, 156, 163, 174 (KD, pp. 120-21, 142, 148, 159).

Barth's identification of Jesus Christ with God's act does not mean merely that Jesus Christ is dependent upon God as other creatures. It means that Jesus Christ is divine in his essence and therefore he is God himself. To show that this is what Barth means, and to indicate his grounds for affirming it, we shall discuss his development of the relation of revelation to the concept of the trinity.

Revelation and the Trinity

Our purpose here is to show that Barth understands Jesus Christ as the act which is God's second mode of being and that he bases this claim upon revelation. Because Jesus Christ is the second of the trinity, he is of the same essence as the Father and the Holy Spirit. His divinity is absolutely his own determination, just as the Father's divinity is his own.

Since Barth identifies Jesus Christ with revelation, his insistence that Christian theology must begin with revelation means that it must begin with Jesus Christ. In addition, because Jesus Christ is also of the same divine essence as the Father and the Holy Spirit, to begin with revelation is to begin with the divinity of Jesus Christ.[1]

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[1] Further confirmation of this point will be found in our discussion of the second moment in God's act, his obedience as a man in Jesus Christ. At this juncture, see CD 1/1, p. 361 (KD, p. 332) where Barth indicates that the action of God in revelation is the divinity of Christ. See

When we begin here, we are led to a doctrine of the trinity.

If God is truly known in revelation, Barth argues, then the God who is known there is the triune God. This is true because an analysis of the event of revelation attested in the Bible leads immediately to a doctrine of the trinity.[1] The event of revelation has a three-fold structure. This trinitarian arrangement is implied in the fact that the event of revelation confronts us with three questions. In order to understand this event, we must ask who reveals himself, how he reveals himself, and what is the result of this revealing. The answer to all three questions is the same. It is God who reveals himself. He reveals himself through himself, and therefore the event of revelation is himself. Finally, the result is the revealedness of God himself. He is the one who is revealed.[2]

According to scripture, Barth points out, that through which God reveals himself is Jesus Christ. He is the event

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also p. 465 (KD, p. 427) where Barth equates the divinity of Christ with his revelation of God. For example: "To confess him as the revelation of his Father, is to confess him as being essentially equal in divinity to this Father of his." For Barth's claim that our thinking must begin with the divinity of Christ, see p. 483 (KD, p. 443).

[1] CD 1/1, p. 358 (KD, p. 329). "We come to the doctrine of the Trinity by no other way than by that of an analysis of the concept of revelation."

[2] Ibid., pp. 339-40 (KD, pp. 311-12).

of revelation, the act of God, and therefore God himself. The scripture acknowledges that Jesus Christ is God in his second mode of being when it attributes to him the title "Lord."[1] If we interpret this assessment of Christ in ways which deny that he is fully divine, then we jeopardize our knowledge of God. Unless this act of revelation is God himself, it is not God that we know but someone or something less than God.[2]

According to Barth, if Jesus Christ is truly God, then God must maintain distinctions in himself, and Jesus Christ must be God's second mode of being. This conclusion follows from the fact that Jesus Christ points beyond himself to the Father, the one to whom he prays and to whom he is obedient.[3] As the Father, God remains free and hidden even in his revelation. In his self-unveiling, God becomes an object of human thought and speech. But this presence before men is the result of his decision. It presupposes his ability to assume a form, to become God himself a second time, in a second way, distinct from his hiddenness.[4]

Barth states that the formal characteristics of the event of revelation indicate the way God is related to himself in his inner being. Just as in the event of revelation there is the origin of revelation, revelation itself, and the result of revelation, so also in God there is an origin and two issues from that origin.[1] The distinctions of the event of revelation are grounded in the essence of God.[2] God can become the Son known to us because he is already the Son in himself.[3] He can become the one we know as the Father of Jesus because he is already the Father in himself.[4]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 458-60 (KD, pp. 420-22).

[2] Ibid., p. 358 (KD, p. 329). See also pp. 436-40 (KD, pp. 400-404).

[3] Ibid., pp. 442-43 (KD, pp. 405-6).

[4] Ibid., pp. 362-69 (KD, pp. 332-39).

In order to state how God can be three and yet still one, Barth prefers to use the concept "essence" (Wesen) for God's oneness and the concept "way of being" (Seinsweise) for each of the three in God.[5] God is God in three modes of being, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But these are not three personalities or three gods.[6] The three are of one essence, and that means that they are the same identical essence.[7] The divinity of Jesus Christ is that he shares in the one essence of God, an essence which is shared also by the Father and the Holy Spirit.[1]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 417-18 (KD, pp. 383-84).

[2] Ibid., p. 440 (KD, pp. 403-4).

[3] Ibid., p. 474 (KD, p. 435).

[4] Ibid., pp. 448-50 (KD, pp. 411-13).

[5] Ibid., pp. 403, 412 (KD, pp. 370, 379).

[6] Ibid., pp. 400-403 (KD, 367-70).

[7] Ibid., p. 403 (KD, p. 370). See also p. 502 (KD, p. 461).

Because Jesus Christ is divine in this sense, he is different from all other men. Barth explains that the divinity of Jesus Christ is

> that which Jesus Christ has in common with the Father and the Holy Spirit as the Son of God, that which distinguishes His being and its nature from the being and nature of man, and of all other reality distinct from God, with an absolute (and infinitely qualitative) distinction.[2]

Thus, when Barth states that Christ's divinity is his revelation of the Father,[3] this does not mean simply that Jesus Christ is a human medium who is said to be divine because he mediates the knowledge of God. Rather, it means that Jesus Christ is the revelation of God as the act which is God's second mode of being. Even in himself, in the innertrinitarian life, prior to the existence of the creature, Jesus Christ is the act of God by which God knows and loves himself.[4] He can reveal God because he is God, not simply because he is a creature who has a special relation to God.

For Barth, then, the event of revelation in Christ indicates that Jesus Christ is the second mode of God's triune being and that he is, therefore, identical with God himself. "Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God Himself, as God his Father is God Himself."[1] Many questions remain, however. The doctrine of the trinity functions to identify God, but it tells us little about his nature.[2] Can Barth give more complete information about the nature of the God who is three? What do the three modes of God participate "in"? What is God's essence? Barth's answer to these questions gives support to the conclusion that Jesus Christ is fully and absolutely divine. He states that the essence of God is his act.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 457-60 (KD, pp. 419-22).

[2] CD 4/2, p. 61 (KD, p. 65).

[3] CD 1/1, p. 443 (KD, p. 406).

[4] Ibid., pp. 474-512 (KD, pp. 435-70). Barth's long discussion of "The Eternal Son" is a defense of the claim that Jesus Christ is the eternal act of God.

God's Act as His Being

Barth defines God's essence as his act. He states

> To its very deepest depths God's Godhead consists in the fact that it is an event--not any event, not events in general, but the event of His action, in which we have a share in God's revelation.[3]

This identification is inherently related to the concept of the divinity of Jesus Christ. Because Jesus Christ is the act of God, and because God is his act, it follows immediately that Jesus Christ is the essence of God. Further, since God's essence is his deity,[1] it follows that the deity of God is also the deity of Jesus Christ.

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[1] Ibid., p. 474 (KD, p. 435).

[2] For support of this notion of the function of the trinity see Robert W. Jenson, God after God: The God of the Past and the God of the Future, Seen in the Work of Karl Barth (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969), pp. 97-98.

[3] CD 2/1, p. 263 (KD, p. 294).

While this equation of Jesus Christ, as the act of God, with the essence of God follows a coherent pattern of thought on the abstract level, it has the appearance of emptiness. What does it mean to say that God's act is his being, and how is the claim to be understood? Our purpose here is to show that the identity of God's act with God's being is directly related to God's act in his inner-trinitarian life. Barth states: "This essence of God which is seen in His revealed name is His being and therefore His act as Father, Son and Holy Spirit."[2] Since the trinitarian act of God is also God's act in Jesus Christ, it becomes clear why Jesus Christ is the essence of God. The nature of God's act is, at the same time, the nature of Jesus Christ.[3]

In himself, in his inner being, God acts in a particular way. The act which is his being is not merely activity in general. God performs one "specific act with a definite content";[4] yet it has different dimensions and can be described in various ways. This act is the act in which God knows and loves himself. It is the act in which he repeats himself, in which he posits himself a second time.

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[1] CD 1/1, p. 401 (KD, p. 369).

[2] CD 2/1, p. 273 (KD, p. 306).

[3] Ibid., pp. 257-321 (KD, pp. 288-361). These pages, containing Barth's consideration of "The Being of God as the One Who Loves in Freedom," are particularly relevant for our discussion below.

[4] Ibid., p. 272 (KD, p. 306).

The act which is God has a trinitarian structure.[1] The way in which the three in God constitute the structure of this act probably can best be presented through the concept of original relations.[2] There is in God an origin of his act, the act itself, and the relation of the origin to the act. Barth states:

> This threeness consists in the fact that in the essence or act in which God is God there is first a pure origin and then two different issues, the first of which is to be attributed solely to the origin, the second, different in kind, to the origin and likewise to the first issue.[3]

The Son of God, Jesus Christ, is the act of God, the first product of God which is at the same time fully identical with God. It is not possible, Barth explains, to conceive how Jesus Christ can be the act of God and also the essence of God. "We, too, cannot say how an essence can be at once its own producer and in a twofold sense its own product." Yet the revelation attested in the Bible requires this statement.[4]

Although Barth conceives of Jesus Christ both as the act of God and also as the Son who is posited and loved in this act, it should not be supposed that he means that there are two "Sons" in God. Jesus Christ is the Son who is loved because he is the act of loving itself.

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[1] CD 1/1, p. 407 (KD, p. 374). Barth uses Ordnung.

[2] Ibid., pp. 416-23 (KD, pp. 382-88).

[3] Ibid., p. 418 (KD, p. 384).

[4] Ibid., p. 421 (KD, p. 387).

Some confusion is created because Barth applies the concept of act both to God in his second mode of being and also to God as a whole. That is, since God is defined as act, and since the structure of this act is threefold, the concept of act designates one of the three elements in the structure and also the whole which the structure establishes. This fact is related to the inconceivability of God's triune character, yet it also attests the importance of the concept of Jesus Christ as the act of God. As the act of God, Jesus Christ contributes to the structure of God's being because he is the "whole."[1]

The affirmation that God's act is his being, then, is rooted in the doctrine of the trinity. The content of this act needs to be explored in more detail. As we specify this content, we also specify the nature of Jesus Christ, for this act is his being.

In the first place, says Barth, the act which is God is his act of revelation. It is the act in which God knows himself and in which he allows men to participate in that knowledge. If God had not revealed himself in Jesus Christ, we could not know him, but because he has, our knowledge is certain.[1]

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[1] CD 2/1, pp. 262-63 (KD, pp. 293-94). "God is He who in this event is subject, predicate and object; the revealer, the act of revelation, the revealed; Father, Son and Holy Spirit." This quote indicates the double character of "act." It indicates the "whole," the "event" which God is "in," and it also indicates the second "part" of this "whole."

Secondly, the act which constitutes God's being is the act which makes him alive. At the core of his being God is active. That means that we have "to resist the threatened absorption of the doctrine of God into a doctrine of being."[2] His life is the act by which he knows and loves himself as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; it is his act in Christ.

Thirdly, the act which is God's being is completely self-motivated and self-moved. God is not determined by something outside himself. His being is simply his decision to be what he is. "The fact that God's being is event, the event of God's act, necessarily . . . means that it is His own conscious, willed and executed decision." In this respect, God is absolutely unique. "No other being is absolutely its own, conscious, willed and executed decision."[3] All other beings are determined by external factors. This decision is identical with Jesus Christ.[4]

Fourthly, God's act is also his love. Barth indicates that it is proper to say "God is love," for love is not merely a quality of God; it is his essence. However, this claim can easily be misunderstood. To say that God is love is to say that God loves.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 261-63 (KD, pp. 292-94).

[2] Ibid., p. 260 (KD, pp. 291-92).

[3] Ibid., p. 271 (KD, p. 304). For a study of Barth's concept of God's decision as his being, see Eberhard Jüngel, Gottes Sein Ist Im Werden: Verantwortliche Rede vom Sein Gottes bei Karl Barth (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1965), pp. 81-95.

[4] CD 2/2, pp. 94-127, especially p. 103 (KD, pp. 101-136, especially p. 110).

> That He is God--the Godhead of God--consists in the fact that He loves, and it is the expression of His loving that He seeks and creates fellowship with us. It is correct and important in this connexion to say emphatically, His _loving_, i.e., His act as that of the One who loves.[1]

In himself, because he is triune, God has love and fellowship. His positing himself a second time is the act in which he loves himself, and it is also the act in which this loving flows outward to men in revelation. In all its dimensions this one act is Jesus Christ.

> As and before God seeks and creates fellowship with us, He wills and completes this fellowship in Himself. In Himself He does not will to exist for Himself, to exist alone. On the contrary, He is Father, Son and Holy Spirit and therefore alive in His unique being with and for and in another. The unbroken unity of His being, knowledge and will is at the same time an act of deliberation, decision and intercourse. He does not exist in solitude but in fellowship. Therefore what He seeks and creates between Himself and us is in fact nothing else but what He wills and completes and therefore is in Himself.[2]

Finally, God's act is free. This does not mean merely that God is free in relation to the reality which is other than himself. He has a positive freedom in himself in the fact that he is grounded in his own being and is determined by himself alone.[1] This freedom consists in the act of loving in his inner-trinitarian life. "We have seen that the freedom of God, as His freedom in Himself, His primary absoluteness, has its truth and reality in the inner Trinitarian life of the Father with the Son by the Holy Spirit."[2]

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[1] CD 2/1, p. 275 (KD, p. 309). See also p. 279 (KD, p. 313). "But God loves because He loves; because this act is His being, His essence and His nature."

[2] Ibid., p. 275 (KD, pp. 308-9).

This freedom that God has in himself is the basis of God's freedom in relation to the world. His freedom in the world, his secondary absoluteness, is the natural expression of his inner freedom. Because Jesus Christ is the inner-trinitarian act, he is also this outward expression of the same act. Barth states:

> Before all worlds, in His Son He has otherness in Himself from eternity to eternity. But because this is so, the creation and preservation of the world, and relationship and fellowship with it, realised as they are in perfect freedom, without compulsion or necessity, do not signify an alien or contradictory expression of God's being, but a natural, _the_ natural expression of it _ad extra_. The world is, _because_ and as the Son of God _is_.[3]

As a result, it is clear that the "freedom of God . . . consists in His Son Jesus Christ."[4]

In this discussion of God's act, we have encountered an important distinction between God's act in himself, _ad_

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[1] Ibid., p. 301 (KD, p. 339).

[2] Ibid., p. 317 (KD, p. 356).

[3] Ibid., p. 317 (KD, p. 357). See also p. 305 (KD, p. 343). "And the freedom to exist which He exercises in His revelation is the same which He has in the depths of His eternal being, and which is proper to Him quite apart from His exercise of it _ad extra_."

[4] Ibid., p. 320 (KD, p. 360).

intra, and his act outside himself, *ad extra*, in relation to the world. It is necessary, Barth argues, to make this distinction in order to preserve the freedom and sovereignty of God. If we made no distinction between God's act *ad intra* and *ad extra*, we would turn his act *ad extra* into a necessary attribute of God. We would make the world and man indispensable for God.[1] The inner act of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit provides the ground and the possibility for God to act *ad extra*, but it does not require that act *ad extra*.[2]

In conclusion, we have shown that Barth's identification of God's act with his essence is grounded in God's trinitarian being. The act which is God's essence is his positing himself in his Son, Jesus Christ. Since there is one act involved here, and it is the act of Jesus Christ, it is clear what Barth means when he says that Jesus Christ is divine. Jesus Christ is the act and the essence of God. His deity is God's deity, and therefore it too determines itself, loves freely, and reveals itself to men. It is also a deity which acts both inwardly and outwardly. To these two dimensions we must give more attention.

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[1] CD 1/1, pp. 426, 481 (KD, pp. 391, 442).

[2] Ibid., p. 450 (KD, p. 413).

The Two Moments in the Divinity of Jesus Christ

The identification of the divinity of Jesus Christ with the divinity of God applies to Jesus Christ's life in time as well as to his being in the inner-trinitarian life of God. To make this point clear, Barth describes God's act *ad intra* and his act *ad extra* as two moments in the one act which constitutes God's being. Since Jesus Christ's existence as a man is the second moment of this one divine act, his existence is also the existence of God.

Barth discusses the two moments of the divinity of Jesus Christ in his treatment of the concept of reconciliation. In explaining the humiliation of God the Son, Barth encounters the problem of the obedience of Jesus Christ. Christ's obedience constitutes a puzzle because it raises the question of how one who is already assumed to be God can also be obedient.

This question becomes even more poignant when the implications of that obedience are spelled out. Jesus Christ, as the eternal Son of God, was obedient even to the extent of becoming the particular Jewish man who suffered and died on the cross as a man rejected by God.

> He, the electing eternal God, willed Himself to be rejected and therefore perishing man. That is something which never happened in all the dreadful things attested in the Old Testament concerning the wrath of God and the plight of man.[1]

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[1] CD 4/1, p. 175 (KD, p. 191). See also pp. 164-76 (KD, pp. 179-92).

In this obedience of Jesus we learn what the deity of Christ is. His deity is not primarily the possession of supreme attributes; it is his willingness to humble himself and become a man. "That God as God is able and willing and ready to condescend, to humble Himself in this way is the mystery of the 'deity of Christ'--although frequently it is not recognised in this concreteness."[1]

This humiliation of Jesus Christ, and therefore his deity, has two moments. The first of these is the obedience of the eternal Son in the inner life of God. The second moment is the Son's becoming a man, his "self-humiliation, His way into the far country, fulfilled in His death on the cross." The first moment "is a matter of the mystery of the inner being of God as the being of the Son in relation to the Father." The second moment "is a matter of the mystery of His deity in His work ad extra, in His presence in the world."[2]

Barth first discusses the second moment of the deity of Christ. In it, Barth affirms, the eternal Son of God freely assumes human nature, and he does so without suffering any change or setting up a contradiction in God. The mystery of the deity of Christ is that he is able to become man without causing a conflict between God's essence and his work as reconciler in the world. Although Jesus Christ places himself in the sinful condition of man, accepting as his own the contradiction of man before God, he does not join in man's opposition toward God. "He makes His own the being of man in contradiction against Him, but He does not make common cause with it." The deity of Jesus Christ allows him to act "as Lord over this contradiction even as He subjects Himself to it."[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 177 (KD, p. 193).

[2] Ibid., p. 177 (KD, pp. 193-94).

For Barth, what God reveals in the second moment of the divinity of Christ corresponds to his divine nature. From his revelation it is clear that God can be absolute and relative, infinite and finite, exalted and humiliated, transcendent and immanent, eternal and temporal.[2]

God's becoming man can be understood as the exercise of his divine perfections. His dwelling in the creaturely realm is the exercise of his omnipresence. His assuming the form of weakness and impotence is the application of his omnipotence. He is able to become temporal without ceasing to be eternal. His righteousness is seen in his identifying himself with the unrighteous. God's being both in the form of God and also in the form of a servant is what we honor and worship as the deity of Christ. This we do without concluding that there is division in God himself.[3]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 183-85 (KD, pp. 199-202).

[2] Ibid., p. 187 (KD, p. 204).

[3] Ibid., pp. 187-88 (KD, pp. 204-5).

At this point, Barth turns from the second moment in Christ's deity to the "first and inner moment of the mystery of the deity of Christ" which is presupposed by the second.[1] When we look at the obedience of Jesus Christ as a man, we infer that it must be grounded in God Himself. If the humility and obedience of Jesus Christ as a man are not simply accidental, then God must be obedient to himself in the inner-trinitarian life. His act *ad intra* provides the foundation for his act *ad extra*. Barth states:

> If, then, God is in Christ, if what the man Jesus does is God's own work, this aspect of the self-emptying and self-humbling of Jesus Christ as an act of obedience cannot be alien to God. But in this case we have to see here the other and inner side of the mystery of the divine nature of Christ and therefore of the nature of the one true God--that He Himself is also able and free to render obedience.[2]

How can it be said that there is in God an obedience? "Obedience implies an above and a below, a *prius* and a *posterius*, a superior and a junior and subordinate."[3] Does not the claim that there is an eternal obedience in God's inner life compromise the unity of the divine being? Does it not imply that there are two divine beings, "the first and commanding properly divine, the second and obeying only divine in an improper sense?"[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 192 (KD, p. 210).

[2] Ibid., p. 193 (KD, p. 211).

[3] Ibid., p. 195 (KD, p. 213).

[4] Ibid.

Because of the difficulties involved, many Christians have concluded that it is wiser to refrain from stating that there is a commanding and an obeying in God's inner act. Barth opposes such conclusions because he thinks that they deny that the true God has a real part in atonement. In order to guarantee that it is really God who acts in reconciliation, justifying and sanctifying man, we must affirm, Barth declares, that the obedience of Jesus as a man is the continuation and reflection of God's obedience to himself as Son to Father.

Because of this necessity, we have to affirm that there is a real above and below, first and second, superiority and subordination in God himself. The divine unity does not preclude this diversity but consists in it. Both, Barth argues, are maintained by a proper understanding of the trinity. The Father is the one who commands and the Son is the one who obeys, but both are the same God. They are one because they participate in the one act which constitutes God's being.[1]

Not only is the obedience of the man Jesus as such grounded in the eternal obedience of the Son to the Father. The relationship between the Father and the Son in eternity is identical with the relationship between God and one of his creatures.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 202-3 (KD, pp. 221-22). Part of Barth's statement of the trinitarian implications of the obedience of Jesus should be reported here. "As we look at Jesus Christ we cannot avoid the astounding conclusions of a divine obedience. Therefore we have to draw the no less astounding deduction that in equal Godhead the one God is, in fact, the One and also Another, that He is indeed a First and a Second, One who rules and commands in majesty and One who obeys in humility."

> In the work of the reconciliation of the world with God the inward divine relationship between the One who rules and commands in majesty and the One who obeys in humility is identical with the very different relationship between God and one of His creatures, a man.

This identity is possible because God, as Son, has become that creature. In his existence as the man Jesus, he is obedient to himself in time as he is in eternity. "God goes into the far country for this to happen. He becomes what He had not previously been." In becoming an obedient man, God not only reflects his inner being and represents it in the relation between Creator and creature, he now causes his inner being to take outward form. This outward action is simply a continuation of "the history in which He is God."[1]

This fact, that God's inner dialectic of obeying and being obeyed takes outward form, distinguishes the act of God in Jesus Christ from his previous acts. Before, his inner life was merely represented and reflected. Now, it takes outward form.

> It is the free grace of the atonement that He now not only reflects His inner being as God as He did in creation, that He not only represents it in a likeness as He did in the relationship of Creator and creature, but that He causes it to take outward form in itself and as such.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 203 (KD, pp. 222-23).

[2] Ibid., p. 204 (KD, p. 223).

In his development of the concept of the two moments of the divinity of Christ, Barth is careful to avoid the suggestion that the one who obeys in eternity is God the Son while the one who obeys in time is a human person called Jesus who is distinct from the person of God the Son. The one who obeys both in eternity and in time is the one Jesus Christ. When he becomes a man, he continues the obedience which he practices in eternity. There is one person, one obedience, and one divinity involved here. Barth states:

> He is as man, as the man who is obedient in humility, Jesus of Nazareth, what He is as God (and what He can be also as man because He is it as God in this mode of divine being). That is the true deity of Jesus Christ, obedient in humility, in its unity and equality, its homoousia, with the deity of the One who sent Him and to whom he is obedient. . . . Jesus Christ is the Son of God who became man, who as such is One with God the Father, equal to Him in deity, by the Holy Spirit, in whom the Father affirms and loves Him and He the Father, in a mutual fellowship.[1]

In conclusion, this discussion of Barth's understanding of the two moments in the deity of Jesus Christ makes it clear that the deity of Christ is at the same time the deity of God. Barth states: "The deity of Christ is the one unaltered because unalterable deity of God."[2] The second moment of Jesus

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[1] Ibid., p. 204 (KD, pp. 223-24).

[2] Ibid., pp. 179-80 (KD, p. 196). See also p. 177 (KD, 193). "Who the one true God is, and what He is, i.e., what is His being as God, and therefore His deity, His 'divine nature,' which is also the divine nature of Jesus Christ if he is very God--all this we have to discover from the fact that as such He is very man and partaker of human nature, from His becoming man, from His incarnation and from what He has done and suffered in the flesh."

Christ's act, his existence as a man in the creaturely realm, is just as divine as its first moment, his participation in God's inner-trinitarian love and fellowship. This means that his act and existence as a man are identical with the act and existence of God.

Jesus Christ as the Person God

Jesus Christ is divine not only as the act and the essence of God, he is also divine as the person God. In Barth's thought, Jesus Christ is not a human individual who becomes a complete person in fellowship with God through grace. Nor is he said to be the divine person because he becomes identical with the Word of God in revelation, as is true for the Bible and proclamation. He is the person God in the strictest sense of the word "is."

The claim that Jesus Christ is the person God is grounded in Barth's correlation of the concept of person with the doctrine of the trinity. God is one person in his trinitarian act of being. Because Jesus Christ is the second of the three which constitute this one person, it follows that he is identical with this person. To demonstrate more clearly that this is Barth's view, we shall begin with Barth's affirmation that God is a person.

When we consider Barth's account of God's being as a person, we encounter again his correlation of act and being.

Barth defines a person as one whose being is in act. This means, Barth explains, that a person is one who determines himself fully through his decision to be what he is. Since God is the only reality who fulfills this condition, only he is truly a person. In determining himself, God is the one person who is three. Barth states:

> Now, if the being of a person is a being in act, and if, in the strict and proper sense, being in act can be ascribed only to God, then it follows that by the concept of the being of a person, in the strict and proper sense, we can understand only the being of God. Being in its own, conscious, willed and executed decision, and therefore personal being, is the being of God in the nature of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. . . . The real person is not man but God. It is not God who is a person by extension, but we.[1]

When Barth states that God is a person, he means that God is an agent. To make this clear, he describes God as "a knowing, willing, acting I,"[2] and as "a single, unique Willer and Doer."[3] The fact that "God's being is absolutely His act"[4] does not mean either that God is act and not an agent or that he is an agent apart from his act. He is the agent who is identical with his act in an incomprehensible manner.[1]

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[1] CD 2/1, pp. 271-72 (KD, pp. 304-5). See also pp. 284-85 (KD, pp. 319-21). Here Barth states that God is "the person." "Man is not a person," but God is. "Not we but God is I." See also p. 285 (KD, p. 320).

[2] Ibid., p. 284 (KD, p. 319).

[3] CD 1/1, p. 400 (KD, p. 368).

[4] CD 2/1, p. 272 (KD, p. 306).

Because Barth assigns the concept of person to God's one essence rather than to his three modes of being, it is clear that Jesus Christ, insofar as he is a person, is the person God. He is this person just as are the Father and the Holy Spirit.[2] Barth accepts this implication. Using the phrase "the One" to denote God, he states:

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[1] There are serious theoretical difficulties created by this identification. Normally we assume that an actor is different from his act, at least in significant respects. Our manner of speaking implies a distinction between the two. For example, when we say "David ran," we assume that David is not completely identical with his running. William H. Poteat, "God and the 'Private-I,'" New Essays on Religious Language, ed. Dallas High (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 136, states that talking about God's acts is logically similar to speech about the acts of a human person. "In both cases an actor who is not assimilatable to his acts is the presupposition of the form of discourse."

Clearly Barth does not intend for God to be "swallowed up" in his act, as though he could not make a decision. Jenson, God after God, pp. 112, 125-27, gives a sympathetic defense of Barth's position. He states that in the case of humans, we posit an "I" to provide the continuity of a succession of events. The "I" bridges temporal discontinuities in "my" acts. "But precisely the absence of such discontinuities is what distinguishes God from us--and therefore the dichotomy between an event and its agent or sufferer does not apply to God" (p. 126). However, if we called God just "event," then it would seem that we had accepted the dichotomy and put God on one side. Therefore, we speak of God as "he," but this does not mean that God is essentially a substance, a "thing," which exists behind his acts.

[2] CD 2/1, p. 297 (KD, p. 334). "What we can describe as personality is indeed the whole divine Trinity as such, in the unity of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in God Himself and in His work--not the individual aspects by themselves in which God is and which He has." See also CD 1/1, pp. 402-3 (KD, p. 370). Here Barth states that the essence which is one personality should be understood as one individual essence, one being. The Father, Son and Holy Spirit are not merely equal in essence, for this might be understood in a polytheistic sense. Their equality of essence is to be understood "in the sense of identity of essence." See also pp. 501-6 (KD, pp. 460-64).

> The One, the person, whom we really know as a human person, is the person of Jesus Christ, and even this is in fact the person of God the Son, in which humanity, without being or having itself a person, is caught up into fellowship with the personality of God. This one man is therefore the being of God making itself known to us as the One who loves.[1]

Even more explicitly, Barth asserts that "the eternal God" not only foresees "the divine-human person of Jesus Christ," he "actually is this person."[2]

Although we usually speak of Jesus Christ as the one who reconciles, the Father as the creator, and the Holy Spirit as the redeemer, this does not imply that the three are different agents. The one God performs all the divine works *ad extra*, and the three modes of God's being participate in each of his works. The doctrine of appropriations functions to guarantee that God is one agent, while drawing attention to his inner distinctions. It indicates that some actions are more appropriate to one or another of the three "persons," but it denies that any action is performed exclusively by one of the three.[3]

The identification of Jesus Christ with the person God is reinforced and reflected in Barth's claim that Jesus Christ's person is his work. This equation is inherently related to that between God's act and being. As we have seen, Jesus Christ is the act and the essence of God. Consequently, if the act and the essence of God are identical, it follows that Jesus Christ's act and essence are also identical. In addition, since Barth states that only God's act is fully his essence, the affirmation that Jesus Christ's person is his work implies that he is God.

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[1] CD 2/1, p. 286 (KD, p. 321). The context clearly indicates that "The One" refers to God.

[2] CD 2/2, p. 108 (KD, pp. 115-16). This passage will be quoted in more detail below. See p. 186.

[3] CD 1/1, pp. 426-31, 452-56 (KD, pp. 391-95, 415-19).

Barth's equation of Christ's person and work applies to the life of Jesus as a man. For example, Barth says, "But His being as a man is the whole of His action, suffering and achievement. His being as man is His work."[1] However, this equation is not limited to Jesus Christ's existence as a man in time; it applies as well to Jesus Christ's participation in the act of God. For example, Barth states, "But His being as God and man and God-man consists in the completed act of the reconciliation of man with God."[2] More clearly, Barth explains that the work of Jesus Christ occurs in God's inner-trinitarian life.

> But the point which concerns us here is that according to the Fourth Gospel it is not merely the eternal but the incarnate Logos and therefore the man Jesus who is included in this circle. He did not give up His eternal divinity when He concealed it to become man. . . . It is only as He is a mode of the divine being, and therefore a moment in the circle of the inner life of God, that He can be in the Father and the Father

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[1] CD 3/2, p. 59 (KD, p. 69). See also CD 4/2, p. 193 (KD, p. 214).

[2] CD 4/1, p. 127 (KD, pp. 138-39).

> in Him; that He and the Father can be one; that the work of the Father assigned to Him can also be His own work and the work performed by Him can be also the Father's work; that He like the Father can have life in Himself, that He can love the Father with the same love with which the Father loves Him; that He can glorify the Father and the Father glorify Him. Undoubtedly all these things describe the inner relations of the Godhead.[1]

Since the work which is the person of Christ is also the act and work of God, it follows that Jesus Christ and God are one person. As God, Christ determines himself through his decision, and he fulfills himself in spontaneous self-realization. At the same time, he reconciles man to himself.

In conclusion, this consideration of the concept of essential divinity has made it clear that Jesus Christ is identical with the act, the essence, and the person of God. Because Jesus Christ shares in the essence of God, his divinity is his own. He is God himself, both in God's inner-trinitarian life and also in his act *ad extra*, his existence as a man. The directness of the identity of Christ's deity with the deity of God can be substantiated further by mentioning three points which are implied in the preceding discussion.

First, Barth states that Jesus Christ is "by nature" God. "It is He, Jesus, who is in the beginning with God. It is He who by nature is God." Similarly, Jesus Christ is "intrinsically divine." As the Word of God, divinity is ascribed to him in "the strictest and most proper sense," because he "participated absolutely in the divine mode of being, in the divine being itself."[1] These statements threaten the Antiochian view that Jesus Christ is divine by relation rather than by nature.

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[1] CD 3/2, pp. 65-66 (KD, pp. 76-77). Immediately below the words quoted above, Barth states that the work of Jesus in history is a portion of the one divine act. It is not a separate, merely human work.

Secondly, the divinity of Christ does not depend upon God's decision to speak through him at a particular moment, as is the case with respect to the Bible and proclamation. Barth states:

> Of course, the fact that Jesus Christ is the Son of God does not rest on the election. What does rest on it is the fact that as such he became man, that as such (to use the Johannine concept) He is 'sent,' that as such He is the bearer of the divine name of the Father in the world."[2]

He does not become the Son of God or the Word of God; he is the Word of God in the beginning, before all time.

Thirdly, Barth states that the "is" which is used to identify Jesus Christ with God is understood in the strictest sense. It is not simply an "is" of becoming, as is the case in the statement that the Bible is the Word of God. Barth explains:

> The phrase "the one" Lord unites Jesus Christ immediately to the Father, of whom the confession in the first article had said emphatically, He is one God. If there can be no rivalry between

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[1] CD 2/2, pp. 96-97 (KD, pp. 103-4). See also CD 1/1, p. 535 (KD, p. 490) where Barth states that Jesus Christ is "wholly and utterly God, the divine Subject."

[2] CD 2/2, p. 107 (KD, p. 114). See also CD 1/1, p. 177 (KD, p. 161). "Christ does not for the first time become, but He already is" the Lord of lords.

> the two concepts "God" and "Lord," if they refer to the one Being, to the one Being in the way in which statements about creation and reconciliation refer to the one operation of this one Being, then by means of this stipulation the decisive statement is already made, that Jesus Christ is himself this Being, not His legate or plenipotentiary merely, but identical with Him. Therefore because he is the one Lord, because in this strictest sense he is the Lord, his lordship for us in his revelation has no beginning and no end, it breaks over us with the unheard-of and incomparable fall of eternal truth and reality itself, it cannot be realised or inferred from any standpoint whatsoever, knowledge of it begins with the acknowledgment of it.[1]

These three points undermine the Antiochian interpretation of Barth. Further, because Antiochian thought regarding the divinity of Christ begins with the assumption that Jesus is a human person who becomes divine in revelation, it appears that it moves in a direction which is almost exactly opposite that of Barth. Barth begins with the concept of Jesus Christ as the act of revelation which constitutes God's being. He stresses that Jesus Christ is the divine being who is "also" human. This emphasis continues in his development of the concept of the unity of the person of Christ, to which we now turn.

The Unity of the Person of Jesus Christ

Following the pattern used in the second chapter, we shall begin our discussion of an Alexandrian interpretation of Barth's doctrine of the unity of the person of Christ with a consideration of the logos ensarkos. Then we shall deal with his concept of the incarnation. Under this category, five principal topics demand attention: the incarnation as an act of God, becoming and assuming, what is assumed, the concepts of anhypostasis and enhypostasis, and God as the subject of human activity. Next we shall turn to the relation of God the Word to the human nature, the resulting union of the two natures, and the correlation of the two aspects of the work of Christ. Throughout this discussion, we shall argue that Barth understands Jesus Christ, even in his existence as a man, as directly identical with God. He is united with a human nature which is less than a complete, human person.

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[1] CD 1/1, pp. 485-86 (KD, pp. 445-46).

The Logos Ensarkos

According to an Alexandrian interpretation, Barth's development of the concept of the logos ensarkos emphasizes Jesus Christ's divine being. As both God and man, Jesus Christ participates in the inner life of God, prior to his incarnation in time, because he is the decision of God. Since God's decision is the act which constitutes his being, the equation of Jesus Christ with the decision of God stresses his divinity.

Barth makes this point most explicitly in his discussion of the doctrine of election. He denies that Jesus Christ is with God prior to creation simply in God's intention, in the same way that other creatures are with him. He is with

God as his decision.

> Jesus Christ was in the beginning with God. He was so not merely in the sense that in view of God's eternal knowing and willing all things may be said to have been in the beginning with God, in His plan and decree. . . . He was also in the beginning with God as "the first born of every creature" (Col. 1:15), Himself the plan and decree of God, Himself the divine decision with respect to all creation and its history whose content is already determined.[1]

Because Jesus Christ is the eternal decision of God, he is completely identical with the person God. He is not merely one who is elected; he is the agent who elects. Drawing on Augustine for support against Thomas, Barth states:

> Thomas, and many others after him, spoke of the election of Jesus Christ only in this second and passive sense, and with reference only to the man Jesus. Augustine, too, had spoken of it in this way, and we ourselves must do the same. But Augustine--and in this we must at once follow him--also looked upwards to the place where the incarnation, the reality of the divine-human person of Jesus Christ before the foundation of the world and all other reality, is identical with the eternal purpose of the good-pleasure of God, and where the eternal purpose of the good-pleasure of God which precedes all created reality is identical with the reality of the divine-human person of Jesus Christ. He looked upwards to the place where the eternal God not only foresees and foreordains this person, but where He Himself, as the presupposition of its revelation in time, actually is this person.[2]

It is clear, then, that Barth's analysis of this concept emphasizes Jesus Christ's unity with God rather than his distinction from God. In this respect, it threatens the Antiochian concern to safeguard the integrity of Jesus as a complete, historical person.

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[1] CD 2/2, p. 104 (KD, pp. 111-12).

[2] Ibid., p. 108 (KD, pp. 115-16). For a similar understanding of Barth's development of this concept, see Jenson, Alpha and Omega, pp. 66-84, 165-67; and Hathaway, p. 112.

The Incarnation

The act of God the Word

The Alexandrian view is in substantial agreement with the Antiochian on this topic, in spite of its understanding of Barth's concept of the *logos ensarkos*. Barth clearly affirms that the event of the incarnation depends ultimately upon the free grace of God, not creaturely power. The original decision of God to become man involves his human nature, so that he cannot be said to be without it. Therefore, when God enters creaturely existence, he does so with his human nature. Nevertheless, his humanity is dependent upon his divinity, and it cannot, in itself, initiate the incarnation or reconcile man to God. God is the agent of the incarnation, both in his original decision and also in his execution of that decision.

Becoming and assuming

The Antiochian position, as we saw, concludes that the concept of becoming applies directly to the human nature, which becomes a man, and indirectly to the divine Word. It infers from this that creaturely predicates apply to the divine Word by relation and that divine qualities are ascribed to the man Jesus by relation. However, this principle is not explicitly affirmed by Barth, and assuming that this is his intention is unwarranted.

The Alexandrian interpretation tends to view the two verbs "become" and "assume" as complementary and mutually corrective, each applying directly to the divine Word. The Word does not become a man in the sense that He is forced into a passive role by external factors, as is the case with human becoming. Nor does he become identical with a man who was already in existence. "Assume" indicates that the divine person is in full control of this act. Yet, "become" also suggests the continuity of the agency which is important for an Alexandrian interpretation. The one who existed in the inner being of God and who is God Himself now becomes a participant in human existence. This is a new determination for him, but he is not transformed into something or someone else by it. It is a new stage of his existence, as when we speak of a person becoming an adult. The fact that Barth continues to use "becomes" when speaking of this act of the Word suggests its value.[1] It is not completely replaced by "assumes." When understood correctly, it is a useful term when used directly of the Word himself and not simply because of his relation to the human nature.

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[1] See CD 4/2, pp. 75, 84 (KD, pp. 82, 92) for example.

What is assumed

The Antiochian interpretation of Barth places considerable emphasis upon the fact that Barth ascribes a personality and a will to the human nature which the Word assumes in the incarnation. It believes that if this human nature has a personality and a will it must be a person. On the other hand, the Alexandrian interpretation believes that Barth makes a distinction between a person and personality in this context. The human nature of Christ, in this view, has its own personality or individuality, but it is not, in itself, a person.

One fact which makes this conclusion plausible is that there is a precedent for it. Brunner in The Mediator makes a radical distinction between the human personality of Jesus and his divine person. For Brunner, the personality of Jesus is available for ordinary knowledge, but the divine person is known only in faith.[1] While Barth does not refer specifically to Brunner in his discussion of this point, the fact that such a distinction is possible among "neo-orthodox" theologians indicates that one cannot conclude without argument that Barth identifies the two concepts of person and personality.

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[1] Emil Brunner, The Mediator: A Study of the Central Doctrine of the Christian Faith, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1947), especially pp. 265-68, 345. For a discussion of Brunner, see J.M. Creed, The Divinity of Jesus Christ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), pp. 134-36.

More importantly, there is a passage in Karl Barth's Table Talk which distinguishes person from personality. Because this text is not without ambiguity, it is best to record it here and then discuss it further.

> S: What is the relation of the doctrines of Perichoresis and Appropriations to the human nature of Christ?
> B: What do you mean by "human nature"? Jesus Christ is a "Person" of the Trinity, but this does not mean that he has a "personality" in the modern sense of a "centre of consciousness." His personality is that of Son of God.
> S: But if human nature lacks personality, is it really human nature?
> B: Individuality is necessary to human nature, but not Person. A person exists in human nature. Of course Christ had a "centre of consciousness." Personality means just this or that man. It can only be applied to the existence of a particular man. His thisness or thatness is his personality. If the old Christological doctrine denied personality to Christ, it meant to deny that there was a man as such and then the Word became that man. No, this man never existed except as Son of God--from the beginning. God chose one possibility of humanity out of a mass of possibilities and realised its existence in the Son of God. Humanity means the nature or essence of man. Personality means the existence of a man. The Father and the Holy Spirit are also concerned in the incarnation (Perichoresis), but not so that you can speak of the "incarnate Father," etc. We might use the illustration of three men: two of them help the other put on a coat, but only this one wears it.[1]

The first response by Barth might be interpreted to mean that the human nature of Jesus Christ has no personality and thus no center of consciousness in itself. This understanding is possible because the questioner focuses upon the human nature and Barth begins his answer with this same subject.

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[1] Barth, Karl Barth's Table Talk, p. 49.

If this interpretation were correct, we would have here a radical denial of the Antiochian view. The human nature has no personality and thus, apparently, is not a person in its own right.

The student seems to understand Barth in this way. Only one concept of personality has appeared so far, and it is the concept of center of consciousness. Thus, when the student says "But if the human nature lacks personality, is it really human nature?" he appears to conclude that Barth intends to say that the human nature lacks a self-consciousness.

Our conclusion is that Barth, in the first response in the quotation, is speaking of the trinity. What he means is that Jesus Christ is one of the three in the trinity, but he does not have a separate center of consciousness. There is only one personality in the trinity, and therefore one center of consciousness, which is shared equally by the three modes of being. This point would be clearer if Barth had added that the personality of Jesus Christ is the personality of the Father and Holy Spirit as well as that of the eternal Son.

In his second response, Barth appears to utilize traditional rather than modern terminology with respect to the concept of personality. As we have seen, Barth explains that the ancients used the term individualitas to designate what moderns mean by "personality," namely, self-consciousness.[1]

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[1] CD 1/2, p. 164 (KD, p. 180). See our discussion above, pp. 103-6.

Consequently, when he states that individuality but not person is necessary for the human nature, he clearly means that the human nature has its personality in the sense of self-consciousness, although it is not a person. To be a person, Barth continues, one must exist.

There are two important distinctions in this argument. One is between ancient and modern concepts of personality, and the second is between essence and existence. The concept of person and a corresponding concept of personality are inextricably connected to the concept of existence. On the other hand, although the essence of man does not exist as a person, it includes individuality and, therefore, personality in the limited sense of self-consciousness.[1]

In spite of its ambiguities, this passage clarifies those in the Church Dogmatics where Barth reports that the ancients sometimes used the term impersonalitas for the human nature but that they did not mean by it what moderns do. Here the denial that the human nature is a person and the affirmation that it has its own self-consciousness appear side by side, indicating that Barth does make a distinction between the concept of person and one meaning of the concept of personality. This distinction undermines the belief that the human nature of Christ must be a person because it has personality.

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 49 (KD, p. 53). Here Barth uses the distinction between essence and existence to combat the argument that anhypostasis and enhypostasis threaten the humanity of Jesus. Following Hollaz, he states, that the perfection of something is judged according to its essence, not its subsistence or existence.

This denial that the human nature is a person also effectively opposes the view that the human nature is a person because it has its own will. For Barth, the crucial element in the concept of a person seems to be existence rather than personality or will. This leads us again to the doctrines of _anhypostasis_ and _enhypostasis_, which deal with the existence of the human nature. Although the human nature may not be a person in its essence, the question still remains whether in the incarnation, when the human nature comes into existence, it becomes a person over against the person of the Son of God.

Anhypostasis and _enhypostasis_

Barth's treatment of these concepts indicates that he thinks that the human nature of Christ is not a person either before or after the initial moment of the incarnation. We shall mention three points which support this Alexandrian interpretation of Barth, and two of them are found in the following important passage.

> We can and must, indeed, speak of a presence, even of a personal presence of God in all created being, and to that extent of a unity also of God with all created being. But then this created being has an independent existence [_selbständige Existenz_] in relation to God. It is real only in virtue of creation and preservation, through God, and to that extent only in unity with God. But it is real in this

> unity, not as though it were itself God, but in such a way that, being in God, it is different from God, in such a way that through God it possesses an existence of its own different from the existence of God. It is the same with God's gracious presence in the word preached and in the sacrament (so far as by that is meant the outward creaturely sign of word and elements), and with God's gracious presence in the hearts of those chosen and called by faith. Unity with God in the former case means that man's speech, that water, bread and wine, are real not only through God, but as inseparably bound to God, and similarly in the latter case, that believing man may live not only through God but inseparably bound to God. But unity with God cannot mean in the former case that man's speech, that water, bread and wine, or in the latter case that believing man, is identical with God. What is proclaimed by the unity of God and man in Jesus Christ is as follows. This man Jesus Christ is identical with God because the Word became flesh in the sense just explained. Therefore He does not only live through God and with God. He is Himself God. Nor is He autonomous and self-existent. His reality, existence and being is wholly and absolutely that of God Himself, the God who acts in His Word. His manhood is only the predicate of His Godhead, or better and more concretely, it is only the predicate, assumed in inconceivable condescension, of the Word acting upon us, the Word who is the Lord.[1]

First, this quote states that human persons are related to God differently from the way the human nature of Christ is related to him. All created beings, including human persons, exist independently from God. Although they are brought into existence by God, their existence is different from his. Yet, the human nature of Christ, even after it comes into existence, has no independent existence. Its existence is identical with God's existence.[2] Since the human nature of Christ does not have an independent existence as persons do, it is presumptuous to assume that it is, in itself, a person distinct from God.[1]

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[1] CD 1/2, p. 162 (KD, pp. 177-78).

[2] CD 1/2, p. 163 (KD, p. 178). Barth means that the

Second, this passage describes the identity between Jesus Christ and God in such a way that it is difficult to explain it as an indirect identity, as though Jesus is a human individual through whom God speaks from time to time. Barth states that Jesus Christ not only lives with God, "He is Himself God." His reality, existence, and being are "wholly and absolutely that of God Himself." Barth does not make such claims about the Bible and the creaturely media of proclamation. They can become the Word of God, but they are not God himself, and their existence is not absolutely that of God. Consequently, it is unwise to conclude that Jesus is a mere man who is more closely related to God than other men. Barth's terminology indicates that the difference between Jesus Christ and other men is more than a matter of degree.[2]

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existence of the human nature is directly identical with the existence of God. The human nature, having no existence of its own, "acquires" the existence of God. There is only one existence involved here, and therefore it is completely identical with itself. See our earlier discussion, pp. 101-4.

[1] CD 4/2, p. 49 (KD, p. 52). Barth seems to associate the concept of person not only with the concept of existence but also with the concept of independent existence. "By ὑπόστασις, *persona*, was meant the independent existence (the *propria subsistentia*) of His humanity."

[2] While Barth does not say explicitly in this context that the identity of Jesus Christ with God is direct rather

The Alexandrian interpretation of Barth admits that Barth's treatment of the relation of God the Word to the Bible and proclamation is Antiochian. The Bible and the creaturely media of proclamation have an independent existence as other creatures. They persist in time even though God may not be speaking through them at every moment. On the other hand, the human nature of Christ does not exist independently as it would if it were a man. It is, as we shall see momentarily, God's mode of operation as a man.[1] In this respect, the human nature of Christ belongs to a class by itself, apart from the Bible and proclamation.

Third, since Jesus Christ is directly identical with God, it is difficult to see how there can be two involved here, and Barth denies that there are two. We have seen that the Antiochian interpreters assume that this denial is intended to prevent the idea that the two persons, God and Jesus, are related in an external manner, side by side. However, Barth denies not only that there are two side by side, but also that another is "in" God. He states:

> We resume the discussion with the second statement in our description of the incarnation: (2) that the existence of the Son of God became and is the

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than indirect, this is clearly his meaning. He affirms that "He who was born in time is the very same who in eternity is born of the Father." CD 1/2, p. 138 (KD, p. 152). The phrase "is the very same" indicates that the identity is direct.

[1] See below, pp. 198-99.

> existence of a man. There are not two existing side by side or even within one another. There is only the one God the Son, and no one and nothing either alongside or even in Him.[1]

This statement clearly precludes the idea that Jesus is a human person who exists in the existence of God.

The concepts of anhypostasis and enhypostasis, then, affirm that the existence of the human nature of Christ is identical with the existence of Jesus Christ and also the existence of God. There is only one existence here, and it is God's acting in the creaturely realm. As a result, these two concepts should be interpreted in relation to Barth's understanding of God's act as his being and his concept of the two moments in the divinity of Christ. The existence of Jesus Christ is God's act *ad extra*. This act and existence are identical with the one divine person in his relation to men.

God is subject

Now we come to the question of what Barth means when he says that God performs the human actions of Jesus. This topic is clarified by Barth's use of the concept of the "bearer."[2] God is the subject of Jesus Christ's actions because he is the bearer of the human nature of Christ. Jesus Christ is fully identical with God because he is also this one bearer, not a person distinct from God in an Antiochian sense. He is the same agent God is.

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 50 (KD, p. 53).

[2] The German for "bearer" is *Träger*. For example, see CD 412, p. 92 (KD, pp. 101-2).

Barth's concept of the bearer is Alexandrian in two ways. In the first place, it emphasizes the divinity of the agent who performs the actions of the man Jesus. Divinity is an inherent quality of this agent, not a predicate ascribed to him because of his association with God. In the second place, it is Alexandrian because it indicates that the human nature of Christ lacks a strictly human bearer, and therefore it neither was nor became an individual person in itself. The bearer of this particular humanity is God himself, while the bearers of other instances of humanity in the world are simply human; thus, Jesus Christ is absolutely unique.

Barth's treatment of the bearer of the divine and human natures is found principally in his discussion of God's assumption of flesh in volume 1/2 and 4/2 of the *Church Dogmatics*. He explains that the actor in the incarnation is God himself, God the Word, not the divine nature. The divine nature has no existence and cannot act, in itself. It exists only in and through the existence of the divine subject, who is its bearer. Godhead, Barth says, "is only the modus" of God's being.[1]

In the same way, human nature is only the modus of a particular human being. It does not exist and act in itself. For that reason, it must be said that the human nature is not the agent of the incarnation and the atonement. Human nature consists of those characteristics which distinguish men from other realities, but it exists only in a bearer. Speaking specifically of Jesus Christ, Barth affirms, "But in itself and as such the humanity of Jesus Christ is a predicate without a subject."[2]

Individual men, Barth states, are bearers of the human essence. Since many men have existed, Jesus Christ is not only the bearer of human essence, although in his case both the bearer and the human essence which he bears are unique.

> Of human essence, on the other hand, we have to say that it, too, is actualised in as many cases as

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 65 (KD, p. 70). "He, the divine Subject, carries and determines the divine essence, and not conversely. . . . The Godhead as such has no existence. It is not real. It has no being or activity. It cannot, therefore, unite with that which is existent and real and has being and activity (which is not the case, of course, with the human essence either). This is done by the divine Subject in and with His divine essence, by the One who exists and is actual, God the Father, Son and Holy Ghost."

[2] Ibid., p. 102 (KD, p. 113). See also pp. 65-66 (KD, pp. 70-71). On the second of these pages, Barth states: "Neither of the two natures counts as such, because neither exists and is actual as such." See also CD 1/2, p. 136 (KD, p. 150), where Barth says: "On the other hand, the flesh not only could not be flesh apart from the Word, but apart from the Word it would have no being at all, far less be able to speak, act, prevail, reveal or reconcile."

> there have been and are and will be men. It is actualised, of course, as human essence: not of itself, but by the creative will and power and act of God, as the One who alone is actual originally and in Himself; and as a creaturely essence, absolutely conditioned and limited by His will and power and act. It, too, does not await the incarnation of the Son of God for its actualisation. It is another matter that it is created with a view to this, and has in it its meaning and telos, and is only true human essence by it and in it. But, since the Son of Man Jesus Christ is only one of countless other men who also bear this essence, we cannot say that it is actualised only in Him.[1]

The uniqueness of the bearer of the human essence of Jesus Christ is that he is the Word of God. In Jesus Christ there is no purely human bearer of the human nature, as is the case with other men. When the Word enters the creaturely realm and becomes man, he adds to the divine nature which is already his fallen human nature, bearing it and its sin. Barth states:

> The Word became flesh--not just man, but the bearer of our human essence, which is marked not only by its created and unlost goodness but (in self-contradiction) by sin, so that it is a perverted essence and lost as such. . . . And we can and must say that He overcame it at the deepest level by not refusing to accomplish the humiliation of the Son of God to be not only a creature but a sinful creature, to become and be the bearer of human essence in its inward contradiction, to repent as such, to become the friend of publicans and sinners, to suffer and die as a malefactor with others.[2]

When the eternal Son or Word becomes the bearer of human nature, he does not cease to be the bearer of the divine

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 114 (KD, p. 127).

[2] Ibid., p. 92 (KD, pp. 101-2).

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nature. Barth makes this point clear by stating that the divine nature belongs to the Son originally, but that the human nature is his through adoption. As the bearer of both natures, he acts through each of them, and he determines each to the other.

> The Son of God is the acting Subject who takes the initiative in this event, and not either His divine or His human essence. Of both these it is true that they are real and can act only as He exists in them: in Himself with the Father and the Holy Ghost in His divine essence; and _per assumptionem_ in His human. He Himself grasps and has and maintains the leadership in what His divine essence is and means for His human, and His human for His divine, in their mutual participation. . . . As His divine essence is that which is originally proper to Him, and His human is only adopted by Him and assumed to it, it is clear that we must see their mutual determination in the distinction in which we have described it.[1]

Barth coordinates the concept of the bearer with his understanding of Jesus Christ as a history. As the Son of God who bears the divine nature, Jesus Christ humiliates himself to become man. As the Son of Man he bears and exalts the human nature. The act in which he bears both natures is his history and his being. Barth states:

> It is in the actual occurrence of this history that we have seen that which particularly interests us in the present context--its movement from below to above, the exaltation of the Son of Man who in His identity with the Son of God comes to God as the bearer of our human essence.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 70 (KD, p. 76).

[2] Ibid., pp. 106-7 (KD, p. 118). This point will be strengthened in Chapter IV when we show that the title "Son of Man" is used by Barth to denote the same subject that is denoted by "Son of God." See below, pp. 240-41, 251-55.

In the event of the incarnation, there are three principal elements: the divine agent, the divine nature, and the human nature. In the act which constitutes his being from all eternity, the divine agent adds human nature to his divine nature. For Barth, there is no need for any additional elements. The human nature is complete in itself, with its own will and personality, its soul and body. The divine agent, with his divine essence, is also complete in himself.[1]

Since there are only these three elements, it can be seen that there is no strictly human bearer of the human nature in Jesus Christ. Barth makes this clear by saying: "There was and is, therefore, no Son of Man who, conversely, has assumed divine essence to His human essence and thus become the Son of God." This statement means that there is no bearer of the human nature, called "Son of Man," who acted in and through the human nature and assumed divine nature to himself, becoming God. On the contrary, the one who is properly called "Son of Man" is already the one who bears the divine nature as well as the human nature.

> But the second, His exaltation as the Son of Man, does not mean that He became God. How could He just become that which He already was from all

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[1] For an example of a statement in which Barth depicts the incarnation as involving three principal elements, see CD 4/2, p. 62 (KD, p. 67): "From the unity with His own existence into which the Son of God assumes human essence while maintaining His own divine essence, there follows, as we have said, the union of divine and human essence as it has taken place and been actualised in Him." See also pp. 114-15 (KD, pp. 127-28).

> eternity as the Son of God, and which He did not cease to be even as the Son of Man?[1]

Barth's use of the concept of the bearer gives him a clear way to affirm that Jesus Christ is one person not two. He is one person in that he is the same subject both in eternity and in time, both in his divine nature and in the human nature which he adopts. Because he acts humanly as well as divinely, he has a human nature as well as a divine nature, and the characteristics of men can be attributed to him. Because the human nature has no strictly human bearer, it is not a complete man alongside or within the one Christ.

At the same time, the concept of the bearer indicates that the man Jesus is directly identical with the Son of God. Since the eternal Son is the single bearer of the human nature and since bearers of humanity are called "men," the man Jesus is the Son himself and not a human person united with him.

Because Jesus is directly identical with God, God is directly the subject of the acts of Jesus. Of course, God performs the actions of Jesus through his human nature, but the human nature is not an agent in itself. Because God bears the human nature, Barth can say that "God Himself is its human subject."[1] More specifically, he affirms that God is this subject "directly" rather than indirectly.

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[1] CD 4/2, pp. 71-72 (KD, p. 77). In this section, Barth makes it clear that "Son of Man"names the single bearer of both natures who is also called "Son of God." For further confirmation of this point, see our discussion of the names and titles of Jesus Christ in Chapter IV, especially pp. 251-55.

> Now it is no accident that for us the Virgin birth is paralleled by the miracle of which the Easter witness speaks, the miracle of the empty tomb. These two miracles belong together. They constitute, as it were, a single sign, the special function of which, compared with other signs and wonders of the New Testament witness, is to describe and mark out the existence of Jesus Christ, amid the many other existences in human history, as that human historical existence in which God is Himself, God is alone, God is directly the Subject, the temporal reality of which is not only called forth, created, conditioned and supported by the eternal reality of God, but is identical with it.[2]

The statement that God is alone the subject of Jesus' existence precludes effectively the supposition that God simply acts vicariously through a human person named Jesus who is distinct from God. Barth clearly rejects the Antiochian idea that there are two persons involved here, and that God is the prior and more important of the two, guiding, directing, and affirming the acts of Jesus. On the contrary, the identity between Jesus and God is an identity in the fullest sense of the word.

Because of the identity of Jesus with God, Barth is not compelled to distinguish two different subjects when he speaks of the divine and human actions which are attributed to Jesus Christ in the Bible. This freedom is most apparent when Barth uses the pronoun "he" to denote the one who obeys the Father in the inner-trinitarian life, descends to earth and is born of Mary, is baptised, calls his disciples, preaches, forgives sins, dies, is buried, and rises from the tomb. Barth gives no indication that he intends to differentiate a divine "he" who obeys the Father in eternity from a human "he" who eats, drinks, and sleeps. In each case, the "he" refers to the one bearer of both natures who acts divinely and humanly.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 51 (KD, p. 54).

[2] CD 1/2, p. 182 (KD, p. 199), underlining mine.

In conclusion, Barth's doctrine of the incarnation gives support to an Alexandrian interpretation. There is a direct identity between Jesus Christ and God not only in the inner-trinitarian life but also in the creaturely realm. The existence of the man Jesus is directly identical with God's existence, and the subject who acts in the human nature is God, not a human person distinct from God. Once this conclusion has been reached, it is possible to understand Barth's treatment of the relation between God and the human nature, the union of the two natures, and the coordination of the divine and human aspects of the work of Christ in an Alexandrian manner.

God the Word and the Human Nature

In his discussion of this subject Barth considers the analogies which have been used to aid in comprehending the unity of God and man in Christ. He argues that there is a radical discontinuity between God's union with the human nature and other unities. We have already shown how Barth distinguishes this union from the unity of God the Word with the Bible and proclamation in the moment in which they witness to revelation.[1] Here we wish to make two points. The first is that the uniqueness of God's union with the human nature of Jesus can be demonstrated by showing how Barth contrasts it with God's relation to the individual and to the church. The second is that Barth has a preference for analogies which suggest that the human nature is not a complete person. Both these points support the Alexandrian conclusion that Barth conceives of the unity of God and man in Christ as a unity between the person God and a specimen of human nature which is not a person.

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[1] CD 4/2, pp. 96-97 (KD, pp. 106-07).

That Jesus Christ is not simply a religious personality who is related to God in a special way is implied by Barth's insistence that all other unions and thus all possible analogies have their ground in Jesus Christ himself.[2] As God's eternal decision, Jesus Christ is the all embracing reality. As a result, all analogies are inadequate and, in the final analysis, misleading. Barth states:

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[1] See above, pp. 126-27, 193-96.

[2] CD 4/2, pp. 56-58 (KD, pp. 60-62). In his discussion of Biedermann, Barth attacks the view that Jesus is a religious personality who is related to God in a special way.

> In Him [Jesus Christ] we have the basic reality which underlies the possibility of the basic relationship of the covenant, and therefore all the natural and historical relationships, and in them the analogies, and therefore His own connexion with His earthly surroundings and the comparisons which it invites. In Him we have their beginning, their meaning and their goal, the centre which unites and carries the whole, both creation and the covenant.[1]

Because the hypostatic union is a union with the human nature of all men and not simply one man, the union of God with all man is included in it. Thus, the presence of God in the life of the individual, the so-called unio mystica, does not actually correspond to the divinity and humanity of Jesus Christ. Consequently, Barth argues, we should not accept Donald Baillie's attempt to understand the Chalcedonian formulation of the unity of Jesus Christ along the lines suggested by texts such as Gal. 2:20, "Nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." The difficulty with this view is that individuals do not have a direct relation to God as Jesus Christ does. Jesus Christ is God Himself, and he is also the mediator of all human relations with God.[2]

Barth's discussion of the unity of the church with God follows much the same pattern. He describes the church as the second form of the existence of Jesus Christ. Since we have seen that Jesus Christ's existence is directly identical with the existence of God the Word, it might be assumed that the church is identical with God in the same way that the man

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[1] Ibid., p. 58 (KD, pp. 62-63).

[2] Ibid., pp. 55-57 (KD, pp. 59-62).

Jesus is. However, Barth is not willing to make this equation. Rather, the relationship between God and man which occurs in the church is included in the reality of Jesus Christ. Therefore, the relation of the church to God is not parallel to that between the human nature of Christ and God. Barth states:

> He carries and maintains it [the community] in this unity with Himself as the people which not merely belongs to Him but is part of Himself. In God's eternal counsel, in His epiphany, and finally in His revelation at the end of the age, He was and is and will be this *totus Christus*--Christ and Christians. And these two elements of His one being are not merely related to one another *as* He Himself as Son of God is related to His human nature. But, in this second form, His relationship to His body, the community, *is* the relationship of God and man as it takes place in this one being as Head and body.[1]

Turning to our second point, Barth notes that certain analogies which were used by the church fathers have value by way of illustration. Many of the ones included in this list, such as "that the Word is in flesh like a man in his clothes, or a sailor in his boat" have to do with a personal reality and a non-personal one.[2] Interestingly, when Barth uses analogies, these are the ones he favors. For example, in his polemic against the Lutheran doctrine that the human nature was divinized in the incarnation, he states that it is better to think of the human nature as a temple in which God dwells.

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[1] Ibid., p. 60 (KD, p. 64).

[2] Ibid., p. 53 (KD, p. 57).

> Is temple or dwelling--a dwelling which is certainly filled with Godhead and totally and exclusively claimed and sanctified, but still a dwelling--not really enough to describe what we have to say of human essence in relation to Jesus Christ and the history which took place in Him? Do we have to deify this temple, this dwelling as such, in order that the dwelling of the Godhead in it may be a real one? If it is deified, does it not cease to be His temple?[1]

As we saw earlier, in his explanation of the notion of appropriations, Barth indicates that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are involved in the action of the incarnation, but only the Son becomes flesh. His analogy is that the Father and the Holy Spirit hold a coat for the Son to put on. They participate, but they do not put on the coat.[2] Barth's preference for analogies of this type suggests that his view is Alexandrian, and that the human nature involved in the incarnation is not a person. If Barth were Antiochian, we might expect to find him using analogies involving two persons, such as husband and wife, more often.[3]

The Union of the Two Natures

Barth's understanding of the fellowship of the two natures is not developed in such a way as to require the assumption that he thinks of the two natures as being two persons,

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[1] Ibid., p. 89 (KD, p. 97).

[2] Barth, Karl Barth's Table Talk, p. 49. See above p. 190.

[3] Barth does not include the analogy of husband and wife among those which have value as illustrations, nor, to our knowledge, does he ever use it.

God and Jesus. In his treatment of the union of the two natures, Barth does not use I-Thou terminology, although he speaks of fellowship and confrontation. In the union of the two natures, the human nature attests the divine nature, witnesses to it, and is obedient to it. In the Alexandrian view, this relationship of fellowship between the two natures should be understood as analogous to the kind of obedience and communication that Barth can locate within a single person, rather than that which is found in a relation between two persons, such as a parent and a child.

Barth describes the relationship between the Son and the Father in the inner-trinitarian life as a relation of obedience. The Son obeys the Father. Yet, this does not mean, for Barth, that the Son and the Father are two separate persons. Barth is quite explicit that it is the essence of the triune God which is a person. God is one subject, although he acts in different ways and although he has internal relations. One of these internal relations can be described as obedience.

Since there are not two persons or "wills" in God, the obedience of the Son to the Father in the inner-trinitarian life should be understood to mean that God is true to himself. God as he is in his second mode of being is obedient to himself as he is in his first mode of being. His inner obedience is complete and perfect, and it cannot be adequately conveyed in the metaphor of Father-Son. Speaking of the term "Son," Barth states:

> But the term cannot bring out the ontological necessity in which this Father has this Son, and this Son this Father, the perfection in which this Father and this Son are one, i.e., are the different modes of being of one and the same personal God, the eternity of the fatherly begetting and of the being begotten of the Son, which is the basis of their relationship, their free but also necessary fellowship and love in the activity of the Holy Spirit as the third divine mode of being of the same kind, the self-evident fulfillment of that determination of a son to his father, the actual rendering of a perfect obedience, the ceaseless unity of the One who disposes and the One who complies, the actual oneness and agreement of that which they will and do. The history in which God is the living God in Himself can only be indicated but not conceived by our terms son and father and spirit.[1]

Barth makes it quite clear that when he talks of the obedience of the Son to the Father he means an obedience which is rendered by God to himself. Only God can render perfect and complete obedience. Barth asserts:

> In rendering obedience as He does, He does something which, as in the case of that lordship, only God can do. The One who in this obedience is the perfect image of the ruling God is Himself--as distinct from every human and creaturely kind--God by nature, God in His relationship to Himself, i.e., God in His mode of being as the Son in relation to God in His mode of being as the Father, One with the Father and of one essence. In His mode of being as the Son He fulfils the divine subordination, just as the Father in His mode of being as the Father fulfils the divine superiority.[2]

The point to be emphasized is that Barth can attribute to God himself relationships which we normally think of as requiring more than one personal agent. Yet, in God, these relationships occur within a single person, the one true person. There is a dialectic in God, but not more than one agent.

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[1] CD 4/1, pp. 209-10 (KD, pp. 229-30), underlining mine.

[2] Ibid., pp. 208-9 (KD, p. 228).

Barth can also attribute an obedience to the human body of Jesus Christ. This body is obedient, Barth explains, to the human soul within the human nature of Jesus Christ. That Barth can speak of a human obedience of this sort gives additional support for the contention that Barth's personal ways of speaking do not necessarily require separate persons in the strict sense. A statement of the obedience of the body of Jesus is the following:

> The interconnexion of the soul and body and Word and act of Jesus is not a chaos but a cosmos, a formed and ordered totality. There is in it a higher and a lower, a first and a second, a dominating and a dominated. But the man Jesus Himself is both. He is not only the higher, the first, the dominating, nor is He both in such a way that the lower, the second, the dominated is associated with him only externally or accidentally. This would again imply the destruction of that oneness and wholeness. He is also the lower, the second, the dominated. He is not only His soul but also His body. But He is both soul and body in an ordered oneness and wholeness. His being is orderly and not disorderly. Nor is He this in such a way that the order is accidental and imposed from without. He is in an order which derives from Himself. He Himself and from Himself is both the higher and the lower, the first and the second, the dominant and dominated. He Himself is in both cases His own principle. The meaning, plan and intention, the logos of His life is thus not exterior and accidental. It is no foreign law to which He binds Himself but which

> comes from elsewhere and is established over Him. Rather He is His own law, and He is subject to it in a free obedience arising in Himself and proceeding from Himself. Jesus wills and fulfils Himself. He is His own ground and His own intention. He lives in such a way that command and obedience, ordination and subordination, plan and execution, goal and aim proceed from Himself and thus partake of an equal inward necessity.[1]

The fact that Barth can use personal language to describe a relation within a person in the examples just given does not prove that his treatment of the relation of the two natures is to be understood in a similar fashion. Yet, it does make such an interpretation plausible. Furthermore, it undermines the argument that the presence of personal language implies that Barth's concept of the relation between the two natures is a way of talking about a relation between a person God and another person Jesus. In these ways, it contributes to an Alexandrian interpretation.

The Coordination of the Work

In Barth's doctrine of reconciliation, the work of Jesus Christ as priest and as king should be understood in an Alexandrian rather than an Antiochian manner. It is the work of one divine agent, not two agents, one divine and the other human. If it is the case that the bearer of both natures is God himself, then there is not a sufficient reason to suppose that Barth means that the priestly work is carried out by the divine agent and the kingly work by a human agent. While it is true that the priestly work is more logically associated with the divine nature and the kingly work is more closely related to the human nature, it does not follow that Barth intends for the two natures to be understood as two distinct persons. Through his divine nature, the eternal Son humiliates himself and overcomes sin. Through his human nature he is exalted to a state of fellowship with the Father. The two aspects of his work are two moments, two movements, and two directions of one work performed by one agent. There can be no question of the human nature, or some human agent, exalting itself or himself.

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[1] CD 3/2, p. 332 (KD, pp. 399-400), underlining mine.

Nor can there be any suggestion that the priestly work is exclusively related to the divine nature and the kingly work exclusively performed by the human nature. What God does, he does through both natures simultaneously. The humiliation of Christ in his priestly task involves his human nature, although the possibility of this act is grounded in his divine nature. Barth says: "It was to fulfil this judgment on sin that the Son of God as man took our place as sinners."[1] This statement indicates that the priestly work, in which God took our place, involves God's being "as man" as well as his being as God.

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[1] CD 4/1, p. 253 (KD, p. 278).

The exaltation also involves the divine nature as well as the human nature. It is through his divine nature and its power that the eternal Son of God can exalt the human nature, although the divine nature is already exalted and needs no additional honor. Barth clearly indicates that the work of exaltation is performed by God himself, and God does not act apart from his divine nature. "But it is also true that in and with His own abasement God has elected and achieved man's exaltation."[1] Thus, the saving work of Jesus Christ is performed by one divine agent through both natures. Barth's account of this work is not Antiochian, in our definition of Antiochianism.[2]

Conclusion

In this discussion of Barth's concepts of the divinity of Christ and the unity of his person, we have defended the claim that Barth's position is basically Alexandrian. Although the human nature which is united with God is capable of witnessing to the Word, and thus has some degree of agency, and although Barth develops the idea of the union of the two natures in Antiochian categories of fellowship and obedience, in the final analysis it seems clear that an Antiochian interpretation cannot be fully sustained. For Barth, Jesus Christ is essentially divine. As the act of God and also as the divine subject who acts in eternity and in time, he is directly identical with God himself. In the incarnation, he becomes the bearer of human nature, which has no independent existence and is not a person in itself. He is not merely a human person who is related to God in a special way, but the all embracing divine reality in which all men have their being.

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 6 (KD, p. 5).

[2] Sellers, Two Ancient Christologies, pp. 24, 56, 94, 95, 252. According to Sellers, the Alexandrians believed that the actions of Christ involved both natures. He did not act exclusively through either nature, although certain aspects of his actions are more appropriate to the divine nature and others to the human nature.

The Alexandrian interpretation of Barth is also supported by an analysis of his use of the name "Jesus Christ" and its variants. As we shall see next, Barth uses these names to denote God himself, not a human person distinct from God.

CHAPTER IV

Barth's Alexandrian Christological Language

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to show that Barth uses the name "Jesus Christ" and its variants to denote the personal subject God rather than a human person distinct from God. As we have seen, the Antiochian interpretation concludes that Barth uses some terms, such as "Jesus," "Jesus of Nazareth," and "Son of Man," to distinguish a human subject from the divine subject, who is usually designated by other terms, such as "Son of God" and "Word of God." In the Alexandrian interpretation, all these terms denote the one divine subject, although they have different connotations. Some of them, such as "Jesus," connote this subject in his being and action as man, while others, such as "Son of God," connote his being and action as God.

To substantiate the Alexandrian interpretation, we shall first consider the evidence which indicates that Barth understands "Jesus Christ" and its variants as names of God. This evidence can be divided into two general categories, one having to do with the theoretical aspects of Barth's christological language and the other with his actual uses of the names. Before turning to Barth's uses of the names, we shall discuss his explanation of the referent of "Jesus" and "Jesus Christ," his analysis of the identity statements called propositiones personales, his rejection of the use of "Jesus Christ" and its variants to denote a human person distinct from God, and his account of the basis for applying possible predicates to these names. Throughout this first section of the chapter we shall show that Barth indicates that even such terms as "Jesus" and "man Jesus" can be used for God himself. In this way, Barth distinguishes himself from the Antiochian theologians who prefer to use such terms only for the human person united with God. Nevertheless, "Jesus" and similar terms are not always used in exactly the same ways as "Jesus Christ" and "Son of God."

In the second major section of this chapter we shall show that an Alexandrian interpretation of Barth can account for the differences in the ways Barth uses "Jesus Christ" and its variants without resorting to the Antiochian hypothesis that there are two agents involved. It does so by appealing to two basic principles which operate harmoniously in Barth's language. The first is that "Jesus Christ" and its variants connote as well as denote. The second is abstraction. Because Jesus Christ, as the act of God, is a comprehensive and complex reality, Barth finds it necessary to abstract from the whole Christ particular aspects of his being and action. When he talks of the divine nature of Christ, for example, he is abstracting from the total Christ. To draw attention to this process, Barth uses the connotations of the various names of Christ. For example, to abstract Christ's mode of being and action as man, Barth sometimes uses the title "Son of Man." In such cases, "Son of Man" should be understood as a shortened form of "Jesus Christ as man," not the title of a separate, human person.

"Jesus Christ" and Its Variants as Names of God

"Jesus," "Jesus Christ," and Their Referent

Barth's belief that "Jesus and "Jesus Christ" name God himself is expressed in a variety of ways. One of the most forceful of these is his claim that "Jesus" has the same "practical meaning" as "Yahweh." Commenting upon the fact that the early disciples prayed, taught, and baptized in the name "Jesus," Barth states:

> It is pretty much the same, comprehensive, pervasive meaning which . . . the name of Yahweh has in the OT: the name of Yahweh is just Yahweh manifest to men. Who then is Jesus, if his name has the same meaning? Does it still need the express declaration of Paul (Phil. 2:9) that God hath given him the name which is above every name?[1]

Barth also clearly affirms that "Jesus," "Jesus Christ," and "Yahweh" have the same referent. "Yahweh" is the Old

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[1] CD 1/1, p. 458 (KD, p. 420).

Testament name for God, and "Jesus Christ" is the New Testament name for God. In both cases, the names denote the "Self-Utterer," the "utterly simple, the simple reality of God." Barth explains:

> The answer of the New Testament to our question about the reality of God's revelation is to be found in the constant reiteration in all its pages of the name Jesus Christ. . . . That is precisely why we say that by the answer of the New Testament is meant the simple reality of God. The real fact, the fact meant, namely Jesus and, earlier, Yahweh, did not admit of utterance, just because in both cases it was the simple reality of God. Any utterance of it by the witnesses could only hint, and was only meant to hint, that the One indicated by this name is the Self-Utterer, the Word. That is why all further utterances of biblical witness point back to this name. In so doing, of course, they point past the name to the bearer of it, whom man can no longer express, because He wills to express or utter Himself in the power of the truth . . . which he Himself is.[1]

In its capacity as a name for God, the name "Jesus Christ" simply points to God without expressing an idea or having any content. It is the symbol of the person who is God.

> Ultimately only the name Jesus Christ, in what would appear to be its utter emptiness as a mere name, which by itself can express no content, principle, idea or truth, but is only the symbol for a person--this eternally inexpressible name, known and still to be made known, alone represents the object which they all signify and to which they all point.[2]

Similarly, this person God who bears the name "Jesus Christ" is the sovereign "I."[1]

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[1] CD 1/2, p. 10 (KD, pp. 11-12).

[2] Ibid., p. 11 (KD, p. 13).

While these passages might be fitted into an Antiochian interpretation of Barth, making them fit would require considerable qualification which is not supplied by Barth. The direct and forceful way in which he affirms that "Jesus" and "Jesus Christ" are names of God suggests that they are not first of all names of some man and that they can also be applied to God because of his relation to that man. These names belong to God in the way that "Yahweh" belongs to him in the Old Testament.

Before leaving this topic, two points should be added. The first is that when "Jesus" and "Jesus Christ" denote God, they refer to an objective reality. This function of these names is evident from the passages just mentioned. God is the "object" to which the names refer; he is their "bearer," and they "point to" him. For Barth, "Jesus Christ" is not simply a name given to the sum total of all particular truths. He is not merely a theoretical concept.[2] As God, Jesus Christ is the transcendent reality who confronts us and to whom our language must conform in order to be valid.

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[1] CD 2/2, p. 54 (KD, p. 57).

[2] Arnold B. Come, An Introduction to Barth's "Dogmatics" for Preachers (Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1963), p. 139. "It must also be remembered that by 'Jesus Christ' Barth does not mean some Absolute Idea that contains all concrete particular truths that are to be deduced by a rational dialectic (Hegel). 'Jesus Christ' is a history in which the living personal God moves from his freely made decision to share his eternal life with a creature, through the whole process of time that he gives that creature, to the fulfillment of his

Second, "Jesus" and its variants are not always used by Barth to denote God himself. They may also be used to refer to themselves or interpretations of Christ. For example, the word "Jesus" has a certain number of letters, a particular history, and a definite meaning. When Barth says that "Jesus" means "Yahweh saves,"[1] he is speaking primarily of the word, not the divine-human person. Also, when Barth speaks of the "Johannine Jesus" or the "Christ of Paul," he is speaking of interpretations rather than the one who is interpreted. Yet, for our purpose, the most important function of "Jesus" and its variants in Barth's theology is to denote God himself.

Propositiones Personales

Barth's explanation of the meaning of the propositiones personales indicates that he thinks such terms as "this man, the Son of Mary" name God, rather than a human person distinct from God. To show how Barth understands these propositions, it is necessary to report part of his account of how Reformed and Lutheran theologians have disagreed about their meaning.

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purpose. And the medium in which this history of God becomes visible is Jesus of Nazareth and his special history as witnessed to in the Bible by the Holy Spirit."

[1] CD 3/2, p. 58 (KD, p. 67).

The *propositiones personales* are equations which result from the *unio hypostatica*, the union of God the Word with the human nature in the incarnation. They affirm on the one hand "that the Son of God, and therefore God in His divine essence, is this man, the Son of Mary." On the other hand, they affirm "that this man, the Son of Mary, is the Son of God, and therefore God in His divine essence."[1] Barth explains that the emphasis is upon the second of these, which states that the man Jesus is by nature divine.

According to Barth, both the Lutherans and the Reformed accepted the *propositiones personales*, but they interpreted them differently. The Lutherans understood these propositions as statements about "the humanity of Jesus Christ which in themselves denote and describe only the divine and not the human essence." Because of the union of the two natures, the Lutherans believed that the predicates of the divine nature, such as "by nature divine," could be attributed to the human nature itself. Thus, when they stated that the Son of Mary is the Son of God and therefore divine by nature, they meant that the human nature is also divine.[2]

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 67 (KD, p. 72).

[2] Ibid., p. 67 (KD, pp. 72-73). Speaking of the Lutheran position, Barth says: "This meant in practice that statements may also be made of the humanity of Jesus Christ which in themselves denote and describe only the divine and not the human essence. It is in the fact that such statements can and

On the other hand, the Reformed tradition interpreted the propositiones personales as statements about the eternal Son who assumed human nature, not as statements about the human nature itself. Thus, when they said "this man, the Son of Mary, is the Son of God, and therefore God in His divine essence," they understood "this man, the Son of Mary" as denoting the eternal Son of God himself, not the human nature.[1] By interpreting the propositiones personales in this way, they evidenced a concern to emphasize the sovereignty of the divine subject in the incarnation.[2]

Barth's preference for the Reformed interpretation of the propositiones personales is explicit. "We, too, have accepted a similar orientation, and therefore attached ourselves to the Reformed tradition."[3] Consequently, when Barth

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may and must be made of the humanity of Jesus Christ that we see the concern of the older Lutheran theology with its particular doctrine of the communio naturarum."

[1] Ibid., pp. 68-69 (KD, pp. 73-74). Speaking of the Reformed, Barth says: "Thus they could not understand the propositiones personales in the sense that statements can and may and must be made about the humanity of Jesus Christ whose content corresponds only to the Logos existing in divine essence, and not to the human essence assumed by Him into unity with His existence." In their use of these propositions, the Reformed "tried to direct their true attention to the One who overcame in this overcoming, and to the act of His overcoming --to Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ, the eternal Son of God, and to the act of God which took place and is a fact in him."

[2] Ibid. Their zeal "was a zeal for the sovereignty of the Subject acting in free grace in the incarnation, of the living God in the person and existence of His Son."

[3] Ibid., p. 69 (KD, p. 74).

proclaims his own version of the *propositiones personales*, he uses "the Son of Mary" to denote God.

Barth's statement of the *propositiones personales*, which occurs immediately following his discussion of the Reformed and Lutheran interpretations, takes this form:

> But in respect of the Subject acting in this matter we must also make a second differentiation. The Son of God becomes man. That is, He adopts and assumes human essence to His own divine essence. He becomes and is Jesus of Nazareth, the Son of Man. We have, therefore, to say quite unreservedly that Jesus, the son of David and Mary, as the Son of God, was and is very God, God by nature, of divine essence. The Son of God exists as Jesus exists, and Jesus exists as the Son of God exists. Jesus Himself is, as very man, the Son of God and therefore of divine essence, God by nature.[1]

"Jesus," and "Jesus of Nazareth," and "the Son of David and Mary" are used here to name the eternal agent who is the Son of God. When he becomes a man, he becomes Jesus of Nazareth. It is only because Jesus of Nazareth is also and primarily the Son of God that he can be said to be divine by nature. The names involved do not denote the human nature itself, as though Barth interpreted this human nature in a concrete sense, identifying it with a particular person. This subject is not a human person who is also divine; he is the divine person who is also human.

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[1] Ibid., p. 71 (KD, p. 77), translation mine. The published English translation does not reproduce the emphasis which is found in the original through spacing.

Since in the propositiones personales Barth refers to God with "this man, the Son of Mary," and other terms which appear to be more directly related to Christ's humanity than his divinity, it is likely that he always uses similar terms in this way. If he were to use them to name a separate, human person as well, he would be using them equivocally, and this could generate considerable confusion. In the next section we shall show that in certain specific cases Barth rejects the practice of using "Jesus" and its variants to denote a person who is distinct from God.[1]

Improper use of "Jesus Christ" and Its Variants

That Barth uses "Jesus" and its variants to denote God himself in his mode of being as the incarnate one is also indicated by his account of the incorrect interpretations of Jesus held by non-believers, Ebionites, Docetists, and the disciples before faith. Barth believes that these groups use "Jesus" and its variants improperly, as though they denote a separate, human person.

Barth makes this point in regard to non-believers by noting that they focus their attention upon Jesus' being as a man and that they fail to grasp that he is essentially and primarily God himself. Because the eternal Son became a man and existed in time, it takes no faith or revelation for people to be aware of him as a figure in world history. He can be known and studied as other historical realities are known, through historical investigation. Because he is "generally visible to His fellow-creatures, and may be generally located and interpreted, within the limits that this is possible to creatures" and because "no special eyes are needed to be aware of Him, nor is any special understanding needed to interpret Him," it is understandable "that there is hardly a historian who can simply ignore Him, or a philosopher who will fail to give Him appropriate consideration in a carefully subdued acknowledgment side by side with Buddha and Socrates."[1] However, it cannot be said that they truly know him. True knowledge of him is possible only through "the divine act of majesty" in which God speaks for himself and makes himself known. Barth states:

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[1] We shall turn to this problem again later when we examine particular instances where Barth appears to use some of the names of Christ to denote a separate, human person. See below, pp. 256-74.

> But it is one thing to know, another to recognise. To recognise is to know Him as the One He--and He alone--is, as the One in whom, in virtue of His ground of being, God's act of majesty, there takes place and is that which is new and unique in the series of all other elements and figures in cosmic being and history--the fact that, without ceasing to be the Creator, the Creator Himself also becomes a creature, and therefore, without ceasing to be God, God also becomes man. To know Him as this--just this, no more and no less--is to recognise Him.[2]

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 38 (KD, p. 40).

[2] Ibid. See also CD 1/1, pp. 188, 373 (KD, pp. 171, 343).

In this passage Barth does not speak specifically of referents of the name "Jesus." However, it is clear that those who do not understand that Jesus is God himself use the name "Jesus" to refer only to Jesus in his being and action as a man. They assume that this is the totality of his being, while, according to Barth, it is only one aspect. Thus, they use the names of Jesus improperly, assuming that the humanity of Jesus is a complete person in itself.

Barth's interpretation of Ebionitism and Docetism indicates that he believes that followers of these views use "Jesus" and its variants to name a human person who is separate from God. Barth does not make this point as explicitly as he might, but what he says about these two positions makes it clear that he understands them in this way.

Barth states that modern Ebionitism and Docetism are not so different from each other as might be imagined. Both of them regard the New Testament statement about the divinity of Jesus Christ as "a manner of speaking loosely meant and loosely to be interpreted."[1] As a result, Ebionites and Docetists can say many of the same things that the New Testament says, but their words do not mean the same thing as the New Testament. The New Testament speaks of the God who became man and revealed himself, while the words of the Ebionites focus upon "the historical form of a 'great man,'" and those of the Docetists have to do with some "general truth" which becomes "personified" in Jesus.[1]

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[1] CD 1/1, p. 462 (KD, p. 424).

The Ebionites and Docetists interpret the New Testament concept of the divinity of Christ as the divinity of a man named "Jesus" who is an individual over against the person God. They defend concepts of the divinity of Christ which are based "on the assumption that the original outlook and declaration of the NT witnesses concerned a human being, who subsequently was either exalted as such to divinity, or appeared among us as the personification and symbol of a divine being." For Barth, there is "no possibility on this road of ending anywhere save in a blind alley."[2]

Both the Ebionites and Docetists begin with a "human being," and then they ask the question of how the knowledge of that human individual becomes transformed into faith.[3] The Ebionites argue that Jesus of Nazareth was such an impressive personality that he was venerated by his disciples and elevated so highly in their minds that "the equation between Jesus and God ceases to be impossible."[4] Of course, this equation might be made in regard to other men as well.

The Docetists, on the other hand, find some general truth personified in the man Jesus. This truth can be understood in numerous ways. It might be the "truth of the community of godhead and humanity" or the "truth of redemption by way of Die and Be born!" Whatever truth is chosen, however, it is "more or less accidental" that it becomes known through this human phenomenon.[1] It is because the idea becomes known through the man Jesus that he was called "Lord," "God's Son," and finally "God."

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[1] Ibid., p. 463 (KD, p. 424).

[2] Ibid., p. 460 (KD, p. 422).

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 461 (KD, p. 423).

Both these views are idolatrous. Ebionitism is idolatrous because it idealizes and worships a mere man. Docetism is idolatrous because it worships a human idea, and since men actually created the idea, Docetism also worships man. Barth makes these accusations here:

> By their assumption that there is at the end of an ascending or descending reflection--reflection upon the man Jesus as such and reflection upon divinity in special connection with the man Jesus--simply a small or even a great exaggeration, as the case might be, by means of which the statement of the divinity of Christ would spring up, or could be made intelligible, the Ebionite and Docetic Christologies impute to the thought of the Biblical witnesses a performance which the latter themselves could, of course, only have condemned as the blasphemy of which Jesus Himself was accused, but really falsely accused. If Jesus had designated himself, or the oldest Church had designated him the Son of God, in the sense presupposed by both these conceptions then he and his Church would have been rightly expelled from the community of the OT. For what else could such idealising of a man or mythologising of an idea be, but characteristically the thing regarded by the OT as setting up and worshipping an idol, one of those unworthy and null rivals of Yahweh. How little could

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[1] Ibid.

> the word "God" have been understood in the sense of the OT by one who could imagine, or even hyperbolically pretend to imagine, that a man could really become God, or that the real God could have His copy in a man![1]

It seems evident, then, that Barth believes that Ebionitism and Docetism use "Jesus" and its cognates incorrectly to denote a human person who is distinct from the person God. Because of this misunderstanding of the proper referent of these names, both these christologies fail to grasp the meaning of New Testament language. The New Testament affirms that Jesus is divine because he is the person God himself. "The actual content in the NT texts is at least this, that in Jesus it is God who is found, because in fact Jesus himself cannot be discovered as any one else than God."[2]

Since Barth thinks that non-believers, neutral observers, Ebionites and Docetists use "Jesus" and its variants to denote a human person distinct from God, it follows that the original disciples practiced the same pattern before they came to faith. However, when they were the beneficiaries of God's revelation of himself in the resurrection event, they became aware that Jesus really was and is God himself. Therefore, they became aware of the proper referent of "Jesus" and its variants.

Barth does not state this point explicitly, but it is firmly implied in his account of the conversion of the disciples from a state of non-belief to a state of belief. There was a time before they recognized who Jesus really was. It was the resurrection event which revealed to the disciples who Jesus was and is.[1] Since they did not know who Jesus really was before the resurrection, they did not know the proper use of his names. Barth states that it is only because of Jesus' self-revelation in the resurrection that "the men of the New Testament could think and speak at all of Jesus Christ." Barth explains, "In His resurrection and ascension He gave Himself to be seen and heard and understood by them as the One He was and is."[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 464 (KD, pp. 425-26).

[2] Ibid., p. 463 (KD, p. 425).

In conclusion, it is clear that in these cases Barth believes that it is improper to use "Jesus" and its variants to name a human person who is separate from the person God. This fact gives additional support to the hypothesis that Barth always uses these names to denote God.

Possible Predicates of "Jesus Christ" and Its Variants

Barth's discussion of the factors which determine what predicates can be assigned to "Jesus Christ" and its variants contributes to our investigation in two ways. First, his explanation of the basis for attributing divine and human predicates to the one Christ has an Alexandrian form. This suggests that Barth understands the names and predicates as belonging to one person, not two. Second, Barth prefers not to affirm all the statements which are made possible by his basic theory of predication, and this preference indicates that he does not always use all the names of Jesus Christ in exactly the same ways.

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[1] CD 3/2, pp. 448-49 (KD, pp. 537-38). Barth states that the deity of Jesus was unknown during his earthly life.

[2] CD 4/2, p. 134 (KD, p. 150).

Barth states that the characteristics of the divine and the human natures are "unlimitedly and unreservedly proper" to Jesus Christ. Everything distinctive of each nature is "not merely *verbaliter*" but "*realiter et verissime*" proper to Christ.[1] These qualifications imply that Barth rejects the Antiochian category of relation. He does not suggest that the divine qualities can be assigned to the man Jesus because of his relation to God or that the human qualities can be attributed to the divine subject because of his relation to a separate, human person. These predicates belong directly to the one divine person because he is the bearer of both natures.

Because the predicates of both natures can be attributed to the one divine subject and because this subject can be denoted by so many different terms, striking combinations are possible. Barth admits this possibility, and he aligns himself with the Reformed theologians who refrain from taking advantage of it. He states:

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[1] Ibid., pp. 73-76 (KD, pp. 79-83).

> Where the Reformed were not willing to follow [the Lutherans] emerges supremely in the fact that they refrained from certain statements which were quite possible within this common framework but seems to be rather arbitrary and without biblical foundation, as, for example, that "God died" ("O ill most dread, that God is dead"), or that "the man Jesus Christ is Almighty."[1]

Barth does not explain why such statements appear "arbitrary," but the reason seems clear. He thinks that it is wise to be aware of the distinctive contributions of each nature to the activity of the one divine subject. For example, he notes with approval that

> both Lutherans and Reformed emphasised that in His work each nature does that which is appropriate to its distinctive character: dying, for example, in the case of the human; and the establishment of the infinite and universal significance of His death in the case of the divine.[2]

However, the distinctions between the two natures are obscured when predicates which belong to one nature are combined with names which are usually associated with the opposite nature.

In the second example which Barth gives above, "the man Jesus Christ is Almighty," the first phrase is more closely related with the humanity of Christ than his divinity, while the predicate is more directly associated with his divinity. Consequently, the statement sounds odd.

In the next section, when we examine Barth's uses of the names of Christ to denote the divine subject, we shall encounter again some of the restrictions which Barth places upon those names which are closely associated with Christ's humanity. Then, in the following section, we shall argue that these restrictions can be explained without accepting the Antiochian hypothesis that they denote someone other than God.

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[1] Ibid., p. 76 (KD, p. 83).

[2] Ibid., pp. 104-5 (KD, p. 116).

Uses of "Jesus Christ" and Its Variants

In the previous sections of this chapter we have concentrated primarily upon Barth's discussion of language about Christ. Our purpose here is to give additional evidence that Barth actually uses "Jesus Christ" and its variants to denote God himself. Since Barth does not use all these names in exactly the same ways, we shall first consider "Jesus Christ" and then "the man Jesus."

Barth's use of "Jesus Christ" to denote God is made apparent in four principal ways. First, qualities and actions which can be predicated of "God," "Son of God," and "Word of God" can also be assigned to "Jesus Christ." Second, these four terms can be used in apposition to each other. Third, in discussion of a specific topic, for example, reconciliation, these four terms can be substituted for each other. Finally, Barth freely affirms identity statements using these four terms, without qualifying the identity as indirect. We shall give some examples under these four categories.

Barth states that all the qualities that belong to the divine nature, and are therefore shared by the three of the trinity, can be ascribed to Jesus Christ. In application of this principle, he speaks of Jesus Christ as being "transcendent," "free," and "sovereign," just as God is.[1] Furthermore, Jesus Christ performs actions which can only be performed by God. He elects man, he creates the universe, he humbles himself and becomes a man in the incarnation, he assumes flesh, he speaks and makes himself known in the event of revelation, and he justifies and sanctifies human beings, reconciling them to himself.[2]

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[1] Since many of the passages in which Barth assigns divine predicates to Jesus Christ also identify him with the Son and Word of God, it is wise to quote some of them. For example, "In his Godhead, as the eternal Son of the Father, as the eternal Word, Jesus Christ never ceased to be transcendent, free, and sovereign." CD 4/1, p. 135 (KD, p. 147). "But again, He, Jesus Christ, as Son of Man is also the Son of God, and as such of one essence with the Father and the Holy Ghost, and therefore the Lord of all lords, the source of all good, the Almighty and All-merciful, the Word by which the world was created and is maintained, the Eternal before whom all His creatures can and must only disappear and perish like dust, and yet shall not simply perish and disappear but persist, the One who in great and little things alike is present to everything near or far in time or space and sustains and keeps and rules it, the gracious One, who knows the transgression and weakness of man, whose anger burns but as the fire of His love, who does not will the death of man but his life and salvation. He, the Son of God, is the One who was and is and will be, existing in the pre-temporality, the co-temporality and the post-temporality of God Himself." CD 4/2, pp. 74-75 (KD, p. 81). See also p. 73 (KD, pp. 79-80).

[2] For the claim that Jesus Christ elects, see CD 2/2, pp. 94-106 (KD, pp. 101-13). "Jesus Christ is the electing God," p. 103 (KD, p. 111). Barth explains that Jesus Christ "does

Barth often uses "Jesus Christ," "Son of God," "Word of God," and "God" in apposition with each other. This usage is more common in relation to the first three of these terms, but it also occurs with "God." Barth uses "Jesus Christ" and "Son of God," in apposition in this statement: "Jesus Christ, the Son of God and Lord who humbled Himself to be a servant, is also the Son of Man exalted as this servant to be the Lord."[1] An example of "Jesus Christ" and

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not elect alone, but in company with the electing of the Father and the Holy Spirit. But He does elect," p. 105 (KD, p. 112).

For the belief that Jesus Christ is the creator, see CD 2/2, p. 94 (KD, p. 101). "It is by Him, Jesus Christ, and for Him and to Him, that the universe is created as a theatre for God's dealings with man and man's dealings with God." See also CD 4/2, p. 54 (KD, p.57).

For the affirmation that Jesus Christ assumed flesh, see CD 1/2, p. 214 (KD, p. 233). "Just as, similarly, Jesus Christ cannot be understood from the standpoint of man's nature and kind, which He assumed and adopted, and which are only too familiar to us." See also p. 238 (KD, p. 259). When he assumed flesh he became man. "Jesus Christ is the Son of God who became man." CD 4/1, p. 204 (KD, p. 224). See also p. 192 (KD, p. 209).

Jesus Christ is the one who reveals himself as Lord. For example, in CD 4/2, p. 156 (KD, p. 174), Barth states "the knowledge of Jesus Christ, and the presentation in the whole of the New Testament and therefore from the very outset in the Synoptics, rests on the self-declaration in which He revealed Himself to His disciples in the resurrection and ascension." Jesus Christ also speaks and is heard in the Church, and this speaking can also be described by Barth as the speaking of God; CD 1/1, pp. 45-46 (KD, pp. 41-43).

With respect to reconciliation, Barth states that Jesus Christ "is the One who justifies, sanctifies, and calls." CD 4/1, p. 147 (KD, pp. 161-62). See also pp. 125, 197 (KD, pp. 137, 215-16).

[1] CD 4/2, p. 3 (KD, p. 1). See also CD 1/1, p. 474 (KD, p. 435), and CD 4/1, p. 163 (KD, p. 178).

"Word of God" used in apposition is the following: "Jesus Christ, the Word of God, meets us as nothing other than God."[1] "God" is used in apposition with "Son" and with "this One," which apparently refers to "Jesus Christ," in the following statement: "It is, then, the secret of the becoming and being of the existence of Jesus Christ that it took place and is: (1) that this One, God, the Son, became and is also man."[2]

The substitution of these four terms for one another can be seen in Barth's discussion of the doctrine of reconciliation in volume four. The event of reconciliation contains two movements, a movement from God to man and, as a result, a movement from man to God. The first of these movements can be designated by Barth in a variety of ways. It is the moment in which God, the Son of God, the Word of God, or Jesus Christ becomes a man. It is the act in which the Word becomes flesh or assumes flesh. It is the event in which the Son of God, God himself, or Jesus Christ goes into a far country. It is the act in which the Son obeys the Father. It is the event in which Jesus Christ the Lord becomes a servant. Since this one event can be designated in all these ways, it seems clear that these four terms are used to name one agent.[3]

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[1] CD 1/1, p. 498 (KD, p. 457). See also p. 218 (KD, p. 199).

[2] CD 4/2, p. 44 (KD, p. 47).

[3] For example, see CD 4/2, p. 100 (KD, pp. 110-11). Here

Finally, Barth uses the four terms under discussion in identity statements. He affirms that the Son of God and the Word of God are identical with God and that Jesus Christ is identical with the Son of God, the Word of God, and God himself. While these identities may appear difficult conceptually, particularly to an Antiochian theologian, Barth's affirmations of them are often quite simple and direct. "Jesus Christ is God."[1] "The Word of God is uncreated reality, identical with God Himself."[2] "God is God the Son just as He is God the Father."[3] "Jesus Christ is the Word of God."[4]

Barth uses several different forms of expression. He states that "the Word became flesh," became and is "also Jesus of Nazareth," and "became identical with this man." The "Creator condescended to be a creature." "As the Son of God" the Creator "goes into the far country." The Son of God "became this man."

If there is any doubt that God performs this act, Barth removes it. See CD 4/2, p. 109 (KD, p. 121). "But, at root, what is the life of Jesus Christ but the act in which God becomes very God and very man, positing Himself in this being?" He also states that God "goes into the far country." CD 4/1, p. 158 (KD, p. 173).

For the use of "Jesus Christ" to denote this one who goes into the far country and becomes man, see CD 4/1, p. 157 (KD, p. 171). "That Jesus Christ is very God is shown in His way into the far country in which He the Lord became a servant." For other statements of Jesus Christ's becoming a man, or humbling himself, or obeying the Father, see CD 4/1, pp. 204-8 (KD, pp. 224-28) and also pp. 133, 177, 294 (KD, pp. 146-47, 193, 324). For the terminology of the obedience of the Son of God, see CD 4/1, p. 159 (KD, pp. 173-74).

[1] CD 4/1, p. 22 (KD, p. 22). See also pp. 79, 126, 128-29, 157 (KD, pp. 83, 138, 140-41, 171); CD 1/1, p. 474 (KD, p. 435).

[2] CD 1/1, p. 180 (KD, p. 163). See also p. 164 (KD, p. 149).

[3] Ibid., p. 474 (KD, p. 435).

[4] Ibid., p. 157 (KD, p. 143).

"Jesus Christ is the Son of God."[1]

We turn now to "the man Jesus," "Jesus of Nazareth," and "Son of Man," terms which are more closely associated with Christ's humanity than his divinity. Barth seldom attributes divine qualities and actions directly to these grammatical subjects, nor does he often use them to substitute for, or in apposition with, "Son of God" and "Word of God." Yet, it is clear that he uses them to denote God.

In our discussion of the _propositiones personales_ we noted that Barth uses "Jesus" and "this man, the Son of Mary" to denote the one who is God "by nature." This is also true of "the man Jesus" and "Jesus of Nazareth." Using the latter term, Barth states: "It was as this man that Jesus of Nazareth was 'the Father's Son, by nature God.'"[2] Similarly speaking of the divinity of the man Jesus, Barth asserts:

> But there can be no disputing the fact that, in the sense of those who gave it, this witness is to the simple effect that, prior to any attitudes of others to Him or statements of others about Him, the man Jesus did in fact occupy this place and function, that, prior to any knowledge of His being or temporally conditioned confession of it, He actually was and is and will be what He is represented in the reflection of this witness, the Son of the Heavenly Father, the King of His kingdom, and therefore "by nature God."[3]

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[1] CD 4/1, p. 206 (KD, p. 225).

[2] CD 4/2, p. 95 (KD, p. 105). See also CD 1/2, p. 13 (KD, p. 15) where Barth states: "The Word or Son of God became a man and was called Jesus of Nazareth." In addition, see CD 4/2, pp. 91, 101 (KD, pp. 100, 112).

[3] CD 4/1, p. 163 (KD, p. 178). See also p. 13 (KD, p. 13).

Because this one is divine by nature, he possesses all the power that belongs to God alone. In his elaboration of this point, Barth indicates that "the man Jesus" and "Jesus of Nazareth" do not name the human nature of the Logos. He states that all divine power is given "to this man," not to his human nature. The human nature is the organ of the divine agent who is called "Jesus."

> He, the Son of God, did and does and will do all these things. But He does not do them in the nakedness of His divine power, in which they could not have been done as the reconciliation of the world with God, but as the Son of Man, in His identity with the man Jesus of Nazareth. But this means that His divine power, all power in heaven and on earth, is given to this man in His identity with the Son of God. . . . It is to Him and not this organ, to His human essence as such, that there is given "all power in heaven and in earth" (Mt. 28:18).[1]

In this same context, Barth makes it clear that "Son of Man" should also be understood as the name of God, not the human nature itself. The human nature is the organ of the Son of Man just as it is the organ of the man Jesus. Barth states:

> There is no reason to mistake the pure humanity of Jesus Christ in relation to the empowering which comes to His human essence by the electing grace of God. We insist that its function is that of an organ of the Son of Man who is also and primarily the Son of God.[2]

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[1] CD 4/2, pp. 97-98 (KD, pp. 107-8).

[2] Ibid., p. 98 (KD, p. 108).

Because the man Jesus is God himself, he is the agent of revelation. Barth is emphatic about the fact that only God can reveal God.[1] Consequently, when he states that Jesus reveals God, the identity between Jesus and God is implied. In his act of revelation, the man Jesus reveals himself and, at the same time, God. Barth states:

> But this means that in the power and mercy of the same divine act of majesty which is the ground of His being the man Jesus speaks for Himself, expounds Himself and gives Himself to be known, so that He is no longer just confessed in a way, but known and recognised as the One He is. This means that in and with His self-disclosure He induces and initiates the human seeing and interpreting which attaches itself to the divine act of majesty in and by which He has His being, following and accompanying it, repeating the being which He has on this basis, and therefore becoming and being a relevant human seeing and interpreting (as that which is mastered by Him).[2]

Because "the man Jesus" and "Jesus of Nazareth" denote God himself in his second mode of being, it would be possible for Barth to use these terms when speaking of the first movement of reconciliation. Just as Barth speaks of Jesus Christ assuming flesh and becoming man, he could also say that the man Jesus elected to become man, that the man Jesus humbled himself and went into the far country, and that the man Jesus, the Lord, became a servant. Barth ususally refrains from such statements, indicating that "the man Jesus" and "Jesus of Nazareth" are not so flexible as "Jesus Christ." Nevertheless, on at least one occasion, Barth says that the man Jesus accepted human nature. This exception confirms that "the man Jesus" denotes God himself. Barth states:

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[1] CD 1/1, pp. 368-72 (KD, pp. 338-42).

[2] CD 4/2, p. 39 (KD, p. 41).

> Thus the man Jesus does not transcend the limits of the humanity common to Him and us, or become alien to us, when in His acceptance of human essence, even in its perversion, He does not repeat the perversion or do wrong, when in virtue of His origin He cannot will or do it.[1]

In this statement about the sinlessness of Jesus, Barth implies that the one called "the man Jesus" is originally divine. The fact that this agent could accept human essence presupposes that this essence was not already inherently his before he accepted it. If "the man Jesus" denoted the one who was already existing as a man in time, it would appear that he could not accept human nature, for he would already have it.

In conclusion, Barth's understanding of the names of Christ and his uses of them conform to his doctrine of Christ. Jesus Christ is directly identical with God, and therefore his names are also names of God. In the next section more needs to be said about the theoretical basis for the distinctive ways that the various names of Christ are used.

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[1] Ibid., p. 93 (KD, pp. 102-3).

Denotation, Connotation, and Abstraction

The purpose of this section is to provide an explanation of how Barth can use "Jesus Christ" and its variants differently, although all of these names denote one divine agent. We shall argue that the names of Christ have connotations as well as denotations and that Barth uses the connotations when he abstracts from the one whole Christ, calling attention to particular aspects of his being and action.[1] Then we shall examine some specific examples which seem to give strong support to the Antiochian view that Barth uses some of the names of Christ, such as "the man Jesus," to denote a human person other than God. We shall show that even in these cases the terms in question denote the divine subject, although they connote his being and action as man.

Our first task is to show that Barth recognizes the connotations as well as the denotations of the names of Christ. "Jesus," Barth explains, is not merely a label which could be replaced at will. It means "Yahweh saves," and this meaning expresses the essence of Jesus Christ.[2] Similarly, other titles and names, such as "Messiah" or "Savior," have meanings which are fitting for the one who bears them.[1]

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[1] Paul Ziff, Semantic Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 94-102, discusses the connotation of personal and proper names. For example, he states: "A proper name connotes what is, as it were, noted with the name by the hearer." p. 94.

[2] CD 3/2, p. 58 (KD, p. 67). Here Barth states that because "Jesus" means that Yahweh saves, it "tells a story." See also p. 60 (KD, p. 70); CD 1/1, p. 364 (KD, p. 335); CD 4/2, p. 501 (KD, p. 567); CD 4/4, pp. 92-93 (KD, pp. 101-2).

Barth relates the meaning of the titles "Son of God" and "Word of God" to their metaphorical character. Because of their places in the metaphors of father-son and speaker-word, "Son of God" and "Word of God" have different connotations, although both denote God in his second mode of being. These connotations enable the two terms to balance and correct each other. While "Word of God" suggests that in his inner fellowship and in revelation God is intellectually alive, eternally knowing himself, it is misleading in that it implies that God's Word is other than God himself. In the creaturely realm, words are essentially distinct from their speakers. On the other hand, "Son of God" indicates that the second of the trinity is of the same essence as the first, just as earthly sons are of the same essence as their fathers. Barth states:

> The two figures, that of the Son and that of the Word of God, point to an object for which they are not appropriate. But for that very reason each of them must be taken seriously for itself, and neither of them should be dispensed with because the other is suggested.[2]

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[1] CD 3/2, pp. 60-61 (KD, pp. 70-71). Barth states that "Messiah," "Son of Man," and "Savior" also "point in the same direction." That is, they indicate that Yahweh saves. See also CD 4/1, pp. 5-6 (KD, pp. 3-4) where Barth considers "Emmanuel."

[2] CD 1/1, p. 493 (KD, p. 453). See also pp. 494-501 (KD, pp. 453-60); CD 4/1, pp. 206-10 (KD, pp. 226-31). In the last

While Barth can describe the terms "Son of God" and "Word of God" as metaphors, he sees no inconsistency in speaking of them also as names. "Under the name of Son of God Jesus took the very place which in the Old Testament has often enough been allotted to the 'children' of Israel in their relation with God."[1]

These examples indicate that Barth believes that names have meanings or connotations as well as referents. He does not explore systematically the significance of this two-sidedness of names; he simply accepts it and applies it.

Our next task is to show that Barth endorses abstraction in theological thinking. This endorsement might not be apparent to the casual reader, since Barth so often attacks abstraction. For example, he argues against abstracting God from his act of revelation,[2] election from Jesus Christ,[3] the election of the individual from the election of the community,[4] the judgment of God from the grace of God,[5] and the humanity of Jesus Christ from his divinity. In the last of these

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of these references, Barth explains that although the metaphor of father-son conveys that God the Father is of the same essence as God the Son, it does not indicate clearly that they are one individual.

[1] CD 4/1, p. 169 (KD, p. 184). See also CD 1/1, p. 155 (KD, pp. 141-42).

[2] CD 2/1, p. 22 (KD, pp. 22-23). See also pp. 81, 84 (KD, pp. 88, 91-92).

[3] CD 2/2, p. 76 (KD, p. 81).

[4] Ibid., p. 309 (KD, pp. 339-40).

[5] CD 1/2, p. 56 (KD, p. 62).

examples, abstraction can lead to false worship. Barth states:

> As God cannot be considered without His humanity, His humanity cannot be considered or known or magnified or worshipped without God. Any attempt to treat it in abstracto, in a vacuum, is from the very first a perverted undertaking. As Son of Man, and therefore in human form, Jesus Christ does not exist at all except in the act of God, as He is first the Son of God.[1]

Nevertheless, in spite of this polemic against abstraction in specific instances, Barth also admits that it is necessary. For example, as we have seen, Barth argues that the concept of a logos asarkos is an abstraction which is "indispensable for dogmatic enquiry and presentation." In this instance, proper abstraction recognizes that the Logos is always united with his human nature in the eternal decision and being of God.[2]

While Barth does not often draw attention to his abstracting by using the words "abstract" or "abstraction," on at least one occasion he does. Concerning an abstraction of Christ's being from his resurrection and ascension, Barth states:

> The being of Jesus Christ was and is perfect and complete in itself in His history as the true Son of God and Son of Man. It does not need to be transcended or augmented by new qualities or further developments. The humiliation of God and the

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 102 (KD, pp. 112-13). See also CD 1/2, p. 19 (KD, p. 21).

[2] CD 3/1, p. 54 (KD, p. 58). See also above, pp. 85-87.

> exaltation of man as they took place in Him are the completed fulfillment of the covenant, the completed reconciliation of the world with God. His being as such (if we may be permitted this abstraction for a moment) was and is the end of the old and the beginning of the new form of this world even without His resurrection and ascension.[1]

In this quote, Barth calls attention to the fact that he is abstracting by using the word "abstraction," and also by using the phrase "as such." The latter of these two methods is by far the more common. Barth often speaks of the man Jesus "as such" when he is abstracting his being and action as a man, and he often speaks of the Son of God "as such" when he is abstracting his being and action as God. Barth does not wish to refer to Jesus Christ "in words that refer exclusively to His divine or exclusively to His human essence," but sometimes he wishes to speak of Jesus Christ in words that refer specifically to his human nature or his divine nature.[2]

Abstraction is a crucial element in Barth's christological language, therefore it merits more clarification than Barth himself has given it. We shall provide some of the necessary clarification by indicating how abstraction and the connotative function of names influence Barth's language about Christ.

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[1] CD 4/2, pp. 132-33 (KD, p. 148).

[2] Ibid., p. 74 (KD, p. 80).

Jesus Christ's Being as God and as Man

When speaking of Jesus Christ, Barth often abstracts particular aspects of his being and action for clarification and emphasis. He abstracts the divine nature, the human nature, the agent himself, the act which he performs, his being and action as God, and his being and action as man. The most important of these, for our purpose, are the last two. In these instances the connotations of the various names become apparent.

Our principal purpose is to show that the names of Christ which are more closely related to his divine nature, such as "Son of God," denote the one divine agent while they connote his being and action as God. On the other hand, the names of Christ which are more closely associated with his human nature, such as "Son of Man," denote the one divine agent and connote his being and action as man. Before we consider the abstractions of Christ's being and action as God and as man, it is wise to mention the simpler abstractions of the human nature, the divine nature, the agent, and the act.

Barth abstracts each of the two natures from the total Christ when he specifies their characteristics, their relation to each other, and their relation to Christ himself. For example, he is abstracting the divine nature when he states that it is characterized by holiness, mercy, wisdom, and so forth. Similarly, he is abstracting the human nature when he lists its temporality, mortality, and responsibility before God.[1] He abstracts the two natures when he states that the two are not transformed into each other in their union but that they maintain their integrity and proper function.[2] Further, he abstracts the two natures from the divine agent when he says that they do not exist apart from him.[3]

From the one whole Christ Barth also abstracts the divine agent and his act. This occurs, for example, when Barth states simply that the act of the incarnation is performed by God rather than man.[4] It also occurs when Barth explains that even after the initial moment of the incarnation the actions of Jesus Christ are the actions of God himself.[5] Although many of Jesus' acts, such as his washing the disciples' feet or taking children into his arms, "might well have been performed by others," they are important because of Jesus' divinity. "The significance of all His acts is finally and decisively to be sought in the fact that they are His acts."[6]

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[1] Ibid., p. 73 (KD, pp. 79-80).

[2] Ibid., pp. 69-70 (KD, pp. 74-75). See also pp. 72-73, 116 (KD, pp. 78-79, 129).

[3] Ibid., p. 66 (KD, p. 71).

[4] CD 1/2, p. 155 (KD, p. 170). See also CD 4/2, pp. 44, 65, 70 (KD, pp. 46, 70-71, 76).

[5] CD 1/2, p. 151 (KD, p. 165). See also CD 4/2, p. 74 (KD, pp. 80-81).

[6] CD 4/2, p. 211 (KD, pp. 233-34).

We turn now to Barth's abstraction of Christ's being and action as God and his being and action as man. Barth abstracts Christ's being and action as God when he draws attention to the qualities which Christ possesses and the actions he performs through his divine nature. Conversely, Barth abstracts Christ's being and action as man when he focuses upon the qualities which Christ possesses and the actions he performs through his human nature. By abstracting in these ways, Barth attempts to convey the distinctions between the two natures without dividing Christ into two persons.

When he wishes to specify Christ's being and action through his human nature, Barth often uses such phrases as "as man," "as the Son of Man," or "in his human nature." To accomplish the same purpose he also omits the preposition "as" and uses such terms as "Jesus," "Jesus of Nazareth," and "Son of Man." Similarly, when he draws attention to Christ's being and action through his divine nature, Barth often uses such phrases as "as God," "as the Son of God," "in his divine nature," or simply "Son of God." Some examples should be mentioned.

Barth states that "as the Son of God" Jesus Christ shares all the attributes of God, such as his omnipotence and omnipresence.[1] On the other hand, Christ "had human wants, was subject to human temptations and influences, shared only a relative knowledge and capacity, and learned and suffered and died as a man."[1] As the Son of God Jesus Christ elects, and as man he is elected.[2] As man he prays to God, but as the Son of God he is the answer to his own prayer.[3] In these examples, Barth clearly intends for "as man" to indicate what Christ does through his human nature and "as the Son of God" to indicate what he does through his divine nature.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 73 (KD, pp. 79-80).

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[1] Ibid., p. 95 (KD, p. 105), underlining mine.

[2] Ibid., p. 32 (KD, p. 33). "As the Son of God He is the One who elects man and therefore His own humiliation. As the Son of Man He is the One who is elected by God and therefore to His own exaltation."

[3] CD 3/3, pp. 274-75 (KD, p. 311). "As the Son of God, he was the divine gift and answer, but as the Son of Man He was human asking."

[4] CD 4/2, pp. 115-16 (KD, pp. 128-29). Speaking of the common actualization of the two natures, Barth states that "what Jesus Christ does as the Son of God and in virtue of His divine essence, and what He does as the Son of Man and in exercise of His human essence" are in harmony with each other.

Barth also uses these phrases in another way, to avoid the implication that Christ sometimes acts exclusively through one of his natures. Since Christ is one person and all his actions involve both natures, it is proper to say that Christ performs "as the Son of God" even those actions which are more closely related to his human nature than his divine nature. For example, Barth states that "Jesus Christ is the Son of God, and as such He is . . . conceptus de Spiritu Sancto, natus ex Maria virgine, . . . crucified, risen and seated at the right hand of the Father, . . . [and] will come again to judge the quick and the dead." CD 4/1, p. 206 (KD, p. 225). See also CD 4/2, pp. 74, 97 (KD, pp. 81, 107). Conversely, Jesus Christ does not elect without his human nature, and therefore it is correct to say that he elects "as the Son of Man." Barth states: "But if He and the Father are one in

In his discussion of the concepts of humiliation and exaltation, Barth explains that when Jesus Christ becomes man the divine nature is humiliated and the human nature is exalted.[1] Since everything that can be attributed to each of the two natures can also be attributed to the agent who acts through both natures,[2] it is possible to say that Jesus Christ is exalted and that he is humiliated. However, in order to clarify that he is exalted through his human nature and humiliated through his divine nature, Barth uses "as God" and "as Son of God" to modify the humiliation and "as Son of Man" and "as man" to modify the exaltation. "As God He was humbled to take our place, and as man He is exalted on our behalf."[3] Similarly, Barth states: "As the Son of God he goes into the far country. As the Son of Man he returns home."[4] He adds: "In and with His humiliation (as the Son

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this unity of the divine name and glory, a unity in which there can be no question of rivalry, then it is clear that the Son, too, is an active Subject of the aeterna Dei praedestinatio as Son of Man, that He is Himself the electing God." CD 2/2, p. 107 (KD, p. 115).

[1] CD 4/1, p. 131 (KD, p. 144). "In Him humanity is exalted humanity, just as Godhead is humiliated Godhead. And humanity is exalted in Him by the humiliation of Godhead."

[2] CD 4/2, p. 73 (KD, pp. 79-80). "All that characterizes divine essence in distinction from human or any other . . . [and] all that characterizes human essence in distinction from divine or any other . . . is unlimitedly and unreservedly proper to the one who as Son of God became also Son of Man." Translation mine.

[3] CD 4/1, p. 131 (KD, p. 144).

[4] CD 4/2, p. 100 (KD, p. 111).

of God) there took place also His exaltation (as the Son of Man)."[1]

Using these qualifying phrases, Barth makes it clear that Jesus Christ cannot be exalted as the Son of God, for as the Son he already participates in the being and essence of God himself. He can be exalted only in his being as the Son of Man. As the Son of Man, he is not divinized nor does he become God, but he is exalted into fellowship with God. Barth states:

> In His Godhead, as the eternal Son of the Father, as the eternal Word, Jesus Christ . . . did not stand in need of exaltation, nor was He capable of it. But He did as man--it is here again that we come up against that which is not self-evident in Jesus Christ.[2]
>
> In His identity with the Son of God, when He was lifted up into heaven, He was not deified, or assumed into the Godhead (for this was unnecessary for Him as the Son of God and impossible for Him as the Son of Man), but placed as man at the side of God, in direct fellowship with Him, in full participation in His glory.[3]

Barth makes these same points about the humiliation and exaltation of Christ by omitting the preposition "as" and relying upon the connotations of the various names and titles. The statement that Jesus Christ, as the Son of God, humbled himself and became man can be simplified into the statement that the Son of God humbled himself and became man. Similarly, the claim that the Son of Man is exalted without being divinized is another way of affirming that Jesus Christ, as the Son of Man, was exalted but not divinized. For example, Barth states: "The atonement as it took place in Jesus Christ is the one inclusive event of this going out of the Son of God and coming in of the Son of Man."[1] Further, Barth affirms: "The Son of Man is not deified by the fact that He is also and primarily the Son of God."[2] In addition, Barth asks: "What else can the Son of God who humbled Himself as man become and be but the Son of Man who is not divinized but exalted to the side of God?"[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 19 (KD, p. 19).

[2] CD 4/1, pp. 134-35 (KD, p. 147). See also CD 4/2, p. 150 (KD, p. 168).

[3] CD 4/2, p. 153 (KD, p. 171).

In these instances, it is clear that the titles and names which Barth uses to denote Jesus Christ also connote information about him. The titles "Son of God" and "Word of God" imply that Jesus Christ has a divine nature and that he performs divine acts. The title "Son of Man" and the name "Jesus" imply that Christ has human qualities and performs human acts. Even when these names and titles stand alone, without the preposition "as," it is not necessary to conclude that they denote two different agents.

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[1] Ibid., p. 21 (KD, p. 21).

[2] Ibid., p. 94 (KD, p. 103).

[3] Ibid., p. 28 (KD, pp. 29-30).

Whether "Jesus" Names a Person Who Is Only Human

Our purpose in this section is to determine whether Barth ever uses some of the names of Christ to denote a human person who is distinct from God. Although we have demonstrated that he uses such terms as "the man Jesus" to denote the divine subject and to connote his being and action as man, it is possible that he might use them also in an Antiochian manner to denote a person who is only human. We shall look at some specific instances which appear to support an Antiochian interpretation, and we shall argue that even in these cases Barth speaks of the Christ who is divine by nature.

The recognition of Barth's use of the connotative function of the names of Christ opens up an alternative to the Antiochian interpretation of Barth's account of the two types of christological statements.[1] While statements of both types, "God's Son is Jesus of Nazareth" and "Jesus of Nazareth is God's Son" are intelligible if they are understood on the basis of the Antiochian assumption that "Jesus of Nazareth" denotes a complete human person distinct from God, they are also intelligible on the basis of the Alexandrian view that both terms denote the divine Christ.

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[1] For the Antiochian view, see above, pp. 74-76, 147-48.

In the Alexandrian interpretation, although "Jesus of Nazareth" and "God's Son" denote the same agent and the "is" indicates a direct identity rather than an identity of becoming, the two types of statements are not merely tautological. Because of the connotative function of the two terms, the statements convey more information than simply that this person is this person. The first type affirms that the Son who is divine by nature also exists as a man, having human characteristics and performing human actions. The second type states that the one who exists as a man is also and primarily God himself.

The Alexandrian interpretation of the two types of christological statements is consistent with Barth's explanation of their characteristics. He asserts, for example, that the two types move in opposite directions, "from above downwards or from below upwards." Because of the connotations of the terms "God's Son" and "Jesus of Nazareth," the first type of statements suggests a movement from the Son's eternal being as God "above" to his being as man on earth. Similarly, "Jesus of Nazareth" can exalt human nature "from below upwards" because he exists as a man "below" but is fully identical with God and therefore has divine power.[1]

That the two types of statements move in opposite directions is also indicated by Barth's explanation of the way divinity and humanity are involved in them. The first type presupposes the divinity of Christ and moves toward his humanity. The second type presupposes his humanity and moves toward his divinity.[1] This explanation indicates that "God's Son" connotes the divinity of Jesus Christ and that "Jesus of Nazareth" connotes his humanity.

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[1] CD 4/1, p. 136 (KD, p. 149). See also CD 1/2, p. 16 (KD, p. 18); CD 4/3, p. 7 (KD, p. 5).

We turn now to some instances in which Barth seems to substitute names such as "Jesus" for "human nature," implying that the human nature is a complete person in itself. Our view is that these occasions should be understood as inferences rather than substitutions. For example, Barth can say that the human nature of Jesus is limited and then add that the man Jesus is limited. An Antiochian interpretation might understand the second statement simply as a way of saying the same thing as the first statement, using "the man Jesus" to denote the human nature. On the other hand, since Barth believes that what can be attributed to the human nature can also be attributed to the bearer of that nature,[2] the second statement can be understood as an inference from the first. The human nature is limited; therefore, the man Jesus is limited. In the second case, "the man Jesus" does not denote the human nature itself but its bearer.

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[1] CD 1/2, pp. 19-23 (KD, pp. 21-26). For example, speaking of the view of the Synoptic Gospels, which are characterized by the second type of statements, Barth says: "But that means that externally they must start from His humanity, from His life before the resurrection," p. 22 (KD, p. 24).

[2] CD 4/2, p. 73 (KD, pp. 79-80). For the quotation, see above, p. 253.

When Barth discusses the knowledge of God, he speaks of both the human nature and also the man Jesus as the form of revelation. This identification raises the question whether "Jesus" names the human nature. For example, in his argument that the form of revelation does not have the power to reveal but that this power belongs to God alone, Barth seems to equate "the _humanitas_ _Christi_" and "the man Jesus of Nazareth" with "this form." Barth states that in the New Testament

> the _humanitas_ _Christi_ comes under the reservation of God's holiness, i.e., that the power and the continuity in which the man Jesus of Nazareth . . . was in fact the revealed word, consisted here also in the power and continuity of the divine action in this form and not in the continuity of this form as such.[1]

While it seems _prima_ _facie_ that "Jesus of Nazareth" names the human soul and body which is the form of revelation and therefore different from God, it is also possible to interpret this name as denoting the divine agent in his being and action as man. Since God, as a man, is the form as well as the content of revelation, what can be said of the form can also be said of him. Consequently, to say that

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[1] CD 1/1, p. 371 (KD, p. 341).

Jesus of Nazareth has no power to reveal is an inference from the statement that the human nature has no power to reveal, not simply another way of denying that humanity has that power.

Another example in which Barth seems to personify the human nature of Christ is found in his statement that the form of revelation can be known by neutral observers.

> What the neutral observer of these events might apprehend or may have apprehended of these events was the form of revelation. . . . Thousands may have seen and heard the Rabbi of Nazareth. But this historical element was not revelation.[1]

Since the form of revelation is other than God[2] and since it is also a rabbi, it seems to follow that this rabbi is a human person distinct from God. However, this interpretation is not the only option. The statement about the Rabbi of Nazareth can be understood as an inference from what can be said about the human nature of Christ. Since the human nature itself is not revelation and since "Rabbi of Nazareth" connotes Jesus Christ in his being and action through the human nature, Barth's point can be paraphrased in this way: "Thousands saw and heard Jesus Christ in his being as a man, but his being as a man was not revelation."

A similar example is found in Barth's polemic against viewpoints which worship the human nature of Jesus Christ apart from his divine nature. This dangerous deviation Barth believes, is not escaped by the pietism of Zinzendorf, the

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[1] Ibid., p. 373 (KD, p. 343).

[2] Ibid., p. 188 (KD, p. 171-72).

"Heart of Jesus" cult of Catholicism, or the historicism of modern Protestantism with its emphasis upon the hero Jesus. In his criticism of these three movements, the clearest apparent use of "Jesus" as a name for the human nature itself is found in the sentence quoted below. After affirming that the eternal Logos is superior to the flesh which he assumes and to which he gave reality, Barth states:

> Likewise from this point there results the inevitable rejection of any abstract Jesus-worship, i.e., any Christology or christological doctrine or practice which aims at making the human nature, the historical and psychological manifestation of Jesus as such, its object.[1]

In this passage, worship of Jesus seems to be identified with worship of the human nature. As in previous cases, however, the statement about Jesus can be understood as an inference. Since the human nature in itself should not be worshipped, it is also improper to worship Jesus only in his being as a man. Further, Barth appears to be relying upon the connotations of the name "Jesus" to make his point. To say that one should reject "any abstract Jesus-worship" is to say that one should not restrict one's worship to "Jesus as a man."

Other examples concerning the human nature as the form of revelation involve the grammatical construction of apposition. In the first of these, Barth places "Jesus of Nazareth" in apposition with "the human being of Christ." Speaking of the Word of God who descended from heaven in the incarnation, Barth states:

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[1] CD 1/2, p. 136 (KD, p. 150).

> There is no other form or manifestation in heaven or on earth save the one child in the stable, the one Man on the cross. This is the Word to whom we must hearken, render faith and obedience, cling ever so closely. Every question concerning the Word which is directed away from Jesus of Nazareth, the human being of Christ, is necessarily and wholly directed from Himself, the Word, and therefore from God Himself, because the Word, and therefore God Himself, does not exist for us apart from the human being of Christ.[1]

There is a difficulty with this example. Since Barth speaks of the human being rather than the human nature of Christ, the question arises whether he makes a distinction between the human being and the human nature. That is a theoretical possibility, but in this passage Barth seems to identify the two. The point he is making is that the Word cannot be known apart from his human being or nature. For support he appeals to Luther, and in his explanation of Luther he uses _Menschheit_, _Menschsein_, and _menschliche Natur_ synonymously. He states:

> This assertion of Luther's was then built up doctrinally by Lutheran orthodoxy in the form of an idea which expressly maintained a perichoresis between the Word of God and the human being of Christ [_Menschsein Christi_], i.e., a reversal of the statement about the _enhypostasis_ of Christ's human nature [_menschlichen Natur Christi_], to the effect that as the humanity [_Menschheit_] only has reality through and in the Word, so too the Word only has reality through and in the humanity [_Menschheit_].[2]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 165-66 (KD, p. 181).

[2] Ibid., p. 166 (KD, p. 182).

Even if Barth identifies human being and human nature in this context, it does not follow necessarily that "Jesus of Nazareth" is the name of the human nature of Christ. Items in apposition need not be identical. They may merely explain or define more precisely what is meant. Consequently, Barth may be paraphrased in this way: "Every question concerning the Word which is directed away from Jesus of Nazareth, that is, from his being and action as a man, is necessarily and wholly directed away from God himself." The phrase "from his being and action as a man" makes a further, more narrowly specified point. It does not simply identify Jesus of Nazareth.

Another case of apposition should be mentioned. Here Barth places "Jesus" in apposition with "the historical existence of Jesus of Nazareth." In a discussion of Docetism, Barth states: "It can upon occasion abandon Jesus, the historical existence of Jesus of Nazareth, and yet retain Christ, i.e., its Christ."[1]

A question which this example raises is whether "the historical existence of Jesus of Nazareth" is identical with "the humanity of Jesus." Without definitely deciding this question, we can say that Barth often seems to use these phrases synonymously.[2] However, even if Barth identifies the existence of the man Jesus with his human nature, it is not necessary to conclude that Barth uses "Jesus" to denote that human nature in such a way as to imply that the human nature is itself a separate person in its own right. As stated above, items in apposition are not necessarily identical, although they might be. Here, by adding the phrase "the historical existence of Jesus of Nazareth," Barth gives an additional explanation of his meaning. He does not simply refer to Jesus using different words. His sentence might be paraphrased in this way: "Docetism can upon occasion abandon Jesus; that is, it can abandon Jesus' existence as a man, and yet retain Christ, its Christ."

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[1] Ibid., p. 17 (KD, p. 19).

[2] CD 1/1, p. 371 (KD, p. 341).

Barth leaves himself open to a misinterpretation of his Alexandrian position when he seems to state explicitly that he is naming the human nature "Jesus Christ." He says that in the event of grace, the human nature

> acquires even in its pure creatureliness divine exousia, even in its human weakness divine power, even its human meanness divine authority, even its human particularity (for individuality with all its limitations belongs to its humanity) divine universality--and all this in the occurrence of this event, or, to put it more simply, as Jesus Christ (for we are speaking of His human essence) lived and lives and will live.[1]

Even here, however, as in the cases involving apposition, Barth should not be understood as giving the human nature itself the name "Jesus Christ" and thereby personalizing it. He is simply emphasizing Christ's life as a man, for it is in Christ's human existence that his human actions and qualities acquire divine power. The words in the parenthesis give additional information; they do not indicate that the human essence bears the name "Jesus Christ."

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[1] CD 4/2, p. 99 (KD, p. 110).

Barth also appears to personify the human nature of Christ in his discussion of election. He argues that Jesus Christ is not only elected as a man, he is also the Son of God who elects. In support of this point, Barth attacks the view of Thomas. According to Barth, Thomas reserves the role of Christ in election to that of recipient. It is the human nature as such which is elected. Rephrasing the point, Barth states that according to Thomas only "the man Jesus as such" is elected. This substitution of the two ways of speaking seems to imply that here Barth uses the phrase "the man Jesus as such" to name the human nature. The important sentences are the following:

> But Thomas would restrict the election of Christ to this passive relationship, and thus to His human nature. . . . If we say only what Thomas would say, then we have knowledge only of the election of the man Jesus as such, and not of the election and personal electing of the Son of God which precedes this election.[1]

In this example, not only do we have an apparent substitution of "the man Jesus as such" for "the human nature," we also seem to have a dichotomy between the man Jesus and the Son of God. "Son of God" seems to name the one divine agent, while "the man Jesus as such" seems to denote a separate human being who is elected by God.

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[1] CD 2/2, p. 107 (KD, pp. 114-15).

However, it is possible to conclude that Barth is not actually substituting "the man Jesus as such" for "the human nature" and that he does not mean that Jesus is a human person separate from the person God. Since what can be stated about the human nature as such can also be stated about the eternal Son as a man, the statements here about the man Jesus can be understood as inferences from the statements about the human nature. Since the human nature has a passive role in election, Jesus Christ as a man also has a passive role. Barth admits that Christ has a passive role in election, but he does not want to limit Christ's involvement to the passive role. As the eternal Son of God, Jesus Christ takes part in election as the elector; as Son of Man he is elected. Again, it is not necessary to resort to an Antiochian hypothesis.

The apparent substitution of "human nature" or "human essence" for the names "Jesus," "Jesus of Nazareth," and so forth, also occurs when Barth is speaking of kenosis. In order to understand the various controversies which have taken place over the way the kenosis should be understood, it is necessary to make a distinction between the divine subject as he is in himself and the human element which he assumed in the incarnation and with which he is subsequently related. Some proponents of the theory of kenosis have argued that the divine subject himself either abandoned his divine attributes or suspended their use when he became a man. Others argued that the kenosis meant only that the human nature did not possess those attributes.

In his discussion of the Calvinistic and Lutheran positions on this question, Barth apparently uses the term "man Jesus" to designate the same reality designated by "human nature." Calvin, Barth explains, makes a point that had been made previously by Augustine, Origen, and Gregory of Nyssa: the humanity of Christ conceals the glory of God for men, but the humanity does not include absolutely the Word of God. Barth can state this position by saying that the essence of the Word of God is united with the human nature but not included in it. He can also make this point by saying that the Logos cannot be included "in the creature, the man Jesus."

Barth's willingness to state the point in the two different ways is evident in the quotation below. When phrasing it in the terminology of the two natures, Barth quotes Calvin in Latin. Immediately afterward, Barth uses language involving "the man Jesus."

> It was the same basic thought which many years later Calvin was trying to express in his well-known statement: *Etsi in unam personam coaluit immensa Verbi essentia cum natura hominis, nullam tamen inclusionem fingimus*. An *absolute inclusio* of the Logos in the *creature*, the man Jesus, *would* mean a subordination of the Word to the flesh, a limitation and therefore an alteration of His divine nature, and therefore of God Himself.[1]

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[1] CD 4/1, p. 180 (KD, p. 197).

In explaining the Lutheran position, Barth again uses both ways of talking. According to the Lutheran position, the two natures are united in such a way that the attributes of the divine nature can be attributed to the human nature. This interpretation should be called, Barth thinks, "the divinisation of the man Jesus as such." On the basis of the doctrine of the communication of properties, particularly of the divine nature to the human nature, it can be said not only that the human nature is omnipresent, but also that the man Jesus as such is omnipresent. One example is the following:

> The Lutherans rejected it [the Extra Calvinisticum], because they thought they could see in it a "Nestorian" separation of the divine and human natures, because on their doctrine of the communication of the attributes the fact that He "filled the whole world" had also to be said of the man Jesus as such on the basis of His union with the Logos.[1]

Barth indicates that there are at least three alternatives on the question of Christ's omnipotence. It is possible to say that the human nature or the man Jesus, in the state of humiliation, refrained from the use of the divine powers which he possessed. This was the view of the Giessen theologians. Another possibility is that the human nature or the man Jesus as such refrained from the visible use of those powers. This was the view of the Tubingen group. A third alternative focuses upon the divine agent and his essence rather than the human nature or the man Jesus. According to it, there was an "abstention not only on the part of the man Jesus as such but on the part of the Son of God, the Logos Himself, from the possession and therefore the power to dispose of His divine glory and majesty."[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 181 (KD, p. 197).

In this discussion of kenosis, it appears on the surface that Barth uses "Jesus" to name the personality of the human nature itself. However, it is possible to interpret these occurrences of "Jesus" as denoting the divine agent in his unity with his human form. If Barth's statements are read with the assumption that "Jesus"denotes the divine agent, the statements which apply divine attributes, such as omnipresence, to "the man Jesus as such," can be paraphrased in the form "Jesus Christ, as a man, is omnipresent," or "the Son of God, in his human form, it omnipresent." Such statements can be read as inferences from the premise that the human nature itself is omnipresent.

In regard to the question of whether the Son of God divested himself of divine power in the incarnation, if one interprets the name "Jesus" as the name of the divine subject in his unity with the human nature, the three alternatives can be paraphrased as follows: (1) Jesus Christ as man refrained from using his divine powers; (2) Jesus Christ as man refrained from visibly using his divine powers; and (3) Jesus

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[1] Ibid., p. 182 (KD, p. 199).

Christ as God surrendered the possession and use of the divine powers when he became a man. Even though, at first glance, "Jesus" or "the man Jesus" seem to name the human nature as such, the language is still understandable if these names actually denote the divine person in his human form.

Some final examples in which Barth appears to use "Jesus" and its variants to name the human nature as such are found in his discussion of the unity of human nature with God. Barth often affirms that the Son of God united human nature with himself. For example, he states:

> For the moment, however, it is enough to maintain that Lutheran and Reformed were at one in their starting-point, that the unity involved, Jesus Christ, is originally and really the unity of the divine Word with the human being assumed by Him. But this unity also implies the unity--a unity to be thought of neither as identity nor as duality--of the divine being of the Word with the human being assumed by Him, the unity of the two natures.[1]

On the other hand, Barth also often speaks of the unity of the Son of God, the Word of God, or God himself with Jesus. Here are some examples: (1) "In the person of His eternal Son, He [God] has united Himself with the man Jesus of Nazareth."[2] (2) "Everything which comes from God takes place 'in Jesus Christ,' i.e., in the . . . union of His Son with Jesus of

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[1] CD 1/2, p. 162 (KD, p. 177).

[2] CD 2/2, p. 8 (KD, p. 7).

Nazareth."[1] (3) "It was in this way, . . . in the unity of His Son with the Son of Man, Jesus of Nazareth (Jn 3:16), that God willed to demonstrate His love to the world."[2] (4) "The Son of God in His unity with this man exists in solidarity with the humanity of Israel suffering under the mighty hand of God."[3] The question which such statements raise is this: when Barth speaks of the unity of God with Jesus is he simply using different words to speak of the unity between God and the human nature of Jesus? If so, the human nature of Christ is apparently a person in its own right.

If Barth intends for "Jesus of Nazareth" and "this man" to denote a human person who is distinct from God, the sentences above are quite simple and direct. Because God has united himself with one man, he is also united with all men. In this union between the divine person and the human person, God's love is revealed and he participates in the suffering of his children.

On the other hand, if Barth intends for "Jesus of Nazareth" and "this man" to denote not simply the human nature but the divine subject in his unity with human nature, the statements are perplexing, but they are still understandable. In this interpretation, the unity which is established by God's grace is a unity between Jesus Christ "as the Son of God" and Jesus Christ "as the Son of Man." Jesus Christ as he is in his divine nature is united with himself as he is in his human nature. This unity might more appropriately be designated as an identity, for Barth does want to maintain that Jesus Christ as God is identical with Jesus Christ as man. However, an identity is also a particular kind of unity.[1]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] CD 3/2, p. 483 (KD, p. 580).

[3] CD 4/1, p. 175 (KD, p. 191). See also pp. 172, 183 (KD, pp. 187, 199); CD 2/1, pp. 56, 61 (KD, pp. 61, 67); CD 3/2, p. 613 (KD, p. 746); CD 4/2, p. 101 (KD, p. 112).

To summarize, in this section we have argued that Barth apparently does not use "Jesus" and its variants to name a human person who is distinct from God. While all occurrences of "Jesus" in the *Church Dogmatics* cannot be examined here, we have noted that significant examples which appear *prima facie* to denote a separate human person can be interpreted quite differently. They can be understood as denoting God himself in his second mode of being.

An Antiochian interpreter of Barth might object, however, that we have not demonstrated that Barth does not use

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[1] In discussions of the unity of God with the man Jesus, the English translation of the *Church Dogmatics* sometimes translates *Identität* as "unity." For example, see CD 4/2, p. 101 (KD, p. 112). In addition, Barth seems to use *Identität* and *Einheit* interchangeably when speaking of the relation of God to Jesus. For his use of *Einheit* see CD 4/1, pp. 172, 175 (KD, pp. 187, 191). For *Identität* see CD 4/1, p. 171 (KD, p. 187).

"Jesus" and its variants to name a human person distinct from God. While we have shown that it is possible to understand many controversial instances of "Jesus" as denoting the person God, we have not shown that it is impossible to interpret them in an Antiochian manner, as denoting a human person distinct from God. Consequently, the two interpretations remain on equal footing, neither having vanquished the other.

In response to this objection, two points can be made. First, the evidence that Barth uses "Jesus" and its variants to denote God must be evaluated in relation to the Alexandrian interpretation of Barth's christological doctrine. When both Barth's doctrine and also his language are taken into account, the Alexandrian interpretation appears to be more formidable than the Antiochian.

Second, once it has been demonstrated that Barth uses such terms as "the man Jesus" to denote the divine subject, the Antiochian hypothesis becomes increasingly difficult to sustain. This is true because if Barth uses the same terms, such as "the man Jesus" and "Jesus," to denote two different persons, one divine and one human, he is using them equivocally. Since Antiochian theologians have traditionally tried to distinguish between the two persons by using different terms to refer to them, Barth betrays that ideal if he uses some terms equivocally. Further, the idea that Barth uses the terms equivocally implies that he tries to hold onto two different theologies, the Alexandrian and the Antiochian, without making a clear choice between them. If so, Barth falls short of his ideal of solid theological achievement. He states: "A theology worthy of respect is always one-sided."[1] Consequently, it seems more reasonable to assume that Barth chooses either the Alexandrian or the Antiochian position and works out its logical consequences, rather than trying to hold onto two opposing alternatives.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have argued that Barth's understanding and use of "Jesus Christ" and its variants should be interpreted in an Alexandrian rather than an Antiochian manner. Although all the terms which denote Christ are not used by Barth in exactly the same ways, the differences can be accounted for by abstraction and the connotations of the various names and titles, without recourse to the Antiochian hypothesis that some of them are used to denote a human person separate from God. Barth clearly uses even such terms as "the man Jesus" and "Son of Man" to denote God himself in his being as man, and the evidence indicates that he considers this their proper use.

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[1] Karl Barth, "The Principles of Dogmatics According to Wilhelm Herrmann," in Theology and Church: Shorter Writings 1920-1928, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith (London: SCM Press, 1962), p. 268.

When Barth's use of "Jesus Christ" and its variants is considered in relation to his development of the doctrines of the divinity of Christ and the unity of the two natures, the superiority of the Alexandrian interpretation over the Antiochian is apparent. The features of Barth's thought which appear to support an Antiochian interpretation can be accounted for within an Alexandrian framework, while the reverse is not always the case. For example, as the Antiochians emphasize, Jesus Christ is the form of revelation, and therefore he is, in some respects, distinct from God. Yet, as the Alexandrian perspective maintains, this distinctness from God does not preclude the essential divinity of the man Jesus, a fact which the Antiochian view can scarcely incorporate.

CHAPTER V

Conclusions

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to consider briefly some of the major implications of Barth's Alexandrian development of the divinity of Jesus Christ, the unity of the person of Christ, and the meaning and use of the name "Jesus Christ" and its variants. Our observations will be organized under three headings.

First, we shall indicate the importance of the Alexandrian character of Barth's thinking on these issues by showing how it influences his understanding of some other principal doctrines. Since this influence is extensive, a recognition of Barth's Alexandrianism contributes to a clear understanding of his theology as a whole.

Second, we shall note the advantages of Barth's Alexandrian christology. Barth's position is formidable for many of the same reasons that have allowed Alexandrian theology to maintain considerable appeal throughout the history of Christian thought. It guarantees the true divinity of Christ, it accentuates the uniqueness of his divinity, and it emphasizes the oneness of the person of Christ. At the same time, Barth's account incorporates many Antiochian elements, and the presence of these features contributes to a well balanced and subtle position.

Third, we shall mention some of the major problems that Barth's construction of this doctrine entails. We shall argue first that Barth's thorough-going emphasis upon the divinity of Christ tends to mitigate the significance of his humanity. Second, while the uniqueness of Christ's divinity is preserved, the fact that Barth attributes divinity to the Bible and proclamation deprives him of a possible argument against Antiochian thinking. Third, the significance of the lives of human persons in time seems to be undercut by Barth's claim that all men have their true being only in Christ. Finally, since revelation and reconciliation occur within God's act *ad intra*, the necessity and importance of God's act *ad extra* are brought into jeopardy.

The Importance of Barth's Alexandrian Thinking

While we have focused upon three principal issues in our investigation of whether Barth is Antiochian or Alexandrian in his christology, we have necessarily encountered many other crucial doctrines in Barth's theology, such as revelation, the trinity, election, and reconciliation. What we have said about these topics indicates that there is an inherent relation between them and Barth's Alexandrianism, particularly his understanding of the direct identity of Jesus Christ with God. Although it is not our purpose either to repeat what we have said or to present a detailed explication of all the ways in which Barth's Alexandrianism influences his treatment of the other doctrines in his dogmatics, we can mention briefly some of the connecting links that are present in, or implied by, what we have said previously. We shall begin with the concept of revelation.

Barth affirms that God's revelation through Christ is the revelation of God, not merely one among God's revelations.[1] This claim seems to make much more sense within an Alexandrian interpretation of Barth than an Antiochian interpretation. If Jesus Christ is directly identical with God and not merely indirectly identical with him, it is clear that God's presence in the human nature of Christ is ontologically different from his presence anywhere else in the created order. In this case, the existence of Jesus is the existence of God, and the actor is God himself. Barth does not mean simply that God is somehow more present in the man Jesus than in other creatures, or that his character is revealed here more adequately than in other sources. The difference between Jesus Christ and other modes of God's presence is a difference in kind, not merely in degree.

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[1] For example, see CD 4/1, p. 45 (KD, p. 47). In this discussion Barth relates the claim that there is "only one revelation" to a rejection of natural theology.

If God's presence in Jesus differed only in degree from his presence elsewhere in creation, it would be more difficult for Barth to sustain his polemic against natural theology. If it were merely a question of whether our knowledge of God is restricted to the ordinary man Jesus, understood in an Antiochian sense as a person distinct from God, there would seem to be little justification for denying that God can be known just as readily through other media, should he decide to reveal himself. In fact, to deny that God might reveal himself just as fully through other media seems to restrict his freedom. Consequently, it is not surprising when interpreters who think of Barth as Antiochian are puzzled by his restricting revelation to Christ.[1]

On the other hand, since the Alexandrian interpretation of Barth emphasizes that Jesus Christ is both the agent God and also the act which constitutes God's being in its dimensions _ad_ _intra_ and _ad_ _extra_, it follows that God does not reveal himself either to himself or to men apart from Jesus Christ. By definition, Jesus Christ is the act of revelation in which all the moments which witness to that revelation have their being. Consequently, even if God reveals himself through various creaturely media, and Barth admits that he can, this does not mean that he reveals himself apart from Jesus Christ.

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[1] For example, McIntyre, p. 167, and Groff, pp. 173-74, argue that there is little justification for restricting revelation to Jesus. McIntyre states that the controversy ought "to be settled by simple appeal to fact. If there are indeed some people who can honestly say that God reveals himself to them apart from Jesus Christ, and if we are to presume that they know what revelation means (say, from their awareness of revelation in Jesus Christ), then I wonder whether it is valuable or indeed proper to prosecute the controversy against them."

It should be added immediately that God's revealing act always involves the human nature of Christ. Both _ad intra_ and _ad extra_, God's revelation has direct reference to his life as a man in time, in which he makes himself known to men as the God who takes man's plight upon himself and reconciles man to himself. If it were otherwise, Barth believes that the uniqueness of the revelation through the human nature of Jesus would be threatened, and the danger of natural theology would be increased.[1]

Another topic which is related to Barth's concept of revelation and his polemic against natural theology is his famous rejection of _analogia entis_. While Barth's treatment of this concept is much too complicated for us to pursue in detail here, we can indicate one way that Barth's Alexandrianism appears to be related to it. One of the reasons that

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[1] Barth, _Karl Barth's Table Talk,_ p. 49. Here Barth states that he thinks that Brunner's acceptance of a concept of a _logos asarkos_ leads to his defense of natural theology.

Barth rejects analogia entis is that he thinks that it requires a higher concept of being in which both God and creation participate. Such a concept impugns the glory of God.[1] Since a theology which emphasizes the independence of the created order from God seems to need a higher concept of being to unite God and creation, the Antiochian interpretation, which believes that Jesus is a person who exists in a relative degree of independence from God, might conclude that Barth is unsuccessful in ridding himself of the analogia entis.[2] On the other hand, those who see Barth as an Alexandrian can better understand his rejection of the analogia entis. Since Jesus Christ is fully identical with God, he is not so independent from God that a higher concept of being is required to unite him with God. Jesus Christ and the creatures who have their true being in Christ participate in God's knowing and loving of himself. They are united with God through God's own act of being, not a neutral being which includes them and God.[3]

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[1] CD 1/1, p. 274 (KD, p. 252); CD 1/2, pp. 37, 43 (KD, pp. 41, 48); CD 2/1, pp. 82-83 (KD, pp. 90-91); CD 3/2, p. 343 (KD, p. 413); CD 3/3, p. 103 (KD, pp. 115-16). See also Balthasar, p. 147.

[2] See Kehm, p. 192, and Prenter, "Die Lehre vom Menschen bei Karl Barth," Theologische Zeitschrift 6 (1950):221. These two interpreters, who tend to see Barth as an Antiochian thinker, believe that Barth's analogia relationis is not an alternative to analogia entis but a new form of it.

[3] Hathaway, pp. 385-98, presents a capable defense of the view that Barth's analogia relationis is not simply

Barth's Alexandrian thinking also contributes to his development of the doctrine of the trinity from the event of revelation. Because God is directly identical with the self who is present in a human form in Jesus Christ, it is clear that his presence here is radically different from his presence elsewhere in creation. Consequently, the doctrine of the trinity is derived from this one event of revelation, not just any revelatory event. If the Antiochian interpretation of Barth were correct, and God were merely more present in Christ than elsewhere, it would be difficult to maintain that the concept of the trinity is derived from this particular revelation rather than others.[1]

Barth's important concept of election can also be better understood when the Alexandrian character of his thought is recognized. Jesus Christ can elect to become man and he can elect other men because he is fully identical with God himself. While he does not elect apart from his humanity, it is his divinity rather than his humanity which enables him to

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another form of the _analogia entis_. Arguing primarily upon his interpretation of Barth's concept of providence, Hathaway states: "Thus while it is possible (and necessary) for Barth to speak of a creature over against the Creator, or even of nature over against grace, he refuses to grant an independence to the creature in such a way that one could speak of a separate _order_ of creation. Hence, Barth's understanding of grace itself seems to preclude that kind of understanding of the independence of nature which is necessary for an analogy of being" (p. 390). For a similar view, see Hartwell, p. 56. For bibliographical data regarding the many discussions of this issue, see Hathaway, pp. 388, 390, and Kehm, pp. 192-93.

[1] CD 1/1, pp. 367-68 (KD, pp. 337-38).

elect. As the Son of God, he participates in God's eternal decision before time, and this participation is the foundation for his sojourn as a man in the creaturely realm. He is not only the one who obeys the Father, he is also the Word which he obeys. He is the act of election itself, and as such he is the reality which embraces all men.

Similarly, when Barth's treatment of reconciliation is understood in an Alexandrian sense, his emphatic rejection of any form of synergism is made clear. Since the human nature of the divine Christ is not a person in its own right, it is not so independent of God that it can make a positive contribution to God's reconciling work. The human nature which is united in fellowship with God is able to respond in obedience and gratitude to God because of God's grace, and its own power. Without this grace, the creature would not be able to exist or avoid evil. While it might be possible for an Antiochian theology to avoid the conclusion that man cooperates with God in the work of reconciliation, the emphasis which this theology places upon the independence of Jesus and other men from God makes it more susceptible to the danger of synergism. If one were to accept the Antiochian interpretation of Barth, concluding that Jesus is a complete person distinct from God and that all other men exist in and through him, Barth's radical emphasis upon the grace of God would be obscured.[1]

These examples indicate that Barth's Alexandrianism exerts considerable influence upon his theology. We turn now to the advantages and disadvantages of Barth's version of this way of doing theology.

The Advantages of Barth's Alexandrian Thinking

By defining Christ's deity as the act which constitutes the being of God, Barth emphasizes that Christ's deity is his being and also the being of God. Christ is not divine because of his faith, his God-consciousness, his obedience, his courage, his concern for others, his sacrifice of himself, or any other aspect of his greatness as a man. Nor is he divine because he is the occasion of faith for others, because he reflects God, or because others interpret God's being and nature through clues found in his existence. He is divine because he is fully and completely God himself, just as the Father and the Holy Spirit are also God.

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[1] CD 4/1, pp. 41-44, 83 (KD, pp. 43-46, 88). On the last of these pages, Barth states: "Everything depends on Him who is above, and therefore on what comes to man from Him and therefore from above. It does not depend at all on what man had or has or will have to contribute from below." See also CD 1/2, pp. 185-89, especially p. 186 (KD, pp. 202-6, especially p. 203). Here Barth rejects "all synergism." For a discussion of Barth's rejection of synergism, see Hartwell, pp. 52, 80, 112, and 127-28.

The affirmation of the divinity of Christ is not the last in a series of propositions, as the conclusion of an argument or an interpretation. According to Barth, we do not believe that Christ is divine because he makes a particular kind of impression, or because of something about him that can be known in an ordinary, empirical and historical fashion. The idea of the divinity of Christ is not the result of human discovery or creative thought. It is based upon the recognition, granted by God himself, that Christ is who he is, namely God himself in and through a human form. Christian thought begins simply by acknowledging that God himself is present in this revelatory act, and because this act is identical with Jesus Christ, to begin with revelation is to begin with the divinity of Christ.[1]

The divinity of Christ is guaranteed by Barth because Christ is God's act *ad intra* as well as his act *ad extra*. Jesus Christ is not simply the act of God in the sense that God called a human person into existence and guided him through his life, accomplishing a unique goal. Jesus Christ in both his divine and his human natures is present eternally in God's act of being.[2]

By conceiving Christ's deity in this manner, Barth precludes any accusation of idolatry. He is not guilty of advocating the worship of a man who is simply declared to be divine. In Barth's construction of this doctrine, divinity is not predicated of Christ in a "loose" manner; it is his essence.

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[1] See CD 1/1, pp. 460-65 (KD, pp. 422-26).

[2] CD 2/2, p. 108 (KD, p. 116).

Barth's concept of the divinity of Jesus Christ also emphasizes the uniqueness of Jesus in relation to all other creaturely realities. The directness of Jesus' identity with God is safeguarded by the claim that the existence of Jesus is also the existence of God himself. In the case of Jesus, the bearer of the human nature is not simply an ordinary man but God himself. Although God is present with other creatures, and even though he can be nearer to them than they are to themselves, he is not identical with them.

While Barth's concept of the divinity of the Bible and proclamation is similar to his treatment of the divinity of Jesus Christ in certain respects, the uniqueness of the divinity of Christ is not undermined. While Christ's essence is divine, the Bible and proclamation become divine when God speaks through them. They are not essentially divine; unlike Christ, they maintain an independent existence of their own over against the existence of God.

Barth's treatment of the concept of the divinity of Christ also emphasizes the oneness of the person of Christ. This oneness can be seen in the identification of act with being. God's person is his act, and insofar as he is one act, he is one person. Barth explains that God is constituted by one act and that this act is his eternal positing of himself in his inner life. In the same way, Christ's work is his being, and it is also the work of God. Christ is the act of God and the person God. Since the act of God which is identical with Christ is, in essence, one act, it is clear that Christ is one person.

The oneness of the person of Christ is also seen in that he is the agent who reveals himself and reconciles men to himself. Even the movement upward to God, which is traversed by the human nature, is not traversed by the human nature in abstraction from God himself. It is Jesus Christ who exalts his human nature. Both the movement downward toward the creature and the movement upward toward God are performed by the one agent Jesus Christ. As the Son of God he humiliates himself, and as Son of Man he exalts human nature. There is only one agent involved here, and therefore Jesus Christ is one person, not two.

Finally, although Barth's concept of the divinity of Christ is a vigorous and innovative reformulation of the classical Alexandrian perspective, it incorporates significant elements from Antiochian thought. Barth affirms that Jesus Christ is fully human. As a man, Christ was subject to the conditions of all men. He had a soul and a body, he was conditioned by his environment, he had limited knowledge, he was anxious. Further, Barth conceives of the human nature of Christ as both a subject of attribution and also a subject of action.[1] That is, he attributes qualities and actions to the human nature. The human nature is active in relation to the divine nature; it obeys, serves, and attests the divine. The fact that Barth grants this degree of independence to the human nature contributes to the hypothesis that he is an Antiochian thinker.

Barth's emphasis upon the concepts of fellowship and confrontation in his treatment of the union of the two natures also makes him similar in some respects to such Antiochian thinkers as Theodore, for whom the harmony of the two wills was of special importance. Barth's use of these categories grants a degree of independence to both natures, since fellowship implies a certain "distance" between participants. Further, Barth sides with the Reformed tradition in refraining from attributing the qualities of the divine nature to the human nature. In agreement with the Reformed, he prefers to stress the distinction of the two natures rather than their inseparability, although he does not deny the latter.

Although Barth has incorporated significant elements of Antiochian thought in his christology, it appears that his perspective is still basically Alexandrian. Barth has not found a genuine synthesis which avoids making a choice between the two theologies. Some of the grounds for this conclusion will be made clearer as we turn from the advantages of Barth's thought to some of the problems which it encounters, for these problems are similar to those which have traditionally plagued Alexandrian theologians.

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[1] Norris, p. 200, explains Theodore's theology by stating that he conceives of the human nature as a subject or center of action. Norris argues that, for Theodore, this subject of action is a person. Barth's subject of action, however, is not a complete, human individual.

The Problems of Barth's Alexandrian Thinking

The limitations of Barth's concept of the divinity of Christ are most apparent at the point of his greatest strengths. It must be asked whether Barth's emphasis upon the divinity of Christ does sufficient justice to his humanity. While it is clear that Barth insists upon the affirmation that the eternal Son became man, it is not clear to what extent Barth can say that Jesus Christ is an ordinary man as other men are.

Because God is identical with Christ in the full sense of the term "identical" and because the bearer of the human nature of Jesus is God himself and not simply a man, the full humanity of Christ is brought into question. Although it is difficult to know precisely all that Barth intends by the concept "bearer," it is clear that other men are the bearers of their human nature, while in the case of Jesus Christ there is no purely human bearer. The bearer is God and only God.

Although Barth does not follow Apollinarius by abstracting some "part" of humanity, such as the mind, and arguing that the mind of the humanity was replaced by the mind of God in the incarnation, his claim that Jesus Christ is the divine rather than the human bearer of his humanity has an Apollinarian appearance. A human element that normally is found in existing men is not present in Jesus Christ.[1]

Although Barth grants to the human nature of Jesus Christ a certain degree of independence, in that it can obey and serve the Son and his divine nature, it is difficult to see how this human nature could fail to obey and serve God. Since the human nature comes into being only because God begins to act humanly and since the human nature exists only as the form of revelation, without having an independent existence, it seems to be merely an aspect or a part of God's being and act. It is so integrally taken up and assumed into God's being that its purely human existence is denied. In the final analysis, the degree of independence which the human nature has is extremely slight. It serves and attests God because God determines it to be that which serves and attests him.[1]

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[1] Pittenger, pp. 114, 219, argues that Alexandrian thought tends to make God the center of Jesus' activity, obliterating the purely human center of consciousness and activity. Insofar as Alexandrian thought obscures the human center of consciousness and activity, it has a tendency toward Apollinarianism.

See also Hathaway, p. 115, who asks this question: doesn't Barth's "christology fail exactly because *as* man Jesus Christ is not *a* man? Or, more precisely for the Barthian formulation, Jesus Christ is only *a* man as *man*, His objectivity and particularity consisting precisely in this being the *humanum* of all men *for* them, on their behalf and in their stead." I have taken the liberty of removing a misplaced comma from Hathaway's text.

The obedience of the human nature to the eternal Son, as we have noted, is analogous to the obedience of the body to the soul of a human person and also to the obedience of the Son to the Father in the inner-trinitarian life. In these instances, two distinct individuals are not necessary. The obedience is the obedience that occurs within one person. Concomitantly, the independence of the "two" which is presupposed by this inner obedience is considerably less in degree than the independence of one person from another. The human nature of Jesus Christ is so inherently related to him and so disposed to his control that we cannot conceive how it could be said that he was really tempted, much less actually moved to commit sin. Thus, for Barth, the claim that Jesus Christ was tempted cannot be systematically correlated with the fact that he is the Son of God.[2]

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[1] For example, see Barth's talk of the human nature as the "organ," the "clothing," and the "temple," of the eternal Son of God. CD 4/2, pp. 96, 101 (KD, pp. 106-111).

[2] CD 1/2, pp. 158-59 (KD, p. 173). "The sinlessness of Jesus thus does not admit of a systematic connexion with

Barth also seems to slight the humanness of Christ in other ways. Although he states that Jesus Christ has limited knowledge and can be anxious, these features of Jesus play no significant role in Christ's revealing activity. While the one Jesus Christ reveals through both natures, he reveals in spite of his human nature. The human nature actually veils God's revelation. It is basically the same story with respect to reconciliation. God performs this function primarily through his divine nature. It is because God is present that man is justified. Justification and reconciliation occur because of God's decision that the human nature be exalted. The human nature simply acquiesces with God's action.

Jesus' human characteristics contribute little to Barth's understanding of Jesus' life as a man. There is no significant attention given, for example, to Jesus' growing awareness of God in his life or to the fact that his beliefs and ideas about God may have changed over time. Jesus' faith is treated as a constant, and it is interpreted through the claim that the human nature attests and serves the divine nature at every moment. The actual form

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the fact that here a true man had a serious struggle, but only of establishment and acknowledgment in its historical connexion with that fact. He who struggled here and won is He who was bound to win, He who when He entered the contest had already won. He really had no awareness of sin. That is the truth of the vere Deus."

of the service of Jesus' human nature is not related specifically to the ideas, teachings, feelings or actions of Jesus as a man.

Similarly, the humanity of Christ appears to play a minimal role in the relation of Christians to Christ. Barth's affirmation that Jesus Christ is always "for" men rather than merely "with" them seems to make it difficult for Christians to feel that he is completely their brother. Further, since Christ cannot really be tempted, it is clear that he cannot experience the human situation exactly as other men who can be tempted. The relation of Christians to Christ is characterized more by obedience and worship than by comradeship.[1]

We have looked now at the problem of the importance of the human nature in Barth's Alexandrian christology. At this point, we turn to the question of the theoretical justification for predicating divinity to a creaturely reality. Although Barth places an extraordinary emphasis upon the divinity of Christ and the uniqueness of that divinity, the fact that he speaks of the divinity of the Bible and proclamation in the way that he does poses a threat to his treatment of the divinity of Christ. If it is proper to affirm the divinity of the Bible and proclamation because of their participation in revelation, it would apparently also be proper to affirm the divinity of a purely human person if he were to become the medium through which God speaks. As a result, if Jesus were considered to be a purely human person in an Antiochian sense, it would appear to be permissible, even on Barthian grounds, to ascribe divinity to him, should God speak through him in a moment of revelation.

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[1] CD 3/2, p. 243 (KD, p. 291). While Barth describes "humanity as a being of man with others," he argues that "only the humanity of Jesus can be absolutely exhaustively and exclusively described as a being for man. There can be no question of a total being for others as the determination of any other men but Jesus. And to the humanity of other men there necessarily belongs reciprocity. . . . [but] reciprocity cannot arise in the humanity of Jesus with its irreversible 'for.'" For a discussion of the difficulties of Barth's position on this issue, see Ogletree, pp. 175-78.

By speaking of the divinity of the Bible and proclamation in the way that he does, Barth deprives himself of an argument that Alexandrian thought might use to oppose Antiochian formulations. That is, he cannot argue that it is improper to speak of the divinity of creatures who merely participate in revelation. By incorporating this element of Antiochian thought in respect to the Bible and proclamation, he raises the question whether divinity should be attributed to Jesus on the same basis.

The fact that divinity can be ascribed to the Bible and proclamation because of their participation in God's speaking indicates that Barth's polemic against Ebionitism and Docetism does not necessarily apply directly to Antiochian thought. Barth argues that Ebionitism attributes divinity to a mere man with an impressive personality. Because of the disciples' veneration of this man, Ebionitism supposes, the equation between him and God becomes a possibility, although it is a slight exaggeration. Docetism is willing to call Jesus "Son of God" and "God" because he is the vehicle of a lofty idea. In both cases, divinity is ascribed to a mere man, according to Barth, and therefore they are guilty of idolatry.[1] This might appear to be a devastating criticism of Antiochian thought, since Antiochian thought conceives of Jesus as a ordinary man. However, if Barth's polemic against Ebionitism and Docetism is effective opposition to the attribution of divinity to any finite reality, it is also effective oppostion to Barth's own attribution of divinity to the Bible and proclamation.

Barth's emphasis upon the divinity of Christ and the way he conceives the human nature of Christ also seem to mitigate the significance of the existence of other men. Barth states that Jesus Christ is a man, but he is a man in a unique sense. He is the one man who is the true actualization of human essence and in whom all other men have their true being. Other men do not exist so much alongside of Jesus Christ as within him. Furthermore, their existence in him is a transformed existence; they are brought into conformity with God's will and therefore into fellowship with God.[1] In the final analysis, sin is rejected. This raises the question of the reality and value of the lives of men now, as they are influenced by sin. Put another way, this question asks whether Barth provides sufficient distinctions within the one whole reality which is Jesus Christ. For example, is the theologically necessary distinction between God and men finally collapsed through the notion that men have their being only in Christ.[2]

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[1] See CD 1/1, pp. 460-65 (KD, pp. 422-26).

The significance of the existence of all men is threatened not only by the fact that they have their true existence in Christ, it is also obscured by Barth's claim that the human nature which the Son assumed in the incarnation has no independent existence. Since the human nature which the Son assumed is the human nature of all men, and since this human nature has no independent existence, it is difficult to see how the many persons who are assumed in and with the assumption of the human nature of Jesus can have an independent existence.[1] Barth does affirm that other men, in contrast to Jesus, exist independently of God. This is how other men differ from Jesus. But since all men exist in and through the particular humanity which has no independent existence, the grounds for affirming that all men other than Jesus exist independently remain unclear. In other words, if all men exist in a humanity that has no independent existence, how can these men exist independently?

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[1] CD 3/2, pp. 157-62 (KD, pp. 188-93); CD 4/2, pp. 270-75, 516 (KD, pp. 299-305, 584). For discussions of this issue, see Hathaway, pp. 114-19, and Jenson, Alpha and Omega, pp. 130-40.

[2] For a list of pertinent questions as to whether Barth has provided sufficient distinctions in the one whole Jesus Christ, see Jenson, God after God, pp. 74-78.

Not only does Barth's concept of the divinity of Jesus Christ as the act which includes all men threaten the independent reality of men, the claim that this act occurs eternally in God seems to make its occurrence *ad extra* in time unnecessary. Because God's decision is his being, his decision to become a man is not a mere plan in the manner of the plans of men. God's plan is executed in its planning, and therefore it is real in the strictest sense. Thus, Jesus Christ is already present as man before creation. Of course, Barth's distinction between God's act *ad intra* and his act *ad extra* is not intended to be a distinction between two acts. It is intended rather to guarantee God's freedom. Nevertheless, the positing of this distinction renders it difficult to supply a reason for God's act *ad extra*. Everything has already happened in God, and therefore God's act *ad extra* seems to have no inherent value. If Jesus' real life, and ours as well, is lived eternally with God prior to his becoming a man in time, how could his life in time be very important?[1]

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[1] Barth states that the assumption of the human nature in the incarnation is the assumption of the human nature of all men. At the same time, it is the assumption of all men themselves. See CD 4/2, p. 59 (KD, pp. 63-64). "In His being as man God has implicitly assumed the human being of all men. In Him not only we all as *homines*, but our *humanitas* as such--for it is both His and ours--exist in and with God Himself."

Conclusion

In this thesis we have argued that Barth's christology is Alexandrian rather than Antiochian. To show that there is a need for investigating this issue, we have demonstrated that reputable scholars disagree over it, and we have specified considerable evidence which can be given for each hypothesis. To provide a basis for determining which view is correct, we have proposed criteria for recognizing Alexandrian and Antiochian ways of thinking, and we have shown that these characterizations can be given historical support. Further, we have focused upon three issues which have been crucial in past debates between these two ways of doing theology and which are also involved in current debates over Barth's theology; they are the deity of Christ, the unity of his person, and the use of the name "Jesus Christ" and its variants.

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[1] Jenson, *God after God*, p. 173, argues that Barth makes God a God of the past. See also his discussion of Barth's concept of Jesus as the eternity of God, pp. 70, 151-54.

The Antiochian interpretation argues that Barth understands the man Jesus as a complete, human person who is distinct from God. Jesus is said to be divine because he participates in God's revelatory event as the medium through which God speaks. Because of his unique relation to God, the characteristics of God can be ascribed to him, although they actually belong only to God. In the Antiochian view, although the man Jesus does not exist before the incarnation, in that event he comes into existence as a creature distinct from God but united with him in a personal unity. This unity is personal in the sense that it involves two persons, Jesus of Nazareth and the Son of God. Similarly, the Antiochian interpretation of Barth thinks that Barth normally uses such terms as "Jesus" and "Son of Man" to denote the human person and such terms as "Son of God" or "Word of God" to denote the divine person.

The evidence for the Antiochian interpretation of Barth revolves around those factors in his thought which seem to emphasize the independence of the man Jesus and his human nature from God. Chief among these are Barth's characterization of the human nature as possessing its own will, personality, and self-consciousness; his inclusion of the man Jesus and his human nature among the forms of revelation which are creaturely and not God; his emphasis upon the concepts of fellowship and confrontation in his treatment of the doctrine of the union of the two natures; and his apparent use of "Jesus" and its variants to denote a person who is distinct from God.

The Alexandrian interpretation concludes that Barth means that Jesus Christ is essentially divine as the Father and the Holy Spirit are divine. As the second "person" of the trinity, Jesus Christ is God's act of speaking and also the Word which God speaks to himself and to mankind. Jesus Christ elects to become man and reconcile men to himself, and in the incarnation he assumes the human nature of all men. While this human nature has a degree of independence and is related to God in obedience and fellowship, it is not an individual person in itself. Further, in the Alexandrian interpretation, "Jesus Christ" and its variants refer to one person not two, although they connote various aspects of his being and action.

The evidence for the Alexandrian interpretation of Barth revolves around the factors in his thought which emphasize the oneness of Jesus Christ with God. The most important of these are Barth's identification of Jesus Christ's act and being with the act and being of God, his development of the concept of the trinity from the event of revelation, his account of the two moments in the deity of Christ, his denial that the human nature has an independent existence, his claim that the bearer of Christ's human nature

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is God, and his use of "man Jesus" and similar terms to denote one who is by nature divine.

The Antiochian interpretation of Barth can scarcely incorporate Barth's claim that the man Jesus is by nature divine without resorting to the assumption that Barth uses "Jesus" and similar terms equivocally, to denote both God and a man. This conclusion strains credulity, however, for it suggests that Barth attempts to avoid making a choice between two alternatives by resorting to obscurities.

On the other hand, the Alexandrian interpretation of Barth can assimilate both the claim of Christ's essential deity and also the basic elements of the Antiochian view. The Alexandrian interpretation can admit, for example, that Jesus Christ is completely a human person, that he has limited resources, that he responds to God in obedience, and that he is the form through which God reveals himself. However, the Alexandrian stresses that although Jesus Christ is all these things as man, he does not abandon his original and eternal divinity. While as man he is other than God, as God he is by nature divine. In Barth's christology, the Antiochian elements are found within a perspective that is basically Alexandrian. For Barth, Jesus is God himself, and therefore "Jesus" is God's name.

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